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Abstract 
It is claimed that the transformation of business support services through some form of 
‘externalization’ mechanism such as the shared service center (SSC) model can drive 
down costs and enhance functionality. A key characteristic of the SSC’s rationale is its 
ability change by replicate the characteristics of third-party outsourcing, whilst also 
retaining overall management control within the boundaries of the organization. In such 
a market-oriented model, it should follow that a key feature of an SSC is the recharging 
of its costs to its customers, the business facing operational units. Yet, in offering a 
hybrid solution combining characteristics of market and hierarchy, it could be expected 
that the recharging for support services will seek to combine the tenets of both market-
orientated transfer pricing with cost allocation methods traditionally associated with 
internal cost centers.  
 
The motivation of this study is the increasing prevalence of the SSC model amongst 
large organizations in the face of a relative paucity of contemporary literature on 
transfer pricing and cost allocation in new organizational forms, especially the SSC 
model. The central theme of this study is to explore the recharging mechanisms applied 
by different SSCs and their organizational effects in terms of balancing market 
coordination between the SSC and its customers and top management control. 
 
Three case studies were undertaken to explore how SSCs recharge the costs for the 
finance function as a business support services and the effects on managerial behaviors 
of both the SSC and business units. Drawing on theory of organizational structure, 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theory, a conceptual framework was 
constructed to guide the analysis of the empirical evidence. 
 
The findings of this study include:1) The choice of recharging method can be either 
transfer pricing approach (direct recharge) or cost allocation (indirect recharge), 
contingent upon; the governance orientation of each organization, asset specificity and 
extent of transactions, uncertainty and opportunism and bounded rationality. 2) 
Mandating the choice of recharging mechanism given the asymmetric bargaining power 
between the SSC and the head office could cause agency problems within the 
organizations, although this could be mitigated by transparency of information, 
appropriate coordination mechanisms, and performance measurement based on 
mutually agreed budget targets. 3) Recharging mechanism is fluid over time and in one 
of the cases (i.e. DHL Express) it is found that the transfer pricing can be used in the 
first stages of SSC implementation to drive change, but on maturity there is a reversion 
to broad brush cost allocation to better enable overall system optimization with reduced 
transaction costs. 
 
Keywords: shared service centers, transaction costs economics, agency theory, 
transfer pricing, cost allocation, case study. 
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Terminology 
Shared Service Centre (SSC)  
“Shared service is a collaborative strategy in which a subset of existing business 
functions are concentrated into a new, semi-autonomous, business unit that has a 
management structure designed to promote efficiency and value customers of the parent 
corporation, like a business competing in the open market” (Bergeron, 2003).   
Function-Based organization 
A medium to large organization within which support activities are grouped into 
departments along the lines of professional disciplines such as finance, human 
resources, IT and procurement.  
Multi-divisional organization (M-form) 
An organization with several semi-autonomous divisions under the overall control of a 
central management board.  
Cost 
The amount of cash or cash equivalent paid or the fair value of other consideration 
given to acquire an asset at the time of its acquisition or construction (IAS 16). 
Cost allocation 
“To assign a whole item of cost, or of revenue to a single cost unit center, account or 
time period” (Eaton, 2005). 
Price 
The payment that given by one party to exchange for a good or service. It is normally 
expressed in the units of currency.  
Transfer price 
The price of the product transferred from one segment of an organization to another 
segment of the same organization (Horngren and Foster, 1987).  
Divisions 
A business unit within a larger organization, usually multi-divisional organization, that 
has a significant degree of autonomy and being responsible for developing and 
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marketing their own products/services, also referred as strategic business units (Eaton, 
2005)  
Departments 
Productive or other support service units operating as a cost centers in a function-based 
(U-form) organization.    
Recharging Process 
How the SSCs recharging for the support services it provides, including the frequency 
of recharging, recharging targets,  
Recharging method 
The way the SSCs recharges for the support service it provides, either through transfer 
pricing approach (recharge directly) or cost allocation approach (recharge indirectly), 
by using actual or budgeted numbers.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the 1980s, there has been a trend for organizations to transform business support 
services through some form of ‘externalization’ mechanism such as the Shared Service 
Center (SSC) model (Ernst and Young, 2011). It is claimed that this process of 
unbundling support activities from divisions and then centralizing them into a semi-
autonomous business unit can help to both drive down costs, improve service quality, 
and more generally enhance the functionality of discipline-based activities such as 
finance, IT, HR and procurement (Herbert and Seal, 2012). A key plank in the 
reconfiguration of many finance functions is the creation of an SSC both to aggregate 
work to achieve economies of scale and scope and to drive the process of change by 
introducing a sense of a market-discipline, underpinned by the SSC recharging its 
service activities to its customer divisions. 
From a wider perspective, the SSC model could be regarded as a significant re-
configuration of a multi-divisional corporation (Sako, 2006; Helper and Sako, 2010; 
Gospel and Sako, 2010). 
The Multi-divisional firm (MDF) as articulated by Chandler (1962) seeks to combine 
central control and coordination across the organization with the discipline of markets 
in ‘local’ business units (Williamson, 1975). The aim is to optimize operational 
efficiency and organizational effectiveness. In line with this thinking, the SSC is 
positioned as a hybrid governance model that has a market orientation, on one hand, 
balanced with ongoing hierarchical control on the other hand (Herbert and Seal, 2012). 
As a new organizational form, the SSC offers an important contribution, to the 
transformation of professional functions that have, hitherto, been of a role-based, 
bureaucratic, leaning, although the concept is still relatively new and academic research 
in this field is only just starting to emerge.  
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According to Porter's value chain (Porter, 1985), activities can be split into two groups: 
primary activities that directly relate to product production, service providing, sales and 
delivery; and secondary activities that include financial, human resources, technology 
and procurement activities. Secondary activities, such as finance, complements the 
fulfillment of primary activities. In most management accounting textbooks (e.g. 
Horngren and Foser, 1987; Drury, 2008; Garrison and Noreen, 2000; Kaplan and 
Atkinson, 2000), the costs associated with primary activities are usually direct costs 
which could be traced to a cost object. For example, one unit of finished goods might 
require one kilogram of a particular material or in the case of service requires one hour 
of labor. However, unlike direct costs, the costs associated with secondary activities are 
normally indirect and generally cannot be attributed to specific goods or services. 
Secondary activities are undertaken by support service departments/divisions and 
typically benefit multiple types of finished goods/services. For instance, financial 
services are provided across the organization, no matter which production 
line/department it benefits and its cost is usually treated as divisional overheads, or 
central costs. The latter can either be absorbed by the head office or be reallocated to 
different departments/divisions by using management accounting techniques, such as 
activity-based costing or a more broad-brush basis of cost allocation. In this 
circumstance, support service activities are framed as a cost allocation problem. 
Whilst, ostensibly, just another central department, but an SSC actually operates as a 
semi-autonomous center within a company, the recharging of a support service should 
no longer be a pure cost allocation issue but alternatively, reflect a more market-based 
mechanism by adopting a transfer pricing strategy. However, in practice, the recharging 
of internal support services generally captures the characteristics of both cost allocation 
and transfer pricing (Scrace and Mcauley, 1997).  
This research will focus on the organizational context of SSCs and the finance function, 
in particular, to investigate the nature and practical application of recharging 
mechanisms to recharge the cost of support services and the behavioral implications for 
both the SSC and client business units. In doing this the thesis will synthesize the twin 
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literature of cost allocation and transfer pricing to develop a theoretical basis for 
exploring the functioning of recharging mechanisms implemented by SSCs in practice.1 
The next section: 1.2, will briefly discuss cost allocation and transfer pricing issues in 
traditional organizations. Following that, the nature and context of the SSC within the 
MDF will be introduced. Section 1.3 will define the research problems and explain the 
purpose of this research. The chapter closes with the explanation of the structure of this 
thesis.  
 
1.2 Cost allocation and transfer pricing in traditional 
organizations 
Cost allocation is a pervasive topic in management accounting partly because it is 
driven by the need for inventory valuation as a part of statutory financial reporting, and 
partly because knowledge of the full cost of products/services is required to set external 
prices, and also to establish internal transfer prices and inventory valuations for 
performance evaluation via management accounts. Thus, cost allocation drives 
managerial behaviors (Zimmerman, 1979; Kaplan and Welam, 1974; Horngren, 1977). 
In addition to the notion of evaluation based on allocated costs, transfer pricing (TP) 
seeks to set a ‘fair’ economic price for products/services supplied internally and this 
should improve performance evaluation and central decisions about resource allocation 
between divisions. In theory, the use of market prices and market freedom enables 
business units to buy from outside if services/products are available at a better value. 
Thus, business behaviors on the part of business units and the potentially supplying 
units reflect market principles more closely and thus, should lead to better cost 
consciousness in resource consumption. Cost allocation tends to assume that business 
units are mandated to buy internally in the interest of the wider organization 
                                            
1 Although the transfer pricing and cost allocation could also be synthesized in the internal transactions 
of tangible goods, this study will focus on recharging mechanism applied in the context of support 
services.  
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acknowledgment of the value transferred. Cost allocation and transfer pricing 
approaches tend to be treated as two individual topics in teaching materials and 
academic research of management accounting. The next two sections will explain these 
two topics (i.e. cost allocation and transfer pricing) as a prelude to considering how 
they might both contribute to the hybrid governance structure of the SSC model.  
 
1.2.1 Cost allocation  
Cost allocation is a key topic in most management accounting textbooks (Horngren and 
Foser, 1987; Drury, 2008; Garrison and Noreen, 2000; Kaplan and Johnson, 1987). 
Overheads and common costs are not directly associated with the production of final 
goods or services but rather they ensure the enablement of operations within the 
business such as the cost of administration. These overheads are usually assigned to a 
final product or service by using either the traditional or activity-based costing method 
(Drury, 2008). Most textbooks focus on the technical skills of performing cost 
allocation calculations (Garrison and Noreen, 2000; Drury, 2008) whilst academic 
papers link cost allocation with performance measures (Balachandran and 
Ramakrishnan, 1982); the concept of fairness (Chua, Mak and Hooper, 2001) and the 
role of agency theory in encouraging good organizational behaviors (Zimmerman, 
1979).  
Cost allocation is not just a necessary step needed to accurately calculate the full cost 
of a product for profit measurement, but it is also a tool used to fairly measure 
departmental or divisional performance and a “useful device for controlling and 
motivating managers” (Zimmerman, 1979). However, there are relatively few studies 
that focus on the organizational effects of cost allocation (Zimmerman, 1979; Ahmed 
and Scapens, 2000; Rogerson, 1997; Modell, 2002). According to such articles, costs 
incurred by an SSC should be shared fairly across those departments or divisions that 
benefit from its common services. If these costs are not directly recharged to the 
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customers but alternatively absorbed by the head office, i.e. treated a cost allocation 
issue, and thus, one might not expect the same level of cost consciousness (and 
therefore good behaviors) on the part of divisional managers as they will not be able to 
so readily appreciate the causal linkages between their demands on the SSC’s activities 
and the overall cost to the company. Equally, the SSC’s managers have little incentives 
to manage their own cost base because the division has no discretion to buy from 
elsewhere.  
 
1.2.2 Transfer pricing  
Transfer pricing theory developed to explain how a ‘fair’ charge could be applied to 
make a division value the products/services they receive from internal sources 
(Horngren and Foster, 1987) within an MDF (Chandler, 1962). TP is typically applied 
when one division transfers tangible goods to another division but is also appropriate 
when support services are transferred between divisions, or between a central support 
function, say, finance and a business facing division (Thomas, 1980).  
There have been a number of conceptual transfer pricing studies conducted in the last 
few decades, addressing topics such as the purpose of using transfer pricing (Spicer, 
1988); determinants of transfer pricing change (Boyns, Edwards and Emmaunel, 
1999) ; relative benefits of applying transfer pricing (Mcaulay and Tomkins, 1992); 
single or dynamic transfer pricing model (Eccles, 1985) and organizational view of 
transfer pricing (Watson & Baumler, 1975; Meer-Kooistra, 1994; Swieringa & 
Waterhouse, 1982). Some researchers (e.g. Borkowski, 1990, 1992, 1997; Tang, 1992, 
1980; Cravens and Shearon, 1996, Adler, 1996, Banke & Edwards, 1980) have 
collected empirical data and used quantitative methods such as surveys to find out the 
transfer pricing methods chosen by organizations in practice. After realizing the 
knowledge-practice gap in transfer pricing, and in response to the call for conducting 
research in an organizational context (Scapens, 1990, Kaplan, 1986), case studies were 
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undertaken by academic researchers since the 1980s (Eccles, 1985; Colbert and Spicer, 
1995; Perera, McKinnon and Harrison, 2003). These studies generally focused on 
transfer pricing methods and linked these to 1) the administrative process; 2) behavior 
context and 3) transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985).  
In the wake of globalization, intra-firm transactions across national borders have 
increased significantly in the past 20 years. For example, intra-firm trade2 accounted 
for 42% of US international trade in goods in 2004 (Akram, Khan, and Holladay, 2007) 
and the trade between affiliated organizations in European Union and the United States 
accounted for 50% of total merchandise trade between these two sides in 2012 (Lakatos 
and Fukui, 2013). This phenomenon has focused the attention of both academic 
researchers and consultants on international transfer pricing (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 
2003; Clausing, 2000; Baldenius, Melumad and Reichelstein, 2004; Sikka and 
Willmott, 2010; Rossing and Rohde, 2010). For instance, Sikka and Willmott (2010) 
provided evidence to show how some organizations used transfer pricing practices to 
avoid tax.   
Although academic papers and consulting reports in transfer pricing reflect a wide 
range of perspectives, relatively few have provided an in-depth understanding of the 
actual implementation process in the organizational context. Moreover, to the best 
knowledge of the researcher, there are no previous studies to explore how this 
management accounting technique is implemented in the context of the SSC model.   
Thus, the purpose of this study is to explore the recharging process for support services 
provided by SSCs. In order to gain an in-depth understanding of this process, cost 
allocation and transfer pricing issues will be discussed in the SSC context. The next 
section will explain the context of this research.  
 
                                            
2 Intra-firm transactions are the transactions between affiliates of one company or between an affiliate 
and the parent company account for a large amount of total trade. 
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1.3 The context of this research—Shared Service Centre 
(SSC) 
Since the first shared service center (SSC) was set up in the US in 1986 (a Client 
Business Service of The General Electric Company), this new organizational form has 
been a great success (Ernst and Young, 2011) and there is a general trend nowadays to 
unbundle business support activities from divisions and aggregate those activities into 
a common shared service center within large MDF, see figure 1.1 
 
Figure 1.1. Organizational structure of the SSC model (Herbert and Seal, 2012) 
A report by Ernst and Young (2011) claimed that over 80% of multi-national companies 
had established their own SSC(s). A similar report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
(2011) claimed that over half (59%) of the respondent organizations in their survey had 
increased their reliance on in-house shared service deliveries. Most of the organizations 
with SSCs had set up them primarily to reduce costs, although many reported that they 
had also benefitted from better system compliance, more effective service to customers, 
and the opportunity to fundamentally re-engineer administration processes and enforce 
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corporate-wide standardization of systems and procedures (PwC, 2011). See Janssen 
and Joha (2006) for ‘serendipitous’ benefits arising from an SSC implementation in the 
public sector.   
The success of the SSC model not only attracts the interests of consulting companies 
but also academic researchers, who have discussed the benefits and challenges of 
setting up SSC, the motives of setting up SSC and how to achieve success with SSC 
model (Meijerink and Bondarouk, 2013; Aksin and Masini, 2008; Janssen and Joha, 
2006; Gospel and Sako, 2010).  
As a semi-autonomous division within a company, an SSC would be expected to 
recharge its customer divisions for the support services they receive for several reasons. 
First, to demonstrate that its operational costs had been allocated fairly to business 
facing units and thus, were included in the full economic cost when decisions about 
selling prices are made. Second to reflect the actual value of the service against a 
benchmark market price (Lynch, 2011). Third, to evaluate properly the SSC’s 
performance and that of the receiving divisions within the organization. Fourth, to 
encourage good behaviors on the part of management in both SSC and other divisions 
(Deloitte,2006) and thus, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall 
organization (KPMG, 2007). Fifth, to provide cost information on the SSC to the top 
management for monitoring the performance of the SSC, especially against potential 
third-party BPO vendors. Finally, to set competitive prices if the SSC the capacity to 
provide services to external customers. (see Quinn, Cooke, and Kris, 2000; Bergeron, 
2003). 
Yet, there is relatively little academic research that has focused on setting prices or 
recharging for the support services provided by SSC (Carlsson and Schurmann, 2004; 
Goold, Pettier and Young, 2001). Perhaps this is not surprising as it is a difficult issue 
for even the most experienced organization with significant experience in SSCs 
(Deloitte, 2006). On the other hand, authors with a practitioner background have been 
more proactive in making suggestions about recharging processes in the SSC. For 
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example, Quinn, Cooke, and Kris (2000) defined four stages of SSC and suggested 
different recharging mechanisms at each stage. In the first (basic consolidation) and 
second (marketplace) stages, they suggested services ought to be absorbed by the head 
office or recharged out to simply recover fully-loaded costs based on actual activity. 
When the SSC reaches the third (advanced market place) stage, they recommended 
market-based pricing (using external benchmarks) and if the SSC operates as an 
independent business which is the final stage, the recharging mechanism should be cost 
plus profit. The basic recharging mechanism is associated with common cost allocation 
problems in management accounting while the recharging mechanisms in the advanced 
market place stage and independent business stage are relevant to transfer pricing.  
Cost allocation and transfer pricing are both key topics in management accounting 
textbooks but are invariably addressed as separate issues. Cost allocation is argued to 
be highly firm-specific and it is difficult to determine general rules (Zimmerman, 1979). 
A majority of accounting literature especially, management accounting textbooks adopt 
a normative stance and focus on the discussion of technical issues with regard to cost 
allocation. Only a few academic researchers link cost allocation with organizational 
factors such as 1) why firms persist in allocating costs? (Zimmerman, 1979; Fremgen 
and Liao, 1981; Ramadan, 1989) and 2) behavioral effects of allocating costs (Kaplan, 
1977; Horngren and Foster, 1987; Zimmerman, 1979). In terms of transfer pricing, 
academic scholars have previously tended to emphasize the importance of linking 
transfer pricing with organizational factors, although from around the 1980s, attention 
has been shifting towards international transfer pricing and the more specific issues of 
allocating ‘fair’ production costs in the computation of tax across a multi-national 
organization’s various local taxation domains. As a consequence, updated studies of 
cost allocation and transfer pricing in organizational contexts have been somewhat 
neglected, especially case studies that are concerned with explaining both cost 
allocation and transfer pricing in an individual organizational context such as the SSC. 
This research seeks to fill this gap in the academic literature and seek to gain an in-
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depth understanding of the recharging process for support service provided by SSC. 
The purpose and aims of this research will be explained in the next section.  
1.4 Research Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the process of applying the recharging 
mechanisms in an SSC environment and to evaluate its effect on managerial behaviors 
in the customer business units and within the SSC itself. Whether the SSC has the 
authority to apply a recharging mechanism and which recharging mechanism is chosen 
depends on the level of authority delegated to the SSC and in turn, is implemented by 
strategy, structure and governance mechanism of the individual organization. During 
the recharging process, the amount recharged is linked to measurement of 
departmental/divisional financial performance. For example, if the service receiving 
divisions consume more of the SSC’s resources, they should be recharged more, 
therefore, the recharging process influences both the divisional performance and 
divisional managers’ behaviors.  
This issue links the twin theories of transfer pricing and cost allocation. In the process 
of discovering the application process of recharging mechanism and exploring its 
influence on managerial behaviors, this research also connects to transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1985) and agency theory. Reviewing existing literature could 
help to build a theoretical framework yet, its verification and development require 
empirical evidence from the real-world to be valid. This enquiry will start from the 
integration of existing theories and then an analysis of the phenomenon observed in the 
empirical world, bearing in mind the identified ‘gap’ between knowledge and practice 
in both cost allocation and transfer pricing. The main contribution of this research is 
the refinement and development of existing theories of cost allocation and transfer 
pricing. 
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This research seeks to answer two questions: 
1. To what extent do SSCs charge their costs to client units? In doing so are 
incurred costs simply allocated on a broad-brush basis, or is a transfer pricing 
mechanism used to position professional support services as an internal 
market? 
2. How does the choice of recharging mechanism effect management behavior in 
the SSC and client divisions?   
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
This introductory chapter has explained the background of support services and defined 
the research questions within the boundaries of the research context. The next stage is 
to review relevant literature (Chapter 2) to provide greater depth in the background 
information and identify any gaps in existing literature or gaps between literature. The 
aim is to ensure that this research can make a theoretical contribution to the field of 
management accounting. As mentioned before, apart from existing literature of transfer 
pricing and cost allocation, this research will also refer to transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985) and agency theory to build the conceptual framework to provide 
guidance for the empirical research, which will be discussed in Chapter 3. In order to 
answer the research questions, it is necessary to develop on an appropriate methodology 
to guide the empirical work. Crotty (1998) defined four elements of research 
methodology: the epistemology informing the research, the philosophical paradigm of 
research, the plan of research actions, and the particular techniques that will be used. 
Details of these four elements will be discussed in Chapter 4, which will provide the 
guidance for the next research stage. Some qualitative research techniques such as 
interviews and documents analysis will be used for data collection, the reasoning behind 
each will be explained in Chapter 4. The research design and structure of the thesis is 
summarized in the following figure:  
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Figure 1.2 Thesis structure 
Chapter 5, 6 and 7 will each start with the descriptive information of the case 
organizations and the recharging mechanisms applied in their SSCs. The cross-case 
analysis and refined theory and/or framework will be discussed in Chapter 8. This thesis 
will end with some conclusions which will also elaborate on both the contributions and 
limitation of this research in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review of recharging 
mechanism 
2.1 Introduction  
In his book Competitive Advantage, Michael Porter (1985) presents a value-chain 
framework based on a process view of the organization. The idea is that organizations 
are converting inputs such as money, labor, materials, etc. into outputs which are final 
products or services for sale. The value of the final product or service is created and 
incrementally added across the value chain. Typically, there are hundreds of different 
sub-activities in the overall conversion process which Porter splits into two process 
streams: primary activities and secondary activities, as shown in Figure 2.1. Primary 
activities are those activities that physically produce final products, delivery services or 
are associated with sales, delivery and the after-sales service. Popesko (2009) argued 
these activities are to "satisfy external demands" (p. 92). Secondary activities, also 
referred to as support activities, cover financial, human resource, technology and 
procurement activities, etc., which create the conditions to ensure the primary activities 
proceed successfully and effectively (Porter and Millar, 1985). Unlike primary 
activities which focus on the end product and the needs of the customer, fulfilling 
internal customers' requirements is the first priority of secondary activities. 
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Figure 2.1 Porter’s value chain (1985) 
There has been a significant amount of attention from both academic researchers and 
practicing managers directed to finding ways to maximize organizational profitability. 
primarily by increasing sales and/or sales margin or reducing costs. Up to around 1940s, 
primary activities such as the purchasing of raw materials and direct labor costs 
accounted for over 90% of the total cost (Glad and Becker, 1995). The focus of 
management accounting research at that time was to control these direct costs by 
reducing wastage or introducing new inventory control techniques. Since the 1940s 
there has been a considerable reduction of the proportion of direct costs as a percentage 
of total cost as many labor-intensive operations have been either automated or 
subcontracted to specialist third-party suppliers. Hence, the structure of an 
organization's total costs has become more complex and generally more ‘fixed' in 
nature. Nowadays, supporting service-related costs typically accounts for 
approximately 40% of the total costs of a manufacturing business (Popesko, 2009). To 
cope with these changes, the focus of both academic scholars and managers has shifted 
from how to further reduce manufacturing costs and customers service costs to how to: 
a) accurately allocate support service costs and b) lower them.  
Setting up an SSC is a popular way to further reduce the cost of support service and is 
employed by many organizations (Ernst and Young, 2011; PwC, 2011) and this new 
organizational form will form the main context of this research. 
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As outlined in the previous chapter, the purpose of this research is to investigate the 
functioning of different recharging mechanisms in SSCs and how they might influence 
the managerial behaviors of both service purchasing units and the SSC. In order to 
answer the research questions, this chapter will start with the definition of business 
support services and consider some background knowledge of SSCs, which is discussed 
in section 2.2. According to the definition, an SSC, is a semi-autonomous business unit 
within an organization and the relationship between the SSC and other units is ‘quasi-
commercial’ (Herbert and Seal, 2012). Support services are supplied by the SSC to 
other units within the company, including the transfer of labor costs within this process. 
If an SSC is treated as part of central management then its cost may be held at a 
corporate level. Alternatively, the SSC may allocate its costs across client divisions. 
Finally, if the SSC is regarded as a semi-autonomous business unit within the 
organization and clients have the option to buy services elsewhere or have at least some 
influence over the costs charged then the recharging issue becomes a transfer pricing 
problem. Therefore, recharging for support service provided by SSC could be either 
cost allocation approach or transfer pricing approach. Section 2.3 will critically review 
the literature of both cost allocation and transfer pricing and elaborate its connection 
with the recharging mechanism in an SSC. This chapter will close with a short 
conclusion. 
2.2 The context of this research --The Shared Service Centre 
(SSC) 
2.2.1 Shared Service Centre (SSC)  
Since the 1980s, to increase effectiveness and cut the costs of support services many 
organizations started to pull support service activities out of business-facing units and 
aggregate them into a semi-autonomous shared service center (SSC) (Quinn, Cooke 
and Kris, 2000; Bergeron, 2003). For example, in a traditional M-form organization 
divisionalized by-product (as shown in Figure 2.2), divisional accounting departments 
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would be unbundled and integrated into a new finance SSC. This would then provide 
accounting services to all the product divisions in the same organization (Sako, 2006).  
 
Figure 2.2 The general scheme of an SSC (adapted from Sako, 2006) 
Whilst there have been various examples of sharing services in business and other walks 
of life, the exact origin of the business support SSC model is generally accredited to 
Client Business Service that General Electric set up in the United States in 1986 (Quinn, 
Cooke and Kris, 2000). In recent years, much attention has been given to the costs and 
benefits of setting up so-called captive SSCs (Bergeron, 2003; Janssen and Joha, 2006; 
Johnson and Johnson, 2006; Quinn, Cooke and Kris, 2000). ‘Captive’ denotes that the 
SSC is internal compared to outsourcing from a third-party or joint-SSC/BPO ventures 
and that the SSC is dedicated to a single organization rather than shared between a 
number of entities, a form popular between public services organizations.  
The SSC model captures benefits from both centralization and decentralization styles 
(Bergeron, 2003). It centralizes administrative functions such as finance, purchasing, 
human resources and IT into a geographically separated unit (Wallance, 2011), or does 
this virtually, through remote process control allowed by new communication 
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technologies (Bergeron, 2003). Such unbundling and centralization of administrative 
activities should help to: a) reduce the costs by benefiting from economies of scale, b) 
facilitate process and system standardization and c) achieve a high degree of corporate-
level control (Janssen and Joha, 2006). Centralizing administrative activities into a 
single unit should maintain overall control by corporate management and ensure 
internal cooperation between the SSC and client divisions. However, strengthening the 
control may be at the expense of creating distance between administrators and their 
customers. The SSC model overcomes this by also capturing benefits from 
decentralization. As a separate business, the SSC enjoys a degree of autonomy under 
the corporation umbrella (Janssen and Joha, 2006) by having its own financial budget 
and bottom-line accountability together with a certain degree of the independent 
operation (Bergeron, 2003). With multiple customers demanding better service and 
lower cost, the SSC is also pressured to become more customer-oriented, as external 
companies providing similar services become potential competitors. SSCs put 
customers at the center of their operation and "successful shared service centers leaders 
are working very hard to create a mindset with clients in the core" (Quinn et al., 2000). 
The recognition of local priorities and quick responsiveness to clients’ needs enhance 
its flexibility and effectiveness (Schulman, Dunleavy, Harmer and Lusk, 1999). The 
productivity of an SSC is increased “from standardization of processes on the one hand 
and customized services and solutions on the other” (Sako, 2006, p. 502). Apart from 
the benefits from both centralization and decentralization, other factors that encourage 
so many multinational organizations to set up SSCs include the transparency of cost 
information, more access to expertise, better business performance (Johnson and 
Johnson, 2006; Sako, 2006; Herbert and Seal, 2012; Mareiniak, 2013. Minnaar and 
Vosselam, 2013) and freeing up headquarters and other divisions to focus on the firm’s 
core value-added activities. However, the decision to introduce an SSC into a business 
also implies a level of risk and can be "a critical decision" for managers (Janssen and 
Joha, 2006). The challenges faced by such companies include a) high starting costs for 
unbundling, migrating and centralizing the activities, especially when the SSC is 
offshore, and b) changes to employees' mindset and working cultures (Bergeron, 2003). 
 27 
2.2.2 SSC or outsourcing? 
Since the introduction of the SSC, there have been discussions about the comparison 
with third-party business process outsourcing (BPO) (Gospel and Sako, 2010; Jassen 
and Joha, 2006). Especially, why large multi-national organizations should choose to 
set up their own ‘captive’ SSCs (keep support services in-house), instead of buying 
support services from the open market and from BPO experts who have the expertise 
and experience to achieve radical transformation of the finance function and its cost 
base (for comparison of the two routes see Gospel and Sako, 2010). The most prominent 
theoretical explanation is grounded in the transaction cost economics (TCE) 
perspective.  
TCE can be traced back to 1937 when Coase first introduced the concept of a 
‘transaction cost’ in a framework which sought to explain why firms might perform 
specific economic tasks (Coase, 1937). TCE has become more widely known and 
applied through Williamson’s expansion of the concept. He used the notion of 
transactions having a discernable cost to explain why economic activities are organized 
in a particular way (Spicer, 1988, Williamson, 1975). By breaking transactions down 
into each economic exchange in the market or within the organization Williamson 
argued that in make-or-buy decision firms could choose to mediate transactions by 
introducing an inter-firm or intra-firm contract (Williamson, 2008). Transaction cost is 
never zero (Spicer, 1988) and costs related to transactions favor either making a product 
in-house (hierarchy) or buying it from external providers (market). Minimizing the sum 
of production and transaction costs is one criterion for the head office to consider when 
making make-or-buy decisions. Williamson’s theory identified three characteristics of 
transactions which could influence a firm’s make-or-buy decision: asset specificity, the 
extent of transactions, and uncertainty. As suggested by TCE, support services with 
high asset specificity (high customized activities) would likely be kept in-house whilst 
more routine ones could be outsourced to the third party. Another characteristic is the 
extent of transactions which reflect the volume and frequency of activities. High 
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frequency activities would be more likely to be internalized (transformed into captive 
SSCs) because firms would like to benefit from economies of scale (Colbert and Spicer, 
1995), although it could also be argued that BPO firms might have the expertise to 
better apply automation to such tasks or in the case of more programmable/lower level 
tasks to move the work to lower cost areas offshore. 
Some academic scholars argued that the BPO and SSC approaches are not mutually 
exclusive, as setting up SSCs could be an intermediate step towards off-shoring 
outsourcing. Gospel and Sako (2010) outlined three trajectories regarding offshore 
outsourcing: a) outsourcing to domestic third parties first and then to overseas suppliers, 
b) creating captive offshoring (such as setting up its own SSC), and c) directly switching 
from domestic division providers to foreign suppliers. Among these three trajectories, 
the authors argued that creating an SSC before offshore outsourcing leads to “greater 
retention of capabilities in-house” (Gospel and Sako, 2010). When the transaction cost 
of purchasing similar services in the open market is lower, the company could choose 
to outsource to the third party or process them in-house, i.e. setting up its own semi-
autonomous SSC.  
 
2.3 Recharging for support services 
As a semi-autonomous management unit within an organization, it would be expected 
that "the costs of the services supplied will be charged back to the participating 
divisions" (Herbert and Seal, 2011, p.29). Such recharging enables performance 
measurement of the SSC and its client divisions and hence resource allocation by top 
management. Furthermore, there are a number of other reasons why the recharging 
process of support services provided by an SSC is necessary. 
An SSC can be treated as “a hybrid governance model with features of both market and 
in-house management control” (Herbert and Seal, 2012, p.93). The SSC may face direct 
threats to its existence from BPO vendors or indirectly through benchmarking the cost 
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and quality of services against the BPO sector. Thus, for both transparency and to cover 
the SSC’s operating costs, various factors need to be considered when setting up an 
appropriate cost allocation or transfer pricing strategy. For example, the price that is 
charged to other divisions should reflect the actual value of the service based on market 
factors and may also include uplifts to include a profit element (Lynch, 2011). A 
research by Deloitte (2007) did a survey and laid out so identified some key objectives 
when implementing a recharging mechanism in an SSC, The first objective was 
simplicity and efficiency. Marciniak (2013) agreed with this point, arguing that the 
method should be understandable to both central and divisional managers as the 
recharging mechanism is expected to drive good behaviors and provide valuable 
information for organizational decisions about resource allocation. The incentive for 
good behaviors is also one of the objectives in Deloitte’s report. Additionally, the 
recharging mechanism should be fair to other divisions (Eccles, 1985). As a captive 
SSC is part of the organization, the recharging figure should be fair to customer 
divisions who cannot be expected to pay for services (or a level of service delivery) 
from which they have not been benefiting. The notion of establishing fairness between 
the SSC and the different divisions should improve inter-divisional cooperation and 
thus, benefit the whole organization. Two pre-conditions of fairness are accuracy (in 
terms of charging the correct cost/price based on the service supplied) and transparency. 
The recharging mechanism should be able to accurately measure divisional usage of 
resources and relevant information should be easy to trace. 
The recharging for support services within a simple business or a large MDF 
organization (either function-based or multi-divisional) has traditionally been seen as a 
cost allocation issue. However, if support services are provided by an SSC operating as 
an independent business unit within the organization, then the recharging process 
should include a more market-like mechanism which reflects the characteristics of 
transfer pricing because the support services are internally transferred from one 
business unit to another business unit. 
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2.3.1 Cost allocation  
2.3.1.1 Rationale of cost allocation 
Cost allocation which means allocate central/joint/common costs or general overhead 
to department/divisions/products has existed for a very long time. Although many 
accounting and economic researchers argued that cost allocation is arbitrary and 
unnecessary (Thomas, 1969; Edwards, 1952; Dopuch, 1977), it is still widely used in 
practice for cost control, price setting and performance measurement. Some researchers 
have tried to explain why cost allocation is undertaken despite the reservations of 
academics (Ahmed and Scapens, 2000). For example, Zimmerman (1979) built an 
economic model to answer the question of why rational individuals want to allocate 
costs. He argued that fixed overhead allocation is like a form of a lump-sum tax which 
helps to reduce the scope for divisional management’s ability to spend on perquisites. 
Kaplan (1974) said that desirable behaviors could be induced through the recharging 
process. 
Ramadan’s (1989) sent questionnaires to 296 UK MDF companies to explore the 
rationale for cost allocation practices. He found that the most important reason for 
recharging support service costs was to increase cost consciousness among divisional 
managers and that cost allocation positively influenced the financial performance of 
those divisions that benefit from support services because the payment for support 
services impacts on divisional profitability. Thus, it plays a critical role in performance 
measurement and internal resource allocation. By allocating central costs3, the top 
management can influence the behaviors of divisional managers to “take action in the 
best interests of the company as a whole” (p. 31). Consistent with Zimmerman’s (1979) 
                                            
3 Central costs in Ramadan’s (1989) paper refers the “costs incurred at headquarters level for the benefit of two or 
more components of a company” (p. 31) and it is interchangeable with “common costs”, “corporate indirect costs”, 
“central administrative costs”, “management charge”, “management fees”, “central head office costs” and so on.  
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argument, Ramadan (1989) proved that cost allocation encourages optimal utilization 
of resources.  
Demski (1981) identified three motives for cost allocation; decomposition, motivation 
and coordination. Amershi (1981) found that in the principal-agent setting, the demand 
for cost allocation is evoked. 
2.3.1.2 Activity-based costing 
Support service costs are not only driven by the final production volume or direct labor 
per hour but by the nature of the activity which causes it. It is believed that the use of 
sophisticated activity-based costing (ABC) methods help to increase the accuracy of 
cost calculation whilst also providing managers with insights into how they could 
improve the profitability and performance of the organization (Hussain and 
Gunasekaran, 2012). ABC first allocates support service costs to activities and then 
allocates those costs to the cost objects. For example, cost drivers of internal services 
could be: the number of orders processed; payments made/received; the number of 
credit v. cash customers i.e. requiring account reconciliation, etc. The rate of cost 
drivers is determined by the resource that the cost driver consumes in each transaction. 
Applying the ABC method to internal services can be time-consuming due to the 
amount of data that needs to be gathered and analyzed. On the positive side, it provides 
more accurate information about the organizational performance to the managers and 
it is easier for them to identify activities with scope for improvement and set a more 
appropriate selling price (Drury, 2008; Kaplan, 2000). In the internal SSC, ABC would 
enable fairer and more transparent cost allocation or recharge by transfer pricing. 
 
2.3.2 Transfer pricing 
Chandler (1962) described the nature of those corporations such as General Motors that 
had adopted the Multi-Divisional Form (MDF) whereby semi-autonomous divisions 
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operate within an overall framework that ensures corporate level direction, coordination 
and control purposes, while evaluating the performance of individual business units 
through return on capital employed (ROCE), or variant of that approach. A key tenet 
of managing such divisions and evaluating their performance is that the price of any 
products supplied internally should cover the cost of their supply and a fair economic 
reward for the supplying division. Transfer pricing theory developed to explain how 
receiving divisions could be charged a ‘fair' price for inter-divisional transactions so 
that managers value the products provided (Horngren and Foster, 1987). Traditionally, 
transfer pricing is applied when one division transfers tangible goods to another 
division, but it is also suitable for the situation when service departments charge for the 
business support services they provide (Thomas, 1970). By definition, an SSC is a semi-
autonomous business unit within an organization, thus the support services transferred 
from the SSC to service purchasing departments or divisions may also cause the transfer 
of costs. The recharging for support services provided by the SSC captures the 
characteristics of the transfer pricing theory (Scrace & Mcauley, 1997). The following 
sections will critically review the transfer pricing literature.  
Transfer pricing has attracted significant attention from both academic researchers and 
managers for many decades although, it is still a problem that is considered unsolved 
or even unsolvable (Kozlowska-Makós, 2014). In the early days, academic research 
focused on finding an optimum transfer pricing method to maximize organizational 
profit and identifying the transfer pricing methods chosen by organizations in practice 
(Cravens and Shearon, 1996; Borkowski, 1997; Tang, 1992; Adler, 1996; Banke & 
Edwards, 1980). In the 1980s, a number of researchers (Eccles 1985) drew attention on 
the gap between transfer pricing theory and its application in practice, opening up a 
new stream of research on transfer pricing within a specific organizational context 
(Meer-Kooistra, 1994; Spicer, 1988; Watson and Baumler, 1975; Swieringa and 
Waterhouse, 1982; Eccle, 1985). In recent years, the focus of transfer pricing research 
has shifted to international transfer pricing because lots of organizations have expanded 
their business to different countries in the wake of globalization. International transfer 
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pricing research covers both the application processes within organizations and tax 
issues caused by cross-border income shifting.  
This review of transfer pricing literature contains three sections: a) early research which 
focuses on transfer pricing methods; b) organizational theory of transfer pricing that 
investigates the application process of transfer pricing and its relationship with 
organizational strategy and corporate governance; c) international transfer pricing and 
tax issues.  
2.3.2.1 Transfer pricing methods 
Eccles (1985) reviewed transfer pricing literature and divided early transfer pricing 
researches into four groups: 1) economic theory, 2) mathematical programming, 3) 
accounting theory and 4) management theory. The principle criterion of the first three 
theories is to ensure the profit maximization of the whole organization. Eccles (1985) 
argued that these theories were restricted by their assumptions and their application in 
the empirical world was quite limited. Most transfer pricing researchers that applied 
economic theory, mathematical programming or accounting theory were keen to find 
the optimum transfer price which will motivate selling and buying divisional managers 
to choose the optimal output level which could maximize the profit of the whole 
organization. Conversely, management theory, see transfer pricing as related to 
organizational strategy and the administrative process and the main rationale for 
transfer pricing is not only maximizing organizational profits, but also ensuring 
divisional fairness. Since the focus of this research is the application process of the 
recharging mechanism in an SSC, which is closely linked to the organizational theory 
of transfer pricing, the review of this group of literature will be discussed separately in 
the next section. This section will start by introducing different transfer methods, 
critically reviewing relevant literature including survey results of transfer pricing 
methods chosen by organizations in practice. 
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There are three groups of transfer pricing methods: 1) market-based price which refers 
to the price of the same or similar product in an external market, 2) cost-based price 
which is based on variable cost, marginal cost, opportunity cost or fully loaded cost, 
and 3) negotiated price which is agreed by both the selling division and buying division.  
2.3.2.1.1 Market-based price 
A market-based transfer price should ideally be equal to the price that external 
organizations would charge for an identical, or closely similar, product (Adler, 1996) 
and it is believed to be the most appropriate transfer price if "a perfectly competitive 
market for the intermediate commodity exists" (Hirshleifer, 1956, p.183). Five 
conditions were identified by Solomons (1965), who suggested different transfer 
pricing methods were appropriate to different situations. If a perfectly competitive 
market for intermediate (mid-process) products exists and divisions are free to either 
purchase from or sell their products or services to, outsiders, then a market-price will 
be the most appropriate price for transfer between internal divisions for four reasons. 
First, a market-based transfer price reflects the economic value of products or services 
in the market. Second, the price could be used to benchmark the quality of product or 
service produced internally with that provided by external companies. Third, any supply 
surplus could be sold externally, similarly inventory shortages could be remedied by 
purchase from a third party (Drury, 2008). Finally, the administrative complexity of 
applying this method is low (Solomons, 1965) because in this situation there is no need 
to determine a transfer price and method internally (Eccles, 1985).  
Earlier management accounting literature tended to recommend market-based pricing. 
For example, Cook (1955) who argued that when a division enjoys complete autonomy 
and there exists a visible market for intermediate products, both the selling division and 
buying division should accept any transactions that will increase divisional profits, 
either trading internally or externally because the transfer price is equal to the market 
price. The profits reflected by the contribution in each transaction will also increase the 
profits of the entire organization.  
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However, situations in which the application of market-based transfer price are 
appropriate are not common and this limits its application in practice (Eccles, 1985). 
First, intermediate products are the output from one production process and the input 
of another (Andersson and Fredriksson, 2000) and an external market for intermediate 
products may not always exist. Second, if a market for intermediate products exists, it 
is rare that the market is perfectly competitive (Collier, 2003). Indeed, based on 
Hirshleifer’s (1956) model, if the market is not perfectly competitive, the marginal cost 
of the selling division is more appropriate than the market price. Finally, aside from the 
existence of an external market, both divisions should be free to trade either internally 
or externally in this situation, because the profit of the firm will be maximized in either 
situation (Eccles, 1985). However, divisions tend not to enjoy complete autonomy in 
real life. Whether the transactions are at a mandated price (by head office) or freely 
negotiated between divisions then there can also be significant influences by other 
organizational factors such as strategy, structure, corporate governance and the 
administrative process (Eccles, 1985).  
2.3.2.1.2 Cost-based price 
Since the existence of a perfectly competitive outside market is rare, some firms may 
use internally generated cost information to set internal transfer prices. The cost option 
could be marginal cost, opportunity cost, average cost or full cost. In some cases, a 
lump sum or mark-up may be added to the payment to cover the fixed costs of the 
selling division.  
Using marginal cost to establish a transfer price has been suggested by a number of 
influential economists. In Hirshleifer’s (1956) model, if an external market for 
intermediate products does not exist, the transfer price should be equal to the marginal 
cost of the selling division. Alles and Datar (1998) developed a model with two 
oligopolistic firms and found that a firm may use the cost-plus method instead of 
marginal cost to set their transfer prices. Göx’s (2000) verified this approach and argued 
that when transfer prices are not observable, the head office of each firm may use a 
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price which is above the marginal manufacturing costs but if transfer prices are 
observable, marginal costs will still be chosen. In addition to economists, some 
accounting researchers (e.g. Solomons, 1965; Kaplan, 1982) also suggested marginal 
cost should be used but from a more practical perspective (i.e. acknowledging 
behavioral influences) they argued that a certain amount of additional reward should be 
added. Solomons (1965) recommended that selling divisions should charge a marginal 
cost per unit plus an annual lump sum as a contribution to fixed costs. This is fair on 
the basis that a division that agrees to provide a product or service for the following 
year commits itself to that activity and hence a certain level of fixed cost. The pre-
condition for such an approach or policy is the lack of an external market together with 
a significant amount of internal transactions. Kaplan (1982) arrived at the same 
conclusion as Solomons (1956) but he also advised that if the internal transactions do 
not form a significant part of turnover, the transfer price should be equal to the variable 
unit cost plus a fixed period fee.  
Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974) argued that using marginal cost may cause 
dysfunctional behaviors. Onsi (1970) also pointed out that using a marginal-cost to set 
transfer pricing has limitations, such as the difficulty to identify marginal costs. He 
applied a mathematical programming approach and suggested an opportunity cost-
based transfer pricing model. However, he argued that using opportunity cost can be 
difficult when there is a lack of ‘perfect’ information. This may limit its application in 
practice.  
Eccles (1985) found some empirical evidence to suggest that firms may use the 
mandated full-cost method to set transfer prices although some researchers argued that 
this may cause problems. Anthony and Dearden (1980) recognized that the full-cost 
method provides no incentives for the buying division to produce final products at a 
level that will maximize the profits of the entire firm. Kaplan (1982) also criticized the 
full-cost method, saying that its only justification was simplicity.  
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A small number of researchers, such as Enzer (1975), recommended that ‘average cost’ 
is an appropriate transfer price when both the selling and buying division have all the 
information about costs and expected volumes.  
Cost-based transfer prices are seen as appropriate when an external competitive market 
for intermediate products does not exist (Drury, 2008). However, some methods 
suggested by academic researchers have practical difficulties in the empirical world. 
First, some economic models include strict assumptions which are rare in the real world, 
such as the existence of perfect competitive market which are required in Hirshleifer’s 
(1956) model. Second, the assessment of marginal and opportunity cost is complex 
because it requires perfect information to be available to both parties, which is difficult 
to achieve in practice. Third, some models assume a linear production function (a 
function that assumes there is a linear relation between inputs and outputs) which is 
oversimplified compared to real situations (Abdel-khalik and Lusk, 1974). Finally, 
cost-based solutions assume that profit maximization is the priority of the firm and 
therefore ignore other possible strategic goals, such as increasing market shares. The 
consideration of strategy is necessary for solving transfer pricing problems (Eccles, 
1985).  
2.3.2.1.3 Negotiated price 
The last transfer pricing method is ‘negotiated’ price. This is appropriate when the 
market for intermediate products is imperfect and the selling price of internal and 
external products are disputed, then a negotiated price may be preferable (Drury, 2008). 
Dean (1955) advocated negotiated prices and said that the price should be bargained 
between divisional managers and they are then free to look externally go outside if the 
price is not satisfactory. He argued that the advantage of the negotiated price is that it 
helps avoid arbitrariness, by which he meant that managers from different divisions 
could reach an agreement. Kaplan (1982) recommended negotiated market-based price 
as the alternative to cost-based price after considering the limitations of cost-based 
methods. The strength of the negotiated transfer price method is that both risks and 
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rewards could be shared between divisions (Anctil and Dutta, 1999). Once the price is 
agreed, the conflicts between different divisions might be reduced. On the other hand, 
the ‘haggling’ process (Baldenius, Reichelstein and Sahay, 1999) may be time-
consuming and the final agreed price depends not only on the cost of products but also 
the negotiating skills and bargaining power of different divisions, therefore, the final 
price may favor those with more organizational and personal power.   
2.3.2.1.4 Empirical studies on the transfer pricing method 
In addition to the normative literature that seeks to find the optimal transfer pricing 
method based on conceptual analysis or economic and mathematical modeling, a 
prominent area of research is represented by empirical studies and the consideration of 
internal and external influencing factors.  
Eccles (1985) reviewed empirical research on transfer pricing before 1985 and 
concluded that many companies use more than one transfer pricing method. Vancil’s 
(1979) survey findings showed that market-based and cost-based methods were equally 
popular. However, the transfer price methods advocated by economists such as 
marginal cost, opportunity cost and the mathematical modeling method were almost 
absent in practice and Tang's (1979) research produced similar results. Whilst, there 
were criticisms of full-cost transfer pricing, it was a popular method in practice. Both 
Vancil’s (1979) and Tang’s (1979) results showed that almost one-third of respondent 
firms chose this method although, Eccles (1985) suggested that a possible reason is that 
most managers actually used the full-cost plus mark-up to establish the estimated 
market price.  
Borkowski (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of the findings of over 20 transfer pricing 
studies and found that cost-based and market-based transfer prices were the two main 
methods applied in practice. Among all the firms that use cost-based methods, most of 
them applied the full-cost or full-cost plus mark-up method to set transfer prices (Tang, 
1977, 1992; Persen and Lessing, 1979; Yunker, 1981; Al-Eryani, 1987; Borkowski, 
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1990). Other surveys separated domestic transactions and international transactions 
such as the work of Mostafa, Sharp and Howard (1984) and Borkowski (1992). Mostafa 
et al. (1984) found one firm in their research which preferred the market-based method 
for domestic transactions but used the cost-based method more often for international 
transactions. However, with a large number of surveyed organizations, Borkowski’s 
(1992) survey showed that both domestic and multinational respondents tended to 
prefer the cost-based methods.  
Negotiated transfer prices are not as popular in practice as economist suggest. Cravens 
and Shearon’s (1996) survey found that only 18% of respondents used negotiated 
prices. Some empirical researches (Borkowski 1990 &1992, Tang, 1982; Yunker, 1981; 
Al-Eryani, Alam and Akhter, 1990) not only focused on the choice of the transfer 
pricing method but also sought to test the relationship between different variables and 
transfer pricing methods through statistical methods. Borkowski (1996) found that it is 
difficult to compare different studies since the contextual factors that different 
researchers focus on varies significantly and some of their results can, therefore, be 
contradictory. Although the relationship between influencing factors and transfer 
pricing choice could not be confirmed as being significant, previous research still 
provides useful references of possible influencing factors. Taxation, rates of duties and 
overall profit of firms are highly ranked factors in several studies (Tang, 1982; Yunker, 
1981; Al-Eryani, Alam and Akhter, 1990). Other factors include the objective of 
transfer pricing, size of the firm and industry factors (Borkowski, 1992).  
2.3.2.2 Organizational theory of transfer pricing 
Watson and Baumler (1975) argued that the transfer pricing problem has to be solved 
in the context of the firm being a social system rather than searching for an optimal 
technical method. They argued that organizations which decide to make changes to 
their strategy or structure tend to do so in response to either technological or 
environmental uncertainty. They claimed that transfer pricing not only enhances the 
differentiation of production but also facilitates organizational integration and 
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governance. The mechanism that they advocated is the negotiated pricing mechanism. 
Watson and Balmier’s research (1975) viewed transfer pricing as involving behavioral 
variances such as the degree of interdependence between the selling and buying 
divisions and the conflict resolution process, but it did not consider the difficulties of 
applying negotiated pricing in practice.   
Inspired by Watson and Baumler’s (1975) paper, which consider behavioral variance 
to inform the transfer pricing problem, a number of researchers started to view transfer 
pricing from the angle of organizational theories and tried to solve this problem within 
an organizational context. The following table (Table 2.1) summarizes transfer pricing 
literature that applies the organizational approach based on four classifications 
according to the different research methods they used.  
2.3.2.2.1 Conceptual researches 
Swieringa and Waterhouse (1982) used four organizational models to explore their 
implications for a transfer pricing context. The four models that they used were: (1) 
Cyert and March’s (1963) behavioral model which focuses on goals, expectations and 
choices of organization; (2) the garbage can model introduced by Cohen and March 
(1974) which not only view organization as a vehicle for solving problems and resolve 
conflicts but also a collection of choices; (3)Weick’s (1969, 1979) organizing model 
which emphasize on the continual process through interaction between individuals; (4) 
Williamson’s (1975) markets and hierarchies model which seek to find more efficient 
way for resources allocation and performance monitoring from either hierarchies or 
markets. Unlike traditional models, these four models suggested compared to achieving 
organizational control the process of devising transfer pricing procedures, rules and 
prices are also important. These four models suggest focusing on "activities or 
processes which lead to the formulation and adoption of transfer pricing rules, 
procedures and prices "(p. 160). During this process, the participants could share 
information and understand each other's situation. 
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Conceptual  
Swieringa & 
Waterhouse (1982) 
Uses four organizational models: behavioral model, the garbage can 
model, organizing model and market & hierarchy’s model to analyze a 
single case.  
Eccles (1983, 1985) Managers’ Analytic Plane (MAP) 
Links transfer pricing to strategy and introduces the concept of 
‘fairness’.  
Spicer (1988) Connects transfer pricing with strategy, structure and management 
control system. Refers to organizational failure framework (Williamson, 
1975).  
Mathematical Modelling 
Bailey & Boe (1976) Applies Ruefli’s Generalized Goal Decomposition Model and includes 
structural and behavioral features.  
Yeom, Balachandran 
& Ronem (2000)  
Analyses transfer pricing in three situations: full information, pure 
adverse and moral hazard. 
Questionnaire 
Lambert (1979) Survey research used to investigate the relationship between transfer 
pricing and inter-divisional conflicts.  
Case Study  
Colbert & Spicer 
(1995) 
Analyses four integrated case companies from a transaction cost 
perspective. 
Boyns, Edward & 
Emmanuel (1998)  
Investigates the determinants of transfer pricing changes through time by 
analyzing one case through three lenses: Eccles’ (1983, 1985), Spicer’s 
(1988) and Emmuauel and Mehafdi’s (1994) frameworks.  
Van der Meer-
Kooistra (1994) 
Builds a framework based on the frequency of internal transactions, asset 
specificity, information asymmetry and uncertainty. 
Table 2.1 Summary of transfer pricing literature based on the organizational approaches 
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Eccles (1983) interviewed almost 150 managers from 13 companies and found that the 
key to solving transfer pricing problems is the strategy of the organization. He built a 
framework called the “managers’ analytic plane (MAP)” which divides organizations 
into four categories according to their degree of integration and diversification, as 
shown in Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3 MAP and the four ‘pure’ organizational types (Eccles,1983, p. 152) 
The transfer pricing problem is argued to be precluded in collective organizations since 
both the degree of vertical integration and diversification is low. Market-based pricing 
and dual pricing4 are suggested to be suitable for competitive organizations which 
decentralize authorities and responsibility to the divisional level. Co-operative 
organizations mandate divisions to purchase from inside providers and the transfer price 
is either full-cost or cost-plus. This is the result of the vertical integration strategy. 
Collaborative organizations enjoy a high degree of vertical integration thus, the transfer 
pricing strategy is also mandated. However, the divisions all operate as independent 
                                            
4 Dual pricing: apply both cost-based and market-based transfer pricing. The buying divisions are 
paying with the price based on cost while the selling division is receiving the market price. The head 
office will absorb the difference between these two prices (Eccles, 1985). 
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units within the organization, thus the full-cost method is less appropriate. Eccles 
(1983) argued that the mandated market-based transfer pricing strategy is more suitable 
for collaborative organizations. The contributions of Eccles (1983) are: 1) he put 
transfer pricing problems in an organizational context and linked this with organization 
strategy, 2) the data from his research comes from managers’ own experiences which 
would help enhance the implication of this research in practice, and 3) he introduced 
the concept of “fairness” which relates to power imbalance and inter-divisional 
conflicts. The characteristics of competitive, cooperative and collaborative 
organizations are summarized in table 2.2. 
Characteristic Competitive Cooperative Collaborative 
Strategy Aggregate of 
division’s strategies 
Total company 
strategy 
Mutually defined total 
company business 
perspective 
Structure Multidivisional  Functional  Matrix 
Systems Profits. ROI compared 
with budget, internally 
and externally 
Costs compared with 
budgets and history 
Combination of costs, 
profit and ROI 
compared with budget 
Processes Bottom-up; 
distributive bargaining 
Top-down; integrative 
bargaining 
Iterative; mixed-mode 
bargaining 
Method of manager’s 
fairness evaluation 
Impartial spectator Shared Fate Rational trust 
Top management 
control 
Through systems on 
outcomes 
Through structure on 
actions 
Through processes 
balancing structure 
and systems 
Table 2.2 Characteristics of competitive, cooperative and collaborative organizations 
(Eccles, 1983, p.153) 
In a further study, Eccles (1985) expanded the concept of fairness and included this in 
his framework of the causes and effects of transfer pricing which is shown in Figure 
2.4. Two principle determinants of transfer pricing are the strategy and administrative 
process. The transfer pricing strategy affects economic decisions within each division, 
performance of the whole organization, performance measurement and individual 
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manager’s feeling of fairness. He discussed three transfer pricing strategies: market 
price in exchange autonomy organizations; mandated full costs pricing, and mandated 
market-based pricing. He suggested that dual pricing, which is a hybrid of full cost and 
market price, could be a solution to the control problems caused by traditional transfer 
pricing strategies such as conflicts of objectives and feelings of unfairness.  
 
Figure 2.4 The Causes and Effects of Transfer Pricing (Eccles, 1985, p. 7) 
Following Eccles (1985), Spicer (1988) also developed an understanding of transfer 
pricing in an organizational context and formulated six further testable hypotheses (see 
Appendix 1). Spicer (1988) referred to Williamson's (1979) organizational failure 
framework and connected transfer pricing problems with strategy, structure and 
management control system. He argued that the control of internal transactions depends 
on the diversification strategy and the degree of organizational decentralization in 
decision making, as reflected in the organizational structure. His framework applied 
three dimensions: investment characteristics (standardized, customized or 
idiosyncratic); extent (or frequency and volume) of buyer activity; uncertainty and 
complexity. Different transfer pricing strategies are applied according to different 
situations. Moreover, he developed nine hypotheses to test the relationship between 
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strategy, structure, central control, arbitration procedures, performance measurement, 
conflicts and the choice of transfer pricing mechanisms. 
Both Swieringa and Waterhouse (1982) and Spicer (1988) accepted Watson and 
Baumler’s (1975) idea that the transfer pricing problem should be solved within an 
organizational context and both papers applied several organizational theories, such as 
Cyert and March’s (1963) behavioral theory of the firm and Williamson’s (1979) 
organization failure framework, into their research. However, neither of them collected 
empirical data with which to test or verify their theories5. Eccles (1983) had rich data 
collected from 13 different companies to build the MAP framework but the hypotheses 
that he proposed in 1985 need to be tested in future research.  
2.3.2.2.2 Mathematical Modelling method 
Bailey and Boe (1976) based their research on Watson and Baumler’s (1975) behavioral 
theory and also related it to Ruefli's Generalized Goal Decomposition Model to solve 
the transfer pricing problem. They considered three typical organizational structures 
and behavioral issues in the modeling which are the degree of centralization, the degree 
of interdependence and the degree of cooperation between different divisions. This 
paper expanded the application of the mathematical modeling method in addressing the 
transfer pricing problem within hierarchical organizations. Other researchers like 
Yeom, Balachandran and Ronen (2000) applied mathematical modeling method and 
framed transfer pricing as a coordinating mechanism and discussed its role in three 
cases: full information; pure adverse and adverse selection; and moral hazard. They 
suggested using the average cost plus a mark-up as the optimal transfer price.  
2.3.2.2.3 Survey method 
Lambert (1979) developed a survey instrument to investigate the relationship between 
the transfer pricing mechanisms and associated conflicts between different divisions 
                                            
5 The case used by Swieringa and Waterhouse (1982) was a hypothetical case rather than an empirical 
case. 
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within the organization. The key finding of his survey is that inter-divisional conflict 
increases if: a) the transfer pricing system affects buying divisions’ profits, or b) 
customer divisions are not permitted to purchase intermediate products or services from 
outside providers. The conflicts were found to be negatively related to the overall 
benefits of the organization of transfer pricing which means that if conflicts increase 
then benefits to the overall organization decrease.  
Lambert’s (1979) findings suggested that conflicts within an organization should be 
minimized by applying a transfer price method which balances the division’s perception 
of other divisions’ advantages. However, conflicts which act as the by-product of 
competition might encourage divisions to understand and communicate with competing 
divisions thus, enhancing the performance of the whole organization (Tsai, 2002). 
2.3.2.2.4 Case Study method 
Since the 1980s, some researchers have started to used case study methods in transfer 
pricing inquiries (Colbert and Spicer, 1995; Boyns, Edwards and Emmaunel, 1999; Van 
der Meer-Kooistra, 1994). Colbert and Spicer (1995) investigated the transfer pricing 
process from the TCE perspective and conducted multi-case research in four vertically-
integrated companies to test their theories. Asset specificity, which is one dimension of 
transaction cost economies, was found to have a significant impact on the transfer 
pricing process. As the asset specificity of internal transfers increases, it is more likely 
that buying divisions would choose internal providers (selling divisions within the same 
organization) and a “greater weight will be given to manufacturing costs in setting 
transfer prices” (Colbert and Spicer, 1995, p. 425). The significance of this research is 
that it was based on an in-depth understanding of the transfer pricing process from the 
empirical world and verified the relationship between asset specificity and transfer 
prices. However, as they mentioned, using a subjective assessment of the impact of 
asset specificity on internal transfers and the ignorance of other organizational factors 
might limit the wider application of their research.  
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Boyns, Edwards and Emmanuel (1999) focused on the determinants of transfer pricing 
change and applied three frameworks – Eccles (1983), Spicer (1988) and Emmanuel 
and Mehafdi (1994) – to investigate the actions taken by an iron and coal company in 
the 19th century. All of these three frameworks included influencing factors such as 
strategy, level of decentralization and interdependence between different divisions. The 
significant contribution of this paper is that the authors did not just confirm that these 
influencing factors could cause the transfer pricing policy to change but, argued that 
this causation could be in an alternative direction-which means the transfer pricing 
policy might be a determinant of the changes of these factors. Boyns, Edwards and 
Emmanuel (1999) argued that this is an open question and may need further research 
into it to find an answer. This paper reviewed three ‘modern-day’ frameworks but the 
empirical evidence they used is that of the actions taken by one particular company in 
the 19th century. The use of data from a very different historical context may limit the 
generalization of the findings in this research.  
The contribution of Van der Meer-Kooistra (1994) was to consider the coordination of 
internal transactions based on seven cases. The empirical data from these seven cases 
enabled the author to formulate an explanatory model which explained the coordination 
of internal transactions and influencing factors such as frequency/size of internal 
transactions, asset specificity, information asymmetry between central and 
decentralized management and uncertainty. Van der Meer-Kooistra's research 
expanded both Eccles' (1983) and Spicer's (1988) work by investigating transfer pricing 
in an organizational context, based on empirical data. Moreover, it did not just focus on 
the implementation process of the transfer process but also the way that the internal 
transactions are coordinated. 
The use of case study method in transfer pricing research enables the researcher to have 
a deep investigation of the practical implication of transfer pricing in the empirical 
world. However, the number of such studies is still limited and there have not been 
many studies since the 1990s. 
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2.3.2.3 International transfer pricing and tax 
Transfer pricing is not only important in terms of resource allocation, performance 
measurement and behavior management within organizations, but it is also an important 
tax issue faced by most multinational enterprises (Ernst and Young, 2014). In the wake 
of globalization, lots of multinational enterprises have expanded their business to 
different countries with diverse tax rates (Sikka and Willmott, 2010). Many 
management accounting researchers started to put their research focus on international 
transfer pricing issues such as the arm’s length principle6, tax compliance/avoidance 
(Rossing and Rohde, 2010; Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003) and income shifting; 
Clausing, 2000; Baldenius, Melumad and Reichelstein, 2004; Sikka and Willmott, 
2010). 
Cross-border transactions of intermediate goods raised the profile of transfer pricing 
issues. Setting the transfer price of internal transferred services and/or how to allocate 
overheads among relevant business units within the same group is highly subjective. 
Transfer pricing provides opportunities for a multinational enterprise (MNE) to shift 
income from high-tax countries to low-tax countries (Sikka and Willmott, 2010). The 
economic goal of most MNEs is to achieve as much profit as possible and thus, add 
value to shareholders. This could be achieved through a number of methods such as 
expanding the market, creating new products or increasing sales and cutting costs. Most 
accounting staff in MNEs treat tax as a cost to be avoided, instead of seeing it being a 
contribution to society (Sikka and Willmott, 2010). Cross border tax arbitrage is often 
used by MNEs to cut costs and thus, maximize profits. However, tax authorities in 
different countries, and global organizations such as the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), have strict guidelines on transfer pricing 
strategies. Moreover, their focus on reviewing and monitoring MNEs' transfer pricing 
                                            
6 OECD transfer pricing guidelines require the multinational enterprises use comparable uncontrolled 
price for internal transfer pricing, based on external market evidence and explain how their transfer 
pricing strategy comply with arm’s length principle.  
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method has been increasing in recent years (Rossing and Rohde, 2010, Ernst and 
Young, 2014). The most important concept in OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines is 
the ‘arm’s length principle’ which means treating associated and independent 
enterprises equally (Hamaekers, 2001). In terms of transfer pricing, the ‘acceptable' 
price for tax authorities under the arm's length principle is the price that an independent 
enterprise would pay for the same, or similar, intermediate products or intra-group 
support services (OECD. 2010). According to both academic writing on transfer pricing 
(Drury, 2008) and the documents of tax authorities (OECD, 2010), market price is a 
preferred transfer price (Cools, Emmanuel and Jorissen, 2008). However, due to 
practical difficulties such as the non-existence of the perfect market for intermediate 
products, adjustments are made by MNEs to formulate a proxy value for arm's length 
transactions. There are other transfer pricing methods approved by the OECD, such as 
the cost-plus method; the transactional net-margin method; and the profit split method 
(OECD, 2010). Multinational enterprises could choose any of the methods but must 
"provide detailed documentation of how their transfer pricing strategy specifically 
complied with the arm's length principle" (Rossing and Rohde, 2010, p.201). 
Internal transactions within MNEs could involve tangible goods, intangible assets or 
support services. In recent years, charges for support services or the allocation of intra-
group service costs have attracted specific interests by tax authorities (Ernst & Young, 
2007). The OECD’s guidelines (2010) include two specific chapters to elaborate on 
special considerations for intra-group services and methods of cost allocation. The 
support services transferred internally could be provided by either the head office of a 
multinational enterprise or a separate service center such as SSC. No matter who is the 
provider of the services, the fees for providing services should be charged (Linnenbaum 
and Stillhart, 2012). Tax authorities prefer MNEs to use the direct-charge method, 
which means recharging service purchasers for specific services with the recharging 
mechanism pre-agreed internally in the service level agreement (SLA). Recharging 
directly is convenient for tax authorities to review and audit. However, due to 
difficulties with applying the direct method in practice, the OECD also accepts indirect-
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charge methods (such as cost allocation) as long as the MNEs can prove that cost 
allocation arrangements satisfy the arm’s length principle (OECD, 2010, chapter 7).  
An SSC, which centralizes regional or global support service activities into an 
identifiable center, normally provides services to more than one customer unit within 
one group. According to the OECD's guidelines (2010), the service activities that an 
SSC provides are considered to be intra-group services because by providing these 
services, commercial value has been transferred from the SSC to service purchasing 
units. The service activities available in SSCs are also available from external service 
providers; for example, legal services provided by an internal SSC could also be 
purchased from independent law firms. At the same time, if the SSC expands its service 
to external customers, other independent organizations might be willing to pay for some 
of the general service activities that the SSC provides. 
 
2.4 Summary 
SSCs operate as semi-autonomous units within organizations and aim to capture the 
benefits of both markets (decentralization) and hierarchy (centralization). The main 
aims are to provide support services to other divisions within the organization and to 
ensure that the core activities which define their competitive competencies are 
operating smoothly and effectively. In order to explore the theoretical base of the 
recharging mechanism in an individual SSC, this chapter started with an explanation of 
the context of this research, the SSC model.  
Some practitioners suggested some ways of recharging for support service provided by 
the SSCs (Quinn, Cooke and Kris, 2000; Bergeron, 2003). As SSC can be interpreted 
in different ways, either cost allocation or transfer pricing can be used to account for 
the service provided. Thus, the literature of both cost allocation and transfer pricing was 
critically reviewed in section 2.3. With regard to research on transfer pricing, there are 
many previous researches that have concentrated on finding an optimal transfer pricing 
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method or predict general trends, but little attention has to be given to explain the 
application process of an individual company. Although there are some studies such as 
Eccles (1983, 1985), Colbert and Spicer (1995) that have investigated the application 
of transfer pricing in an organizational context, they focused on the traditional 
organizational form (function-based or multi-divisional). And most of the cost 
allocation researches keen to answer the positive questions of why cost allocation is 
widely applied. Little attention has been paid to study the cost allocation process and 
its behavioral effects in organizational context. This research extended the research of 
cost allocation and transfer pricing by regarding them as two approaches of recharging 
mechanisms in a new organizational form – SSC model and links it to the resulting 
behaviors of each division within the organization.  
The literature review has critically reviewed some previous researches in cost allocation 
and transfer pricing. Some researchers have demonstrated theoretical perspectives like 
TCE and agency theory in explaining cost allocation and transfer pricing in an 
organizational context. This study keens to investigate recharging mechanism in SSC 
context, thus, in order to better guide the research and help to explore the recharging 
mechanism in depth, the development of conceptual framework will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 
 
 
 52 
Chapter 3 Development of conceptual 
framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed the generally distinct literature of transfer pricing and cost 
allocation. This chapter will outline some further theories that might address the gaps 
identified and provide a theoretical angle with which to interpret and explain empirical 
data.  
The overall aim of this research is to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
recharging process of SSCs from both theoretical and practical perspectives. As 
explained in Chapter 2, the recharging for support service provided by SSCs appears to 
capture both the characteristics of cost allocation and transfer pricing (Scrace and 
Mcauley, 1997) and there would seem to be an opportunity to suggest how the transfer 
pricing and cost allocation literature might be synthesized. According to the SSC 
practitioner literature (Quinn et al., 2000; Bangemann, 2005; Deloitte, 2006), the 
recharging mechanisms could be: a) no allocation (costs incurred by SSCs are absorbed 
by head office with no charges to the consumption units), b) allocation of full costs 
incurred to service purchasing units without ‘profits’, c) recharge with a price which is 
either the full-cost plus a mark-up, or set by reference to the market price. 
According to Hopper and Hoque (2006), theoretical triangulation involves examining 
the same research problem by employing different theoretical perspectives. Theoretical 
triangulation is suggested because it is rare that a single theory could have a monopoly 
on the explanation of organizational practice (Hoque, Covaleski and Goonetarne, 
2013). Moreover, in management accounting research, the attention to integrating 
theories and empirics is generally insufficient (Modell, 2005). Integrating 
complementary theories can help to enhance the explanation of the empirical evidence 
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of the cases. Therefore, theoretical triangulation is chosen in this research, based on 
theories of organizational structure, transaction cost economics and agency theory. 
The research question addressed in this study is to understand at the micro level the 
practice of recharging mechanisms applied in SSCs. This includes 1) exploring how the 
SSCs charges for its support services and 2) understanding the behavioral effects 
resulting from the choice of recharging mechanism. To outline a conceptual framework, 
this chapter starts by integrating the theory of organizational structure and 
Williamson’s7 market and hierarchies and transaction cost economics (1975; 1985). 
The setting-up of an SSC could be treated as reconfiguring the multi-divisional (M-
form) organization because it moves professional support service from divisions, and 
through standardization in the SSC and a ‘global’ ERP system, creates visibility for top 
management to bear down overhead costs and better allocate resources between 
competing business divisions. Therefore, the background information about M-form 
organizational will be discussed further in section 3.2. The other theory chosen is 
Williamson’s transaction cost economics (TCE). TCE uses the concept of transaction 
cost to explain how economic activities are governed in particular ways. The focus of 
cost and corporate governance makes TCE a potential framework to describe the 
functioning of recharging mechanism in SSCs. Section 3.3 will discuss TCE and its 
application in this research. However, both organizational structure and TCE theories 
only address the first research question which is about how the SSCs recharge for their 
support services. In terms of the organizational effects of recharging, their explanation 
is inadequate. Thus, agency theory is drawn on to provide a more complete explanation 
of the organizational effects of recharging. Section 3.4 explains why an additional 
theory is needed and the details of agency theory will be discussed in section 3.5. 
Following that, section 3.6 will outline a conceptual framework built on the integration 
of these three theories (organizational structure, TCE and agency theory). This chapter 
closes with a brief summary in section 3.7 
                                            
7 Williamson (1985) acknowledged the influence of Chandler (1962) on his own thinking on TCE 
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3.2 Organizational structure  
The SSC model could be approached from the context of it representing a 
reconfiguration of the M-Form organization because the relocation of business support 
services in specialized sites is intended to reflect characteristics from business 
divisions, head office, and outsourcing. In a traditional function-based organization, a 
vertical integration strategy is applied. Co-ordination of different production processes 
building up into a single product enables the top manager to exercise control over both 
production process and their managers. As a multi-divisional form of organization (M-
form) developed to better serve multiple markets with multiple products. Chandler 
(1962) selected four samples Du Pont, General Motor, Jersey Standards, and Sears to 
explore how American firms began to be diversified and decentralized in the 1920s in 
his seminal work. Functions were the basis of those companies' organizational structure 
before the 1920s. After enjoying the dramatic increase of productivity resulting from 
the development of transportation and communication (Helper and Sako, 2010), both 
Du Pont and General Motors faced financial difficulties and with U-form, they could 
not react quickly to changes of environment (Hoskisson, Hill and Kim, 1993). To 
overcome these difficulties, Alfred Sloan, who became the president of GM since 1923, 
started to re-organized GM, with each division has its own functional hierarchy but at 
the same time under head office’s supervision. Johnson (1978) referred this as 
“centralized control with decentralized responsibility”. Williamson argued that the M-
form of organization provided an efficient response to the perceived problem of 
managerial discretion (Williamson, 1970), as well as offering superior transaction cost 
solutions to the problem of coordinating large and diversified businesses (Hoskisson et 
al., 1993). The multidivisional form (M-form) structure was regarded as “the most 
significant organizational innovation” of the twentieth century by Williamson (1985). 
In Williamson’s view, the key aspect of the M-form was the uncoupling of strategic 
decision making from operational decision-making. Top management could focus on 
long-term improvement and strategy while divisions’ responsibilities are daily 
operation tasks (Hoskisson et al, 1993). The delegation of authority from top 
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management to divisional level enables decisions to be made at local level and hence 
to adapt to changing business environments and customer requirements 
instantaneously, thereby addressing the ‘slow reaction’ problem of U-form. Moreover, 
production factors can be coordinated more effectively at divisional level (Ronen and 
McKinney, 1970) and the M-form also stimulates divisional managers to improve 
performance because their Return of Capital Employed can be evaluated in comparison 
to other divisions. The M-form enables a balance between the coordination of products 
and market between different divisions and the control of divisional management from 
the head office with the overall strategic mission of the corporation.   
 
3.2.1 Organizational structure and SSC 
Within functional organization structure (U-Form), there is likely only one production 
function and support services are undertaken within the administrative functions or 
headquarters (Gospel and Sako, 2010). Within M-form organizations, support services 
are undertaken within individual divisions. As the business context became more 
dynamic through the 20th century, the problem of co-ordination of changing products 
and markets was exacerbated. In recent decades, some corporations have tended to 
concentrate on fewer aspects of the overall value chain and to unbundle non-core 
support activities to either third parties or reorganize activities into a captive SSC. The 
creation of shared services “moves away from the M-Form” (Gospel and Sako, 2010, 
p.1372) and changes the administrative structure of the firm. The administrative 
functions are unbundled from the product division and re-centralized in a semi-
autonomous business unit (Sako, 2006). However, it could be argued that the process 
of unbundling transaction-centered support services into an SSC creates a new division 
under the corporate umbrella, combining the discipline of market forces, enacted 
through Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and the power of the management hierarchy. 
The SSC model is a new organizational form which seeks to present a standardized 
platform of business support services to allow new possibilities for the coordination 
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and control both of SSC itself and the wider organization. The significance of the semi-
autonomous feature of SSC can be seen through the reporting lines to both divisions 
and the head office, compared with the alternative multi-divisional model in which each 
division is responsible for providing its own service support.  
Gospel and Sako (2010) compared the outsourcing of the human resource services of 
two M-form companies (P&G and Unilever) and analyzed how corporate structure and 
nature of supplier market affected the choice of shared service or outsourcing and 
developed three paths to transforming and outsourcing business processes, as shown in 
figure 3.1. A company could set up its internal SSC and then outsource the management 
of SSC to the supplier(s) in the open market (path A) or outsource existing processes to 
multiple service suppliers and let the supplier take a lead on transferring process (path 
B). The last path is directly outsourcing to a single supplier to change business 
processes in one ‘big bang’. By doing this, the company could benefit significant cost 
reductions and efficiency saving, albeit there may be much greater risks in this pathway. 
  
Figure 3.1 Pathways to support service transformation (Taken from Gospel and Sako, 
2010, p. 1386 
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3.2.2 Organizational structure and recharging for support 
services 
In the traditional U-From organizations, most support service departments are cost 
centers, whose main responsibility is fulfilling administrative functions rather than 
generating revenue or making profits. The use of internal facilities is mandated (Eccles, 
1985). The costs incurred in providing support services are regarded as “overhead” and 
allocated to service-receiving functions. Within M-form organizations, support services 
are undertaken by the function-based departments within individual divisions. The cost 
allocation method is similar to that in U-form organization. However, SSC is a separate 
division whose core competence is undertaking back-office services for other divisions. 
This change of organizational structure would be expected to change the basis of 
recharging for support services from intra-divisional cost allocation to inter-divisional 
transfer pricing.  
The research of transfer pricing is closely related to the theory of strategy and structure 
because it is usually the co-product of changes in organizational structure. McAulay 
and Tomkins (1992) argued that the “functional necessity” of applying transfer pricing 
arises from the divisionalization of an organization and the fact that each division is 
responsible for its own cost and profits. In addition, a number of researchers analyze 
transfer pricing from the organizational context, determined by factors such as strategy 
(vertical integration and diversification), structure, strategic nature of internal 
transactions and management control system (Spicer, 1988; Colbert and Spicer, 1995; 
Eccles, 1985; Emmanuel and Mehafdi, 1994; Meer-Kooistra, 1994). Eccles (1985) 
argued that strategy is one of the important causes behind different choices of transfer 
pricing policy. Spicer (1988) agreed with this argument and further posited that transfer 
pricing policies are dependent on organizational strategy, structure, and dimensions of 
intra-firm transactions. He also concluded that whether the organization is applying 
cost-based or market-based transfer pricing, it is associated with the strategy adopted 
by the organization. Other researchers, such as Emmanuel and Mehafdi (1994) and 
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Meer-Kooistra (1994), also claimed that transfer pricing was determined by a range of 
factors including organizational strategy and structure.  
Common to the studies mentioned above is the idea that transfer pricing should be 
studied in an organizational context and the application of transfer pricing is contingent 
upon a range of factors, among which organizational strategy and structure are 
important ones (Perera, Mckinnon and Harrison, 2003). However, Boyns et al. (1999), 
in their longitudinal study of an iron and coal company in the 19th century, confirmed 
that changes in strategy and structure could influence transfer pricing policy and further 
suggested that transfer pricing policy might be used to enact strategy, as ‘a result’ or 
‘an instrument’ of strategic change. Perera, McKinnon and Harrison’s study (2003) 
agreed with this statement and suggested that transfer pricing policy may vary between 
these two roles in one organization over time.  
According to Chandler’s (1962) theory, structure follows strategy. Based on the data 
collected from four countries over ten years, Caves (1980) concluded that with an 
increase of degree in the diversification it is more likely that an organization will adopt 
a divisionalized structure. The application of diversification strategy and the 
divisionalization process of organization lead to the need for intra-firm transactions 
(Vancil, 1979). The consultation between "selling and buying" divisions with regard to 
the functioning of rules, determines how the internal transactions work (Meer-Kooistra, 
1994). The key tenet of the internal transactions policy is the transfer pricing policies 
chosen should be consistent with the change of organizational structure which in turn 
follows strategy.  
Thus, recharging for support services provided by the SSC reflects the characteristics 
of transfer pricing within the context of organizational structure and strategy. Whether 
the organization is a function-based or multi-divisional, the decision to set up an SSC 
changes the original organizational structure. Theoretically, a change of organizational 
structure would be expected to have effects on the transfer pricing policies applied in 
the organization and thus the recharging for the support service provided by the SSC. 
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Therefore, as part of organizational context factors, both strategy and structure would 
be considered to influence the recharging mechanism applied by SSCs. Thus, the theory 
of organizational structure will be the first theoretical basis of the conceptual 
framework built for this research. However, this theory only considers the 
administrative structure of the firm. In order to understand how the internal transactions 
between SSC and its customers are governed, transaction costs economics is used as 
another theoretical perspective.  
 
3.3 Transaction cost economics 
The concept of “transaction cost” was first proposed in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ written 
by Coase in 1937. He relaxed neo-classical assumptions of perfect certainty and sought 
to explain the questions about ‘why a firm emerges’.  
A firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within 
the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means 
of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm” 
(Coast, 1937, p.395).  
Williamson extended Coase’s theory and developed transaction cost economics (TCE) 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1999). The TCE developed by Williamson is more 
predictive. Williamson (1975,1979) not only treats both markets and hierarchies (firms) 
as alternative ways to organize economic activities, and that transaction costs can be 
used to explain the variance between different firms about how they organize economic 
activities in this particular way (Colbert and Spicer, 1995; Spicer, 1988; Madhok, 
2002).  
TCE regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis. Transaction costs refer to the 
costs incurred when a good or service is exchanged across the separable interface 
(Williamson, 1981) and production costs arise from organizing and managing 
production in-house. If the transaction costs are high, the firm will prefer to internalize 
production but if transaction costs are lower then, the firm will purchase the 
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good/service from the market. The transaction costs not only include the price of 
transferred good/service but also the coordination costs which are incurred during the 
information exchange process (Gulati & Singh, 1998).  
When a firm chooses to internalize production goods/services from the external market, 
the costs will be imposed because of contract incompleteness. When the circumstances 
change unexpectedly, the pre-agreed contact might be no longer effective. The 
objective of decision-maker is to adapt the contact to the changing business 
environment and customer requirements at the least cost (Klein, 2004). However, there 
is a key assumption of bounded rationality in the TCE. The transactions occur with 
limited information (Williamson, 1986) because the amount of information processed 
by human mind is limited and the capacity of decision making is constrained by the 
amount and quality of information (Jones, 2006). Williamson (1985, p20-21) divided a 
transaction into three stages which are contact, contract, and control stages. Nooteboom 
(1993) argued that bounded rationality may affect the decision-making process at all 
these stages. Bounded rationality limits parties to the trade to search for suitable 
partners at contact stage and limits them to include all contingencies in contractual 
arrangements at contract stage. At control stage, the trade parties’ ability to monitor 
performance against the contract is limited and, as transactions become more complex, 
it is difficult for them to adjust the terms to the changes in business environment. The 
other human factor considered in TCE is opportunism which assumes that decision 
makers might seek self-interests ‘with guilt’ (Williamson, 1985).  
TCE assumes that organizational choices are driven by the goal to achieve economic 
efficiency and also minimize transaction cost (Ahmed and Scapens, 2000). One of the 
criticisms of the TCE is that the transaction costs are difficult to measure, however, 
most of the empirical studies assume that the transaction costs are measurable. Buckley 
& Chapman (1997) argue that in practice, it is not necessary to accurately calculate the 
transactions costs because, in practice, decision makers use "selling costs", "financing 
costs" and "transaction costs" etc. to decide whether to "make or buy", they are just 
unaware of the existence of transaction cost theory. 
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Although it is difficult to accurately measure transaction costs, the trade parties could 
decide how to govern activities by considering the characteristics of transactions. The 
main characteristics of TCE are asset specificity, uncertainty, the extent of transactions 
(Colbert and Spicer, 1995). Asset specific measures the transferability of an asset to a 
different use or user (Williamson, 1985). It includes six different types: site/location 
specificity; physical asset specificity; human asset specificity; specific investments 
(include investments in research and development); brand name capital and temporal 
specificity. Whether the firm will do the transaction internally or externally depends on 
the level of asset specificity. The second characteristic is uncertainty. This normally 
refers to the environmental uncertainty. The volume of transactions, the business 
environment such as technological development and customer requirements might 
change thus, the adaption of contractual agreements is required. However, the adaption 
process itself will also increase transaction costs (Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar, 
2006; Walker & Weber, 1984). The last characteristic is the extent or frequency of 
transactions. Transactions with high frequency are more likely to be undertaken within 
a firm. The frequency of transactions also relates to environmental uncertainty and its 
influence on trade parties' decisions. Repeated and high-frequency transactions with the 
same trade party may enhance reputation effect and help reduce behavioral uncertainty 
(Williamson, 2002).   
TCE focuses on the relative costs and hazards of conducting transactions within 
alternative governance structures (Colbert and Spicer, 1995). When the governance 
mechanism is market, the transactions are safeguarded by formal contracts. In the 
hierarchy model, the firm is the governance mechanism and the transactions are 
internal. Each of two modes of governance has strengths and weakness. Markets are 
free from intervention from head office but may suffer from market failures such as 
information asymmetries which could cause opportunist behavior. Hierarchies use 
authority to ensure horizontal divisional cooperation but may have problems of slow 
reaction to changes and thus reduce flexibility. A diversified M-form firm could be 
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viewed as “a self-correcting mechanism for market failure” (Hoskisson et al., 1993) 
which combines features of both competition and collaboration.  
 
3.3.1 Transaction cost economics and SSC 
The TCE approach is widely used to explain firms’ ‘make or buy’ choices. But Gospel 
and Sako (2010) argue that the previous analysis based on TCE is mainly on ‘primary 
activities’. TCE could be used to explain and analyze ‘the make-or-buy decisions 
involved in designing and operating shared service centers (Gospel and Sako, 2010; 
p.1374).  
TCE is a theory to help to study governance structures, as an “institutional framework 
within which transactions are negotiated and executed” (Williamson, 1979, p. 239). 
Within traditional organizations, transactions are governed by hierarchy. However, 
with the development of SSC, a horizontal intra-firm client-supplier relationship is 
created (Minnaar and Vosselman, 2013). Herbert and Seal (2012) argue that a new 
organizational form (the SSC) is distinct from both third-party outsourcing and 
traditional centralized organization and represents "hybrid practices combining a 
market orientation with ongoing hierarchical control" (Herbert and Seal, 2012, p.95). 
Apart from ‘make-or-buy' decision and governance structure, there are some 
researchers who use TCE to analyze SSC from a process-oriented perspective. Minnaar 
and Vosselman (2013) explore the change of management control structure related to 
the development of SSC from TCE perspective. Based on TCE reasoning, they assumed 
that a change of management control structure is a choice made by a rational top 
manager and the decision depends on the characteristics of transactions. Based on 
Vosselman’s (2002) framework, they undertook a single case study with a publisher-
PCM Media, Figure 3.2 shows the original framework. 
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Figure 3.2, Management control structure choices for service transactions 
Source: Minnaar and Vosselman, 2013, p. 82 
Minnaar and Vosselman (2013) assumed that the transactions of support services with 
different characteristics might determine different management control structure 
choices. The support services could be undertaken by the outsourcers with free buying 
and selling (SSC free b/s) or within captive SSC with the possibility to be outsourced 
(SSC captive b/s). Some highly specialized and recurring services might be retained 
within the divisions (de-concentration). They found that some of the empirical findings 
from the case study were inconsistent with the hypothetical framework. For example, 
the back-office services which are standardized should be dealt in an SSC with free 
buying or selling. But the case publisher chose to centralize the services within a captive 
SSC. This indicates that the most efficient management control structure suggested 
based on TCE might not be chosen by the managers in a firm. The choice of the 
management control structure is a consequence of managers' day-to-day interaction in 
the network instead of considering the transaction costs. 
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In their working paper, Cooper and Herbert (2015) used three dimensions of 
transactions defined in TCE to answer the question that which type of financial 
activities are more likely to be retained or unbundled. According to the web-based 
survey results, they find that financial activities with high asset (human and 
technological) specificity are more likely to be retained while high-frequency routine 
activities have a high propensity to be outsourced. They found SSC is preferred when 
the benefits of economies of scale are larger than the transaction costs.   
TCE is used by most academic researchers to analyze SSC from several perspectives: 
make-or-buy decisions (retained in captive SSC or outsourced), the choice of 
governance structure and management control structure and unbundling process. 
However, the focus of this thesis is the recharging process for support service provided 
by SSC. The next section will discuss how TCE might help to explain the recharging 
practices of SSC.   
 
3.3.2 Transaction cost economies and recharging for support 
services 
Colbert and Spicer (1995) applied TCE from the perspective of transfer pricing and 
emphasized three dimensions which are relevant: asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
extent (volume and frequency of transactions).  
Among these three, the most widely used for explaining the transfer pricing method 
choice is asset specificity. A high level of asset specificity such as a considerable degree 
of customization in the product/service will increase transaction costs of purchasing 
products or services from markets, which will increase the possibility of keeping these 
transactions in captive SSCs. From the demand side, if asset specificity of customer 
divisions is at a high level, it is more likely for them to purchase services from SSCs 
since both parties are operating within the same organization thus, customized 
requirements are relatively easily fulfilled internally. On the other side, for SSCs, high 
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asset specificity or high customization of intermediate products or services means it is 
more likely that internal manufacturing costs rather than market referents incurred will 
be the "primary basis for setting transfer pricing" (Colbert and Spicer, 1995, p. 425). 
Most of the time, general activities such as payroll processing are repeatable and barely 
change over the course of years; it is easier to set the budget price for them or find a 
reference in the open market. However, labor usage measured in labor hours varies a 
lot along with highly customized tasks, therefore in this case recharging extra based on 
actual costs is more appropriate. Some existing SSCs recharge for general tasks and 
specially customized activities in different ways. As examples, the global services 
business of DuPont recharges fixed rates for routine activities but for special or 
customized services there are usually extra charges (Goold, Pettifer and Young, 2001). 
Another dimension of TCE is uncertainty. This dimension is relevant to an SSC’s 
recharging method from two perspectives: the necessity for coordination and adaptation 
(Colbert and Spicer, 1995). There is a significant body of transfer pricing literature 
which discusses the coordination problem of internal transactions (Meer-Kooistra, 
1994; Spicer, 1988; Watson and Baumler, 1975; Swieringa and Waterhouse, 1982; 
Eccles, 1985). The broad argument is that the transfer pricing problem should be placed 
within the organizational context. According to TCE, authority relations are used to 
ensure internal coordination between divisions or departments while in the market; 
coordination between different contracting parties is ensured by the price mechanism 
(Madhok, 2002). As mentioned before, the SSC is a hybrid of market and hierarchy 
modes (Herbert and Seal, 2011) because it applies both mechanisms. In terms of the 
relationship between the SSC and its customers, price mechanism helps ensure 
coordination at the divisional level. Specific price rates and clear terms in the SLA 
enable the customer divisions to have transparent information about their consumption 
and usage. The divisional manager's feeling of fairness (Eccles, 1985) lowers the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior. With respect to the relationship between SSC and 
head office, there are two possibilities. If head office dictates the SSC's recharging 
mechanism, then its authority must also be used to balance the interests between the 
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SSC and its customer divisions to ensure goal congruence and rational resource 
allocation. If an SSC has the right to choose its recharging method, head office may use 
different performance evaluation methods and reward systems of SSC to ensure the 
achievement of organizational goals such as profit maximization. The uncertainty of 
transactions also requires adaptation to preserve the relationship between divisions. 
Customer requirements and firms' objectives change regularly; firms have to adapt their 
strategies to these changes, including divisional performance measurement, reward 
systems and the method of recharging inter-divisional transactions at different stages in 
their life cycles (Jones and Hill, 1988). The market model, which is based on 
negotiation and contracting, may have problems of bounded rationality and time and 
cost consuming while the hierarchy model while enjoying common resource 
ownership, will encourage cooperation but may suffer from the problem of slow 
reflection and adaptation. There is no recognized optimal method in the transfer pricing 
literature. Hence, no single recharging mechanism of SSC could solve all the 
organizational problems once and for all. Thus, similar to Eccles’ (1985) argument for 
transfer pricing, the recharging mechanism of SSC should also be dynamic and adapted 
to the changing business environment and customers’ requirements.  
The last dimension of TCE is the frequency and volume of the transactions. Benefiting 
from economies of scale is the most common reason for some firms to keep the 
transaction in-house. Thus, it is more likely for the firm to internalize transactions when 
the volume of the transactions is greater (Colbert and Spicer, 1995). Also, if most of 
the keep-in transactions are routine, it is much easier to standardize the process and thus 
further reduce the costs and control the quality. For multi-divisional organizations, if 
the number of support service activities within each division is large, the head office 
may prefer aggregating them in captive SSCs. In the case of general or routine tasks, 
the usage of resources such as working efficiency of each headcount varies little, SSCs 
may use fixed rate or budgeted rate for recharging. At the same time, because general 
tasks or large volume activities have a lower level of customization, the market price, 
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i.e. the price charged by outsourcing companies, would be the primary reference 
(Colbert and Spicer, 1995). 
3.4 The need for additional theory  
Integrating the theory of strategy and structure with TCE could provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the functioning of recharging mechanism of SSCs and 
the influencing factors. The choice of recharging mechanism should be aligned with the 
business strategy and organizational structure change. The functioning of the 
recharging mechanism is assumed to be influenced by the TCE factors of internal 
transactions. Previous theory integration of structure and TCE only answers the first 
part of the research question, which is about the choice of the recharging mechanism. 
It is inadequate to explain how the recharging process might drive better behaviors on 
the part of client divisions whilst also facilitating continued control by head office. To 
provide a more comprehensive theoretical framework for data interpretation, additional 
theories are needed.  
Although most academic scholars tend to focus on explaining the configuration of 
organizational form and different strategic choice by using the concept of transaction 
costs (Hill, 1990), TCE could also be treated as a branch of agency theory to help 
explain how opportunistic behavior could be limited (Baiman, 1990). TCE constraints 
like bounded rationality and incomplete contracts may prevent cooperative solutions 
and governance better procedures which could help a firm to limit opportunistic 
behavior (Williamson, 1975; Baiman, 1990). It is assumed that information 
transparency also plays a critical role in the cooperation between SSCs and their 
customers. Therefore, the principle-agent model of agency theory is also useful in 
interpreting the data collected. The details of agency theory, including both the 
principle-agent model and TCE model, will be discussed in the following section.   
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3.5 Agency theory 
Agency theory is widely used in an organizational context where one person performs 
the task on behalf of another person because a principal who does not have time, ability 
or wish to do the task themselves. The basic assumption for both principal-agent model 
is that individuals are all self-interested (Baiman, 1990). In this circumstance, agents 
have the opportunities to divert organizational resources to their personal use. The 
‘agency problem’ arises when an agent’s desires conflict with those of the principal or 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor an agent’s behavior 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Baiman (1990) classified agency theory into three branches – the 
principle-agent model, the TCE model, and the Rochester model – in terms of their 
application in management accounting research. Because the Rochester model focuses 
on the capital and employment, which is less relevant to the research question of this 
study, only the principal-agent model and TCE will be addressing in this study. TCE 
model has already been discussed in the previous section, the next section will focus on 
the principal-agent model.  
3.5.1 Principal-agent model 
The basic assumptions for the principal-agent model include: individuals act in their 
own interests; individuals could anticipate all future contingencies; contracts are 
complete; each individual's actions are endogenously derived and there is information 
asymmetry between principal and agent (Baiman, 1990). Information asymmetry exists 
between agents and principals which means a principal does not know exactly what an 
agent has done. Agency problem could be through a lack of efforts on the part of agents 
(moral hazard) or the misrepresentation of the ability by agents such as that agents 
might claim to have certain skills which they do not have (adverse selection). 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that this problem could be solved in two ways: principals 
could use a budget system with formal reporting procedures to reduce information 
asymmetry and to monitor the behaviors of agents. Alternatively, to use outcome-based 
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contracts to align the interests of agents with that of principals. Oviatt (1988) examined 
the manager-shareholder relationship through both agency and transaction costs 
perspectives and argued the practical results of his research is not only to understand 
the relationship itself but also generate a greater understanding of organizational 
incentive and control.  
However, there are also some criticisms of agency theory. Agency theory is criticized 
for its narrowness, as it ignores the existence of trust and fairness which also affects 
managerial behaviors (Baiman, 1990). The interdependence and corporative 
relationship between different divisions and the effective management from the top also 
played roles in solving agency problems in practice. Harris and Tizard (1994) conclude 
that agency theory ignores facilitative effort such as teamwork but overstates the 
importance of operational efforts involved in the transformation from inputs to outputs. 
Rather they argued that a firm is a network of inter-dependent roles and cooperation 
and trust plays critical roles in the process of managing the uncertainties arising from 
interdependence.   
 
3.5.2 Principal-agent model and recharging for support services 
Within an organization, it is possible for divisional or departmental managers to use the 
resources of the firm to maximize his or her own utility, which may conflict with the 
organization's goals. At the same time, tasks are performed by different departments 
and each of them has special knowledge which is unknown by others and head office 
(Harris, Kreibel and Raviv, 1982). This information asymmetry may induce 
unconstrained opportunistic behaviors (Noreen, 1988). Within a large organization, 
especially a multi-national organization that has different divisions around the world, 
the costs of directly observing and monitoring are extremely high and corporate 
management have to find an alternative, cost-effective ways to monitor subordinates’ 
behaviors and ensure goal congruence across divisions and support functions. 
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Cost allocation is widely used in the empirical world but was not recommended by 
some academic scholars, who have tended to view cost allocation as an arbitrary 
decision which serves no useful purpose (Thomas,1970; Dopuch, Birnberg and 
Demski,1974; and Horngren,1977). For example, Zimmerman (1979) addressed the 
question of why firms persist in allocating joint costs based on economic models to 
justify the monitoring of subordinates’ behavior. Zimmerman extended Williamson’s 
tax scheme idea by arguing that allocating support service costs could help reduce 
subordinates’ consumption of perquisites if the allocation scheme acts as “a lump-sum 
tax” (Zimmerman, 1979). Support service costs are incurred by the running of head 
office and support service departments. Allocating these costs to operating departments 
directly affects departmental financial performance and reduces income that might 
otherwise be seen as available for divisions to spend. Thus, the allocation process could 
also induce departmental managers to monitor head office and support departments. 
Zimmerman’s research was based on two other authors’ arguments: Kaplan (1977) and 
Horngren (1977) who believed that the cost allocation process influences managerial 
behaviors. In the 1980s, Baiman (1982) argued that the costs allocated to different 
‘agents’ provide head office with information about agents’ unobserved behaviors. 
Zimmerman’s main contribution is using an economic model to prove the necessity for 
organizations to allocate common costs and at the same time to link this to incentives 
for managers and to managerial behavior.  
Allocating costs could help head office to monitor the agents’ behaviors (Zimmerman, 
1979). Transfer pricing has the same objective in multi-divisional organizations. 
Transfer pricing is the by-product of decentralization and one of the purposes of 
implementing transfer pricing is to ensure divisional autonomy. However, it also plays 
the role of facilitating organizational integration (Watson and Baulmer, 1975). The head 
office could also use transfer pricing information to monitor divisional managers’ 
behavior, in case divisional managers pursue divisional objectives at the cost of the 
whole organization.  
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In the case of the SSC, by recharging for support services undertaken by the SSC, both 
customer divisions and head office could get detailed cost information. Head office 
could use this information to better allocate resources, while customer divisions could 
improve their operating efficiency by taking actions such as removing wastage. At the 
same time, the recharging figure will also enable customer divisions to monitor the 
SSC’s efficiency. This two-way monitoring relationship is helpful for the whole 
organization to achieve the goals of cost reduction and efficiency improvement.  
Previous agency theory studies have largely focused on finding ways to minimize 
agency costs and there is a lack of in-depth studies on how organizations do in practice 
at reducing agency costs and ensuring corporation between divisions. In this research, 
the interpretive analysis of the cases will not only focus on the agency relationship 
between the SSC and its customers and also the SSC and the head office but will also 
investigate how the head office uses the recharging information to ensure control and 
coordination.   
3.6 Conceptual Framework 
Chandler (1962) identified different types of administrative structures. Williamson 
(1975) used transaction costs to explain how different firms organize their economic 
activities in particular ways. Agency theory further helps researchers to understand the 
behavioral aspects in organizational context. By integrating these three theories, a 
conceptual framework has been developed, which is presented in the following figure 
3.3.   
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Figure 3.3, Governance aspiration framework 
Setting up SSC transform the support service provision from intra-divisional to inter-
divisional relationship (Herbert and Seal, 2012). But whether or not the transactions 
between SSC and its customer business units are actually governed by market approach 
or hierarchical approach is uncertain. If the relationship between SSC and its customer 
business units is market-based this indicates that a buyer-seller relationship exists 
within the organizational context and this relationship is safeguarded by the contracts. 
The SSC in this scenario is like the outsourcer in the open market. The ‘price' of support 
services is set either by applying a cost-plus method or referring to the price of similar 
services available in the market. Both SSC and its customers should be free to choose 
a contractual partner. Transfer pricing approach of recharging mechanism is assumed 
to be applied with market-oriented governance, which means the costs incurred for 
providing support services will be directly recharged to the service-consuming business 
units. Direct recharging should reduce information asymmetry between a service 
provider and its customers because the customer could ‘feel’ the payment and raise 
their cost consciousness. The recharging of SSC will become part of customer business 
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units’ operating costs. Thus, directly recharging by using transfer pricing approach will 
drive customers’ good behaviors and motivate them to improve their own efficiency. 
On the other extreme, when internal transactions are governed by a sole hierarchical 
approach, both SSC and customer business units are operating under the control of the 
head office. In this circumstance, SSC is essentially regarded more like a central service 
department, regardless its identification of a semi-autonomous business unit. Being part 
of the head office, the costs incurred by SSC will be absorbed by the head office without 
further allocation to customer divisions. Without direct recharging, the cost information 
is hidden for customer business units, which means there is no appreciation of costs. 
Because customers are not aware of their consumption of support services, they will 
likely feel no accountability to contribute to the cost reduction or efficiency 
improvement of SSC.  
Hybrid approach stays between market-based and hierarchical based approach. For the 
SSC in this type of organization, the costs of providing supporting services is assumed 
to be absorbed by the headquarters before allocating to service-receiving business units 
by using the management accounting techniques such as Activity-Based Costing. Or in 
some cases, the full costs incurred in SSC will also directly recharging to its customers. 
The difference between hybrid and market-based approach is that the purpose of 
operating SSC in a hybrid organization is not to generate profits. Therefore, no mark-
up or profit will be added to the recharging amount.  
In this framework, the support services provided by SSC are classified into two groups: 
transactional and transformational services. Transactional services "deal with all the 
process and activities related to meeting the administrative requirements of employees" 
(Ulrich, 1995, p.14). Transactional services in finance are routine financial activities 
that require little or no judgment such as general ledger, account receivables etc. 
(Cooper and Herbert, 2015). Transformational activities which are non-routine or non-
administrative might be classified as high value added (Sako, 2006). This type of 
activities might require specialized technical or professional knowledge (Cooper and 
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Herbert, 2015) and could be undertaken in Center of Excellence8 rather than SSC. This 
type of activities within finance context include financial report analysis and investment 
decisions etc. Whether the recharging is based on budgeted or actual number depends 
on the different type of services because as explained in the previous section, it is easy 
to standardize transactional activities and find the reference prices in the market. 
However, for transformational activities which might be highly specialized or 
customized, the recharging rate might vary largely in different cases. Therefore, the 
actual recharging rate is more appropriate.   
3.7 Summary  
This research seeks to have an in-depth understanding of the recharging process of 
SSCs. The research objective includes an illustration of the recharging mechanism and 
the behavioral effects of recharging. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it 
is rare that one single theory has a monopoly on the explanation of organizational 
practice. Thus, several theories have to be integrated to build a more complete and 
fruitful framework to address the research questions. Three theories: the theory of 
organizational structure, TCE and agency theories are reviewed in this chapter and each 
theory is linked to the research context – SSC and its recharging mechanism.  
This chapter has reviewed the organizational structure theory in section 3.2 as the 
setting-up of SSCs has changed the organizational structure of a traditional multi-
divisional organization. As SSC is operating as a semi-autonomous business unit, the 
transaction between SSC and its customers has changed from hierarchical to hybrid of 
hierarchical and market-based. The original theoretical integration includes the theory 
of organizational structure and Williamson's TCE (1975). Several factors, such as asset 
specificity, bounded rationality, and uncertainty are assumed to influence the 
recharging mechanism chosen by SSCs. In terms of the behavioral effects of 
recharging, as the SSC provides support services on behalf of its customers, the agency 
                                            
8 A Centre of excellence combines individuals and teams who have deep knowledge and expertise 
(Ulrich, 1995, p.15).  
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problem might be raised. Principle-agent model is used to discuss how the recharging 
process influences the managerial behaviors of both the SSC and its customers. Based 
on the theory triangulation, a conceptual framework is built in section 3.6. Different 
governance aspirations are assumed to influence different organizations’ choice of 
SSC’s recharging mechanism and the recharging process would enforce the control of 
the head office and drive good behaviors of both the SSC and its customers. This 
framework will be used to analyze the empirical data of case organizations in the 
discussion chapter, before moving to the description of cases, the next chapter will 
explain research methods that applied in this research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 critically reviewed the existing literature about transfer pricing and cost 
allocation, while the conceptual framework to be employed was developed in Chapter 
3. This chapter will explain the research methodology and method applied in this 
research. 
It will discuss the common research paradigms in the social sciences and, more 
specifically, the interpretive paradigm and its application in the research of 
management accounting (section 4.2), as a prelude to explaining the research strategy 
in this inquiry (section 4.3). This will include an explanation of data collection and 
analysis methods and how the research findings were evaluated.  
The details of the research design are explained in section 4.3, including the research 
approach, data collection process, and data analysis methods. Interviews with key 
informants are employed as the main source of empirical data along with ‘in-house’ 
documents providing complementary information. The evaluation of qualitative 
research is discussed in section 4.4. The chapter closes with a short summary in section 
4.5. 
 
4.2 Research Paradigm 
Different ways of viewing the world shape different ways of researching the world.                        
(Crotty, 1998).  
It is important to be clear of the researchers’ beliefs about the world before discussing 
the research methodology which guides the practical ways of doing this research. A 
research paradigm is a basic belief system that represents the researcher’s view of the 
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nature of the world, together with the researcher’s role in the world and the relationship 
between them (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Normally, there are three dimensions of a 
chosen research paradigm: ontology, epistemology and methodology and Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) express these different paradigms as three fundamental questions: 
1. Ontology: What is the nature of reality?  
Ontological assumptions concern the nature of reality and whether reality exists 
independently of the human mind, or whether it is a product of our own 
subjective thoughts (Chua, 1986; Hopper and Powell, 1985) 
2. Epistemology: What is the relationship between the knower/researcher and 
what can be known? 
Epistemology assumptions consider how the knower begins to understand 
reality.  
These first two dimensions form a researcher’s beliefs about the world. There is a 
natural dichotomy between two beliefs about reality: objectivism and constructivism. 
Those researchers who hold the worldview of objectivism believe that reality is 
objectively given and the researcher is independent of that reality. On the other hand, 
in constructivism, researchers believe that reality is constructed through human 
interactions and the researcher is a participant observer in the processing of finding out 
about reality.  
3. Methodology: How can the knower find out what he/she believes can be 
known? 
The choice of methodology is driven or influenced by his/her answer to the first two 
questions, ontological and epistemological assumptions (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
Methodology not only includes the method(s) that are applied by the researcher to 
investigate and acquire knowledge but also to the research design and the plan of 
research activities which will guide the researcher in collecting and analyzing data 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979).   
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Different answers to these three fundamental questions constitute different research 
paradigms. There is no unified classification of research paradigms. For example, 
Collins and Hussey (2003) distinguish a positivistic paradigm from the 
phenomenological one, whilst Guba and Lincoln (1994) define four paradigm 
positions: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, and constructivism. The next 
section will first introduce Burrell and Morgan’s framework (1979) which is frequently 
used in social science research followed by Laughlin’s (1995) framework which will 
also be discussed.  
 
4.2.1 Burrell and Morgan’s Framework 
Using two dimensions which represent the nature of social science (objectivism and 
subjectivism) and two approaches to society (regulation and radical change), Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) defined four paradigms: radical humanism, radical structuralism, 
interpretivism, and functionalism, see figure 4.1. Different ontological assumptions 
about the world and epistemological notions of knowledge determine each of four basic 
research paradigms. According to Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) argument, the 
researcher can only use one paradigm at one time because using one research paradigm 
means denying the assumptions of the other three. The four paradigms are explained 
further in sub-sections 4.2.1.1 to 4.2.1.4. 
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Figure 4.1 Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.22)  
4.2.1.1 Functionalist paradigm 
Functionalist researchers believe that reality is independent of the participants of the 
research programme and that reality exists objectively without any influence by the 
investigator (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The purpose of functionalist research is to 
summarize knowledge “in a form of context-free generalization” (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). Researchers believe that research objects can be both observed and measured, 
and as such, they seek to establish a causal relationship(s) between different variables 
(Hopper and Powell, 1985), in order to predict phenomena (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). 
Such ontological and epistemological assumptions are adapted from the natural 
sciences. The common research approach starts from general theories/laws and seeks 
to test pre-determined frameworks or hypotheses by collecting a large number of 
empirical observations. During the data analysis process, mathematical tools are 
frequently used by researchers to find the causal relationship between 
indicators/independent variables and effects/dependent variables (Sale, Lohfeld and 
Brazil, 2002). The functionalist paradigm has tended to dominate research in 
accounting and finance since the 1970s.  
Radical Change
Subjective Objective
Regulation
Radical Humanist Radical Structuralist
Interpretive Functionalist
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4.2.1.2 Interpretive paradigm 
In contrast to Burrell and Morgan’s framework (1979), the basis of interpretive research 
is subjectivism. In other words, reality is socially constructed and thus, dependent on 
the human mind (Collis and Hussey, 2003), which in turn means that institutions only 
come to life because a human makes them come to life (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009). 
Researchers who use interpretive methods see themselves as participants in the research 
process (Creswell, 1994) as they interact with what is being researched (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). Interpretive researchers attempt to understand the human mind and 
people’s perception of reality in order to try and make sense of human behavior by 
interpreting their actions. According to Lukka and Modell (2010), the key characteristic 
of interpretive research is the adoption of an emic perspective, which requires a native 
insider (normally a participant of interpretive research) accessing the meanings under 
analysis. Denzin (1983) emphasized the importance of a researcher’s immersion in the 
phenomenon to fully understand and interpret human experience. Due to this personal 
involvement, interpretive researchers are usually bounded within a specific context 
(Collins and Hussey, 2003; Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 1992; Hopper and Powell, 
1985). Interpretivists essentially undertake research through the observation and 
interpretation of the participants’ language, behaviors or other actions so as to 
understand participants’ own perception of the phenomenon at hand (Deetz, 1996).  
4.2.1.3 Radical Humanist  
The assumptions of the radical humanist about the nature of social sciences are 
essentially the same as the interpretive paradigm. However, their assumptions about the 
nature of society are different. The radical humanist paradigm is associated with a 
considerable change in the environment and researchers concentrate on how the 
relaxation of social restrictions enable human development (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
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4.2.1.4 Radical Structuralist  
The radical structuralist paradigm shares many of the assumptions with the functionalist 
paradigm about the objective nature of reality. However, the focus for those researchers 
that adapt radical structuralist is to study structural relationships within the context of 
the social world.  
4.2.1.5 Criticisms about Burrell and Morgan’s Framework 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) classification (especially the distinction between 
functionalist and interpretive research) has inspired many accounting researchers 
although, is also subject to some criticisms. The framework suggests a mutually 
exclusive relationship between different research paradigms which means only one 
research paradigm can be used at one time. Gallholfer and Haslam (1997) argued that 
this restricts the communication between the followers of different research paradigms. 
Another important criticism is that the distinction between the objectivism and 
subjectivism (Ryan et al., 1992). Interpretive research could include both subjective 
and objective features (Chua, 1986; Lukka and Modell, 2010; Ahrens, 2008). For 
example, human minds are inherently subjective, but humans can create social 
structures that subsequently become capable of objective analysis (Ryan et al, 2002).  
 
4.2.2 Laughlin’s middle-range thinking approach 
By avoiding Burrell and Morgan’s distinction between subjectivism and objectivism, 
Laughlin (1995) provides an alternative framework to categorize different schools of 
thoughts in accounting research. This is comprised of three dimensions – theory, 
methodological and change.  
The ‘theory’ dimension in this framework includes the view about the nature of the 
world (ontology) and what is knowledge and its relationship with current investigation 
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(epistemology). A High level of theory indicates an assumption about the material 
world which is believed to be “distinct from the observers’ projections and bias” 
(Laughlin, 1995, p.66). Research with a high level of theory tends to have a high level 
of generality. The other extreme of the theory dimension assumes that the world is a 
projection of human minds, hence, for this type of research, generalization is 
impossible. The ‘methodology’ dimension comprises the role played by the observer in 
the discovering process (human nature) and the level of theory in methodology itself 
(methodology). According to Laughlin (1995), the methodology dimension is related 
to theory dimension in a linear manner, which means a high level of theory will indicate 
a high level of methodology. For these research studies, the observer is irrelevant to the 
research process. If the level of methodology dimension is low, the observer is “free-
thinking” (Laughlin, 1995, p.67) and heavily involved in the research process. His or 
her perceptual skills are regarded as a strength of the research rather than it being a 
limiting problem. The last dimension ‘change’ measures whether the investigation 
changes in according to the change in the phenomena being investigated (Laughlin, 
1995). Researchers that believe in a high level of change assume that everything is 
inadequate and incomplete and thus, desire change. Researchers who choose a low level 
of change dimension prefer to maintain the status quo. By using the level of these three 
dimensions, Laughlin (1995) classified different approaches as shown in figure 4.2.   
Each approach is depicted in the cell referring to its implicit theoretical and 
methodological chosen position with the change element marked as L, M or H 
(referring to low, medium and high, respectively. The empty cells are theoretical 
possibilities but do not currently appear to be occupied. The positioning for each 
approach, which is only indicative, could be justified individually (p.70).  
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Figure 4.2 Characteristics of Alternative Schools of Thoughts (Taken from Laughlin, 
1995, p.70)  
According to Laughlin (1995), accounting researchers should be more “middle-range 
thinking” (the central cell in figure 4.2) because accounting is not a purely technical 
problem and the application of accounting theory is contingent to the context. The top 
left cell in figure 4.2 represents positivistic research. For this kind of research, theories 
are well defined with hypotheses to be tested. The research is well-structured and 
quantitative method is applied. The conclusions about findings are tight. At the other 
extreme, the bottom right cell represents interactionism, pragmatism, and 
ethnomethology researches. For these researches, the theories are ill-defined and there 
might be not generalized theory to be found. Research methodology is unstructured and 
qualitative, for example, based on longitudinal case studies that provide a view of 
change over time and include rich empirical data. But, the conclusions are likely 
inconclusive (Laughlin, 1995, p. 80).  
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The “middle-range” argues “a case for taking a mid-point on each of the three 
continuums” (Laughlin, 1995, p.78). In terms of theory dimension, “middle-range” 
maintains the idea that only “skeletal” theories in social phenomena can be found. For 
“high” level theory, theories are well-defined and differences are assumed away. 
However, accounting practices are not like scientific theories which are context-free, 
because they are conducted by diverse social actors. On the other hand, a “low” level 
of theory assumes that everything is unique and independent from each other, as such 
it respects the details of actual situations. “Medium” theory includes both the empirical 
details (from the “low” position) and the possibility of learning through theoretical 
insights (from the “high” position). In Laughlin’s words, “its design and use of 
‘skeletal’ theories, which cannot stand on their own but need empirical ‘flesh’ to make 
them meaningful and complete” (p. 83). Following the assumptions about theoretical 
perspectives, the medium position in methodology also combines the strengths of both 
the “high” and “low” positions. Clear perceptual processes are adopted but, during the 
observing or discovering process, flexibility and diversity are still encouraged. The 
method is “part-constrained and part-free” (Laughlin, 1995, p. 84). With regard to 
“medium” position of change dimension, current situations are maintained but the 
researcher is open to changes if that is appropriate. The medium/medium/medium 
approach does not guarantee the generalization about reality but is open to its existence. 
It emphasizes the vital importance of empirical evidence which is essential to complete 
“skeletal theory”.  
4.2.3 Previous research in Management Accounting 
Before the 1980s, research methods such as deductive analysis and controllable 
laboratory experiments dominated management accounting researches (Kaplan, 1986). 
According to Kaplan (1986), 87% of published papers during the period from the 1920s 
to 1980s used these two methods. Following the suggestions in the conference 
"Accounting in Its Organizational Context", held at the University of California Los 
Angeles, in the 1980s, the direction of management accounting researchers moved from 
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pure theoretical analysis towards the collection of empirical data from actual 
organizations (Kaplan, 1986) and consequently from normative theories (concerned 
with what ought to happen) towards positive theories (concerned with what actually 
does happen) (Scapens, 1990).  
Since then, functionalist research methods such as quantitative surveys have come to 
dominate mainstream empirical research in management accounting. Researchers have 
been keen to either give a “superficial view” of management accounting practices or to 
find “law-like regularities that are testable with empirical data sets” (Lukka, 2010). This 
functionalist research approach assumes that reality exists objectively and the 
hypothetical-deductive method (testing the hypothesis that deducted from existing 
theories) is therefore applied by researchers. In a functionalist paradigm, human beings 
themselves are also classed as objects, rather than just the external makers of social 
reality (Chua, 1986). Aside from these underlying assumptions about reality, positive 
accounting research before the 1980s also shares the basic assumption of neo-classic 
economic theories, including the notion that the driver of all organizational behaviors 
is utility maximization at the best price in the market (Scapens, 1990). Positivist 
theories informed by these assumptions seek to predict market-level behaviors or 
general trends, yet, can essentially fail to explain individual behavior and motivation 
(Ryan et al., 1992).  
By the end of the 1960s, some management accounting researchers had started to 
criticize functionalist research as they believed that knowledge is historically and 
socially conditioned. They argued that management accounting practices are not a 
natural phenomenon, for which generalized rules can be found (Hopper and Powell, 
1985). While that might be possible for abstract conceptualizations of economic 
phenomena, management accounting practices are essentially contingent on the 
organizational context and management accounting practice varies according to the 
environment, the nature of organizations and other economic factors (Hopper and 
Powell, 1985). Moreover, some human factors, such as the decision makers’ 
perspectives, behaviors, and experiences, can also have a significant influence on 
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practitioners’ choice of management accounting practices. When the research is 
context-specific and subjective factors are involved, it is better to seek insight into the 
inner world of the research context (Hopper and Powell, 1985). 
In addition, the knowledge-practice gap in management accounting is starting to be 
noticed by many researchers (Eccles, 1985; Nørreklit, Nørreklit, and Israelsen, 2006; 
Scapens, 1990, Kaplan, 1986; Tissen and Waterhouse, 1983). However, the 
management accounting models and techniques suggested in academic papers and 
textbooks were found not to be widely used in practice (Eccles, 1985; Nørreklit et al., 
2006). Indeed, Chua (1986) argued that only an abstract image of accounting is obtained 
if the contextual knowledge of the role and meaning of accounting numbers is missing. 
The realization of the practice/theory gap raised the importance of understanding 
management accounting practices in a real-life context (Scapens, 1990; Kaplan, 1986; 
Tissen and Waterhouse, 1983). Chua (1986) suggested two alternative approaches in 
mainstream accounting research – interpretive and critical research – with both of 
approaches being bounded within real-life contexts.  
4.2.4 Research paradigm adopted in this study: Interpretivism 
The research paradigm used in this research is essentially based on interpretivisms but, 
as Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka and Kuoriskoski (2008) suggested, interpretive research 
in management accounting straddles two paradigms (interpretive and functionalist), 
including as they do subjective and objective features.  
Interpretive research methods, such as case studies, examine a single instance of a 
phenomenon (Collins and Hussey, 2003). Unlike traditional mainstream management 
accounting research, which focuses on the answer to a ‘why’ question, interpretive 
research in management accounting seeks to solve the ‘how’ question by studying 
accounting in action (Chua, 1988). It does not seek to discover general rules but rather 
to understand the specific phenomenon within a particular context (Yin, 2008) and 
alternatively, to get a dynamic view of a particular management accounting practice 
 87 
(Vaivio, 2008). Burrell and Morgan (1979) argued that this interpretive research is 
associated with subjectivism; although, there has been a continuous debate on this 
subjectivist base of interpretive research in management accounting (Chua, 1986; 
Lukka and Modell, 2010; Ahrens, 2008; Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008). From a 
subjectivist perspective, the interpretive research places an emphasis on providing 
"thick" descriptions (Geertz, 1973) which cover the details of phenomena and 
dependence between phenomena from the viewpoint of the participants or native 
insiders (Denzin, 1983). The researchers stay within the same social context as the 
research subjects and try to understand and analyze people's words, behaviors, and 
actions in this specific context through observations and communication. The holistic 
analysis is "shaped in interaction between people and a broad range of human and non-
human aspects" (Lukka and Modell, 2010, p. 464). 
However, interpretive research not only requires the adoption of an emic perspective, 
which is understanding from the examined subjects’ point of view, but also an etic 
(objective) perspective, which is from the outsiders’ point of view (Dezin, 1983; 
Headland, 1990; Pike, 1954; Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008). Chua (1986) argued that 
although the daily actions of human beings are subjectively created, in continuous 
interaction with others’ actions, the meanings and norms of these actions become 
objectively (inter-subjectively) real. The application of management accounting 
activities varies depending on different contexts but, in reality, companies tend to model 
themselves on those that are successful in their field. Thus, it is possible to find common 
issues in social research (Lukka and Kasanen, 1995).  
In this study, the researcher does not assume there is a reality that is independent of 
human minds to be discovered, because individuals play a role in the construction of 
reality (Creswell, 2003). In terms of epistemological assumptions, the researcher 
believes that knowledge comes through interaction with individuals who participate in 
the research. These leading to a subjective position of social science. However, as 
explained in the previous section, although the functioning of management accounting 
technique is contingent on organizational factors, there is a possibility to find 
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generalizable aspects of social rules (Chua, 1988; Laughlin, 1995). Therefore, within 
the continuum of Laughlin’s framework, the researcher is at the medium ontological 
position where it is possible to find “Skeletal theories” (Laughlin, 1995) and in this 
study empirical evidence will be used to complete the theories. A medium position in 
theory dimension indicates that the researcher is also at the medium position of 
methodology dimension, which means the researcher is not completely free but partly-
constrained by the external environment. The last dimension of Laughlin (1995) is 
change. The purpose of this research is to investigate the recharging mechanisms in a 
shared service context. The focus is to understand a particular practice in social 
structure. Although the researcher is open to the changes in the phenomenon being 
studied, there is no intention for the researcher to create any change. 
4.3 Research strategy: qualitative research   
Crotty (1998) defined four steps for research design that a researcher needs to be clear 
about: how epistemology informs the research, the philosophical paradigm of the 
research, the research strategy and the particular techniques that will be used. The 
previous sections elaborated the first two aspects and now the research strategy and the 
particular research approach to be employed will be discussed. The three possible 
research approaches are qualitative methods, quantitative methods and mixed methods 
(Creswell, 2003).  
Generally, qualitative and quantitative research designs are antithetical because they 
are grounded in different ontological and epistemological paradigms and thus, data 
analysis processes involve distinct techniques (Walliman, 2005). Researchers who 
apply quantitative methods use numerical data to measure relevant variables and, by 
using a ‘hard’ (Walliman, 2005) analysis method (usually statistical calculations) to 
discover potential correlations and causal relationships between independent and 
dependent variables (Creswell, 2003). Most researchers who conduct quantitative 
research aim to test the hypotheses which are deduced from theoretical literature (Gill 
and Johnson, 2010). Alternatively. qualitative researchers collect non-numerical data 
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to understand people’s perception of a phenomenon and its context. The sources of 
qualitative data could be interviews, observations, documents, questionnaires, focus 
group discussions and the impressions of researchers. Types of data could include voice 
recordings (with or without transcriptions) of interviews, notes of meetings or other 
textual information (Creswell, 2003). Many qualitative research methods, such as field 
work and case study, require the researchers’ active participation and interaction with 
the research objects in the context. Unlike the hypothetical-deductive (Walliman, 2005) 
process of quantitative research, qualitative researchers intend to start from the nominal 
data (Collins and Hussey, 2003) and develop themes or create theories from the 
empirical evidence (Creswell, 2003).  
The underlying philosophical paradigm of this research is interpretivism and the 
purpose of this research is to understand the recharging process in the SSC context. 
Denzin and Lincon (2000) argued that qualitative studies are used to understand 
phenomena in their natural settings and try to explain the meanings that people might 
attach to the phenomena. Rather than be predictive and prescriptive, qualitative research 
tends to be more descriptive and explanatory (Leavy, 2004). Thus, it is appropriate for 
understanding the application process of a particular accounting technique (recharging) 
in a particular context (SSC). The advantage of undertaking qualitative research is that 
it helps the researcher to understand how phenomena come about, how they are 
experienced and how they are interpreted. Nonetheless, the greatest criticism of 
qualitative research is that the findings in the study sample cannot be generalized to a 
wider population. Generalization will be discussed further in the next section 4.4.3.  
In order to answer the ‘how’ questions, it is better for researchers to use an in-depth 
case study method (Perry, 2001) and collect data directly from the organization 
(Kaplan, 1986). A multiple-case study will be undertaken in this study including a 
detailed description and analysis of three individual case organizations. The case study 
method is a research technique that is popular in the social sciences as it aims to 
understand human beings in an organizational context, in a group setting or in a social 
event (Yin, 2008). The researcher conducted three case studies in SSCs to collect 
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primary data for this research and the details of the research process will be discussed 
below.  
4.3.1 Case studies 
Case study research is, perhaps, the oldest means used to explore and explain real-world 
phenomena. When a holistic perspective is required to understand the phenomena, it is 
arguably the best method (Baker, 2003). Yin (2008) defined the case study approach as 
follows: 
 A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (p.18). 
Yin (2008) defined three types of case study: explanatory, descriptive and exploratory. 
Especially if little is known about the phenomenon, a case study could be conducted to 
explore a new field and provides a useful first step in the research process to generate 
ideas, propositions and/or hypotheses (Ryan et al., 1992). Yin (2008) argued that 
although some scientists believe that case studies are only appropriate in the exploratory 
phase, it is possible, nevertheless, to do descriptive and explanatory case studies. 
Descriptive case studies focus on the description of a particular technique such as an 
accounting practice applied in the real world. It is most useful in terms of determining 
the extent of the knowledge-practice gap (Ryan et al., 1992). On the other hand, an 
explanatory study aims to explain the reasons for implementing particular practices in 
a specific case. This is useful when producing a theory because theoretical insights can 
be generated through a detailed investigation in the field (Thomas, 2004). Yin explained 
that the case study  
attempts to examine a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, 
especially when b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident (Yin, 2008).  
The purpose of a case study is to develop a tentative explanation or hypothesis to guide 
further research, rather than simply to confirm or disconfirm a pre-determined 
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hypothesis (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). It can be the bridge between quantitative data 
and further mainstream deductive research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). However, 
a case study is not totally inductive as it could combine both induction and deduction 
since some of the information is based on prior theoretical knowledge whilst the other 
insights come from the field research (Baker, 2003). It is possible to have research units 
of different scopes in a case study but the most common unit in business studies is either 
an organization or a business unit of a particular organization (Thomas, 2004).  
Criticism of the case study method 
There are several concerns about using the case study method in research. First is that 
undertaking a case study could be costly in terms of time and money, especially a 
multiple-case study (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001), not only during the collection 
process but also when analyzing qualitative data on a large-scale (Yin, 2008). Second 
is that data could lack rigor (Yin, 2008). Unlike numerical testing which is objective, 
the subjectivity of case study research is often criticized because the researchers 
involved could influence the data, and be influenced by the data, in several ways, for 
example, by the style of the questions they ask, how they ask them and how participants 
answer those questions. Third, a relatively small sample size in case study may cause 
the case study result to be biased in terms of verification. However, this bias could be 
reduced through triangulation, which means the results would come from using 
different sources of data (Denzin, 1978). One of the most common criticisms of the 
case study method is that the results may not be generalizable. This is because the 
understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon is closely relevant to the context, 
therefore it is not certain whether similar results will be generated from another context. 
It is difficult for a case study to be ‘generally accepted’ and produce ‘law-like’ theories.  
Despite there being some criticisms about case study research, it is still the preferred 
strategy used to understand “how” questions in social science (Yin, 2003). If the 
researchers can interpret and calibrate the empirical data of the case study with existing 
theories and across data from multiple cases, it is likely that they will still be able to 
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produce an authentic account of the enquiry and thus, convince the readers of the 
validity of the study and gain their approval for generalization (Lukka and Kasanena, 
1995). 
Single or Multiple cases 
Case study research could comprise single case or multiple cases. Yin (2008) put 
forward five rationales of applying a single case study. For example, if the study aims 
to critically test existing theory, or investigate the same case along a timeline, a single 
case study will most likely be chosen. The other three reasons include: that the case is 
rare/unique, representative/typical or revelatory. Yin (2008) argued that a single case 
requires careful investigation to minimize the risk of misrepresentation which may 
result in a potential vulnerability in the overall research process.  
For this reason, some researchers may choose to include several cases within their 
studies. In terms of sampling logic, researchers tend to choose multiple cases since they 
represent varied attributes of the population (Thomas, 2004). It is believed that 
including more than one case in a research enquiry, which predicts either how similar 
or different results will be, could provide more convincing and robust evidence. By 
comparing data from different situations, the researcher could defend himself/herself 
and argue that the findings are not idiosyncratic and thus, applicable to just one 
particular case (Eisenhardt, 1991). Also, doing multiple case studies could enable a 
researcher to expand the research question and give a broader theoretical elaboration 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
Considering the advantages and criticisms of both the single and multiple case methods, 
this research will apply the multiple case method. From theoretic analysis and context 
literature, it is believed that there is likely to be more than one recharging mechanisms 
in the SSC model whilst single case could provide enough information to answer the 
question of ‘how the particular recharging mechanisms work’ it would not enable the 
researcher to discover and compare how different recharging mechanisms might lead 
to or are influenced by, different governance mechanisms. Thus, a multiple-case study 
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will be undertaken in this research and this approach will be explained further in the 
data collection sub-section 4.3.3.  
 
4.3.2 Access to data 
A good research setting is the one that the researcher has sufficient access to the 
research context to establish an open relationship with participants quickly and enable 
data directly related to the research interests to be collected easily (Bogdan and Taylor, 
1990). Patton (1990) argued that qualitative research seeks to understand the 
phenomenon in depth on a relatively small sample, and sometimes these samples need 
to be selected purposefully.  
Prior to this study, the supervisors of the researcher had been undertaking research into 
the SSC model for over ten years. In that wider scheme of enquiry, there had appeared 
to be a general disjuncture between management theory and the SSC as a new, quasi-
commercial, organizational form (e.g. Herbert and Seal, 2012, and Seal and Herbert, 
2013). In order to investigate the views of practitioners across a number of SSCs, the 
supervisors had set up a series of practitioner roundtables (CIMA-Loughborough SSC 
forum) that had been held quarterly since 2008, in areas of the world where there are 
SSCs, e.g. UK, Ireland, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Singapore. The meetings were hosted 
in turn by the participating organizations and would normally last a full day, with 
around 20-30 SSC managers attending each meeting. Over time, a range of issues 
pertaining to the nature, structure, and operation of SSCs were discussed, such as the 
transforming process of finance function, benchmarking techniques, SLA formats, and 
the impact of the SSC model on the career path of management accountants. 
Participating SSC managers were keen to share best practice and to benchmark their 
approach and performance against other SSCs. 
In 2013, as the researcher started her doctoral studies, the question of recharging cost 
from SSCs to client divisions was placed onto the agenda of the roundtable. A 
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surprising finding from the discussions at the meetings was that, despite the rhetoric of 
the SSC model as a relatively straightforward organizational form governed by SLAs 
and which recharges its costs to client units on the basis of market-based transfer prices, 
in practice, there was actually a complex mix of approaches to recharging costs. Whilst, 
some of the SSCs said they used quite detailed service recharge schedules, there 
appeared to be little use of market-pricing. Indeed, a majority of SSC managers 
preferred to employ a somewhat elementary ‘broad-brush’ cost allocation approach 
(Seal and Herbert, 2013). Moreover, the researcher had expected that the choice of the 
recharging method would evolve as each SSC matured, from broad-brush cost 
allocation to more sophisticated transfer pricing, as suggested by Quinn et al. Yet, this 
appeared not to be the case. As a result, the researcher initiated a more specific enquiry 
into SSC recharging methods and approached several of the forum members to request 
permission to do exploratory case studies. A number organizations accepted the 
requests, but given the wider experience of SSC community and visits by the researcher 
herself to SSC site e.g. Network Rail, RCUK, together with experience at the 
Loughborough SSC forums, the researcher eventually chose three organizations which 
she believed would both provide a sufficiently representative view of the SSC model 
and the range of recharging mechanisms used in practice, and provide sufficient depth 
and richness in understanding what appeared to be complex and dynamic organizational 
context. Table 4. shows the broad characteristics of the three chosen case organizations 
below.  
In one of the CIMA-Loughborough forum meetings held in Malaysia in 2012, the 
researcher discussed the recharging issue with the represents from the local SSCs of 
some multinational organizations, including the VP of AMD SSC and the HR manager 
of DHL GBS. It was surprising to discover that the AMD SSC recharges all its costs to 
the head office of AMD and it is not clear whether there is any identifiable reallocation 
to the customer divisions. This led the researcher to consider how cost consciousness 
might alternatively be created and how the head office ensures the cooperation between 
SSC and its customers, this makes the AMD an exploratory case of this study.  
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 AMD DHL MyCSP 
Industry Technology Logistics Pension 
Administration 
Geographical scope Multi-national Multi-national UK  
History of Financial 
SSCs 
Since 2002 Since 2006 Since 2010 
Offshore location of 
SSC 
Malaysia Malaysia, Netherland, 
Mauritius, Costa Rica, 
Argentina, Czech 
Republic 
N/A 
Charge-back 
mechanism 
No recharging Transfer pricing (direct 
recharge) to divisions 
for transactions 
Cost allocation 
(recharge through the 
Cabinet Office) for 
activities covered in 
core contract and 
transfer pricing (direct 
recharge) for 
additional services 
Governance type Hierarchical 
orientation 
Market-based Hybrid (with the 
ambition to become 
more market-oriented)  
Table 4.1 Details of case organizations  
Of the three case organizations, two are large multinational private sector organizations 
(AMD and DHL) and the third is a UK company in the public sector (MyCSP).   
Whilst, the HR manager of DHL did not know much about the details of the recharging, 
she kindly introduced the researcher to the CFO of the DHL Global Business Service 
Center (GBS), based in Malaysia. The first interview at DHL was undertaken in 2013 
but despite a number of subsequent requests contact was lost with the GBS CFO. In 
2015, the researcher met another senior manager of DHL’s SSC network at an SSC 
trade conference. Further to a visit to the Company's SSC in the Netherlands, it was 
apparent that the recharging mechanism applied within DHL had changed to a cost 
allocation basis from the transfer pricing system that had been evident in Malaysia in 
2013. This evolutionary process inspired the researcher’s interest and suggested that 
this might be more typical case and the have significant similarity to other companies. 
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DHL was chosen as the main case of this study and a further series of research activities 
were undertaken to collect data between 2015 and 2018.  
The last case chosen, MyCSP, is UK-based pension administration company that 
evolved out of the public sector around 2011 with a novel ownership structure 
comprising a private sector outsourcing specialist, the UK Government, and its 
employees. Following preliminary discussions with the finance controller of MyCSP in 
2015, it was apparent that MyCSP applied different recharging mechanisms according 
to different types of services, which makes MyCSP quite representative and comparable 
to DHL case. Therefore, MyCSP was chosen as the third case of this study. Detailed 
research activities were undertaken for each case organizations will be explained in the 
following chapters (sub-section 5.2.3, 6.2.3, 7.2.2).  
 
4.3.3 Data Collection 
Triangulation  
The logic of triangulation is that by mixing different data, investigators, theories and 
research methods (Denzin, 1978), complementary insights of the same phenomenon 
can be provided and compared, thus enhancing the validity of the research (Modell, 
2009). Although some researchers equate triangulation with mixed research methods, 
this is not the only form of triangulation, for example, collecting data from different 
sources, combining different theories (Hopper and Hoque, 2006) or using different 
people to analyze the findings (Denzin, 1978; Patton, 1990). Indeed, Yin (1981) 
suggested that in order to reduce the problems that may arise from ‘within-case’ 
analysis, narrative writing should be organized around the topic and data should be 
collected from different sources such as from interviews with different respondents. 
Patton (1990) argued that it is a misunderstanding that data collected from different 
sources or research approaches might yield the same result. Indeed, inconsistency 
between different sources of data such as different interviewees might actually help 
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researchers to gain a deeper insight into the phenomenon at hand. Yin (2008) noted that 
although using triangulation would enhance validity, the evidence collected from 
different sources should provide a chain which allows the reader to trace the steps of 
the research – and thereby help them to determine the construct validity of the research.  
Data triangulation is commonly used in case study research as researchers tend to 
collect data from a combination of interviews, documents and observations (Eisenhardt, 
1989) and consequently this enquiry will also use data triangulation. The main source 
of data will from interviews with individual people and focus groups consisting of staff 
familiar with the related operational aspects. Internal documents will also be used to 
provide additional information. The other form of triangulation employed in this 
research is the use of theories from different disciplines such as cost allocation and 
transfer pricing theory from accounting, transaction cost economics from economics 
and the agency theory from organizational studies.  
 
 Interview 
Interviews are one of the most important means to collect data in case study research 
(Yin, 2008) and this method can be used for either functionalist or interpretive research. 
Functionalist researchers tend to use a highly structured approach, i.e. asking structured 
and often more closed questions to gather information. Whereas, interpretive 
researchers tend to use semi-structured or unstructured interviews in order to encourage 
flexible responses from participants and to allow interactive clarification of answers to 
probe further emerging themes (Collins and Hussey, 2003). The chief assumption of a 
semi-structured interview is that the questions need to be adapted to the individual’s 
respondent’s context. Indeed, even the order in which the same questions are asked may 
change depending on interview context and the respondents’ reaction (Thomas, 2004). 
The advantage of undertaking either a semi-structured or unstructured interview is that 
different topics or questions may be raised during the interview which will benefit 
future data collection processes. However, the researchers should also pay attention to 
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practical problems such as how time-consuming interviews may be and therefore, fewer 
represents will be sampled. Other problems of interviews include information 
confidentiality and the lack of comparability in data collected. Moreover, stimulus 
equivalence should be ensured. This means the interview should be conducted in the 
same way for all respondents in order to reduce bias (Collins and Hussey, 2003). 
Another way to reduce the bias of interview data according to Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) is to use informants from diverse perspectives, e.g. people from different 
hierarchical levels or different functional departments.  
Interviews are the main source of data in this research and are preferred over 
questionnaire survey because 1) the research object is the SSC in different 
organizational settings instead of individual person, getting access to a large number of 
organizations that have an SSC is difficult for a doctoral candidate, and considering 
time and cost because SSCs are often relocated overseas; 2) as explained before, the 
purpose of the research is to understand a phenomena in context instead of, necessarily, 
testing deducted hypothesis, although it is possible to find "skeletal theory" (Laughlin, 
1995), empirical evidence is compulsory. 
The participants in the interviews included representatives from senior management 
wherever possible and middle management staff from SSC. Also, in order to increase 
the reliability of data, the representatives from either head office or other business units 
within the same organization were interviewed wherever possible. The details of the 
interviewees of the three cases are as follows: 
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 AMD DHL MyCSP 
No. of interviewees 10 
(including eight 
representatives that 
participated in group 
discussion)  
8 2  
(excluding informal 
discussions with 
relevant employees, 
which were not 
recorded) 
Variance of 
interviewees in SSC 
Finance Director, 
Financial Accounting 
Managers, Tax 
Managers, Vice 
President of SSC 
CFO of the SSCs, 
Manager of Pricing 
Department, CFO of 
CoE, Senior 
Controller, Junior 
Controller 
Financial Controller, 
General Manager of 
MyCSP 
Other perspective Head office 
perspective (the CFO 
of AMD group as a 
member of top 
management) 
Customer 
perspectives (CFO 
and Head of 
controlling of DHL 
business units in two 
countries) 
N/A 
Table 4.2 Details of interviews  
The researcher visited the SSCs of all three case organizations and much effort was 
made to get access to both the customers of the SSCs and the top/central management 
team of each company. In the AMD case, the data were collected from both the SSC 
and the head office of the group with more detailed research activities explained in 
Chapter 5 (section 5.2.3). In the DHL case, both the staff from the SSCs in two countries 
and two customer division countries were interviewed. Moreover, as DHL is the main 
case in this study, there was a change of recharging mechanism, in order to precisely 
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describe the evolution process of its recharging mechanism, and the interviews were 
undertaken in 2013, 2015 and 2018. At MyCSP, the clients are central government 
departments and the customers (government departments, e.g. Defence, or individual 
workers) are very fragmented and MyCSP is now a third-party to the public sector and 
thus, it is difficult to access relevant personnel for an interview. However, in addition 
to the two interviews undertaken in 2015, another interview was undertaken with the 
Financial Controller in 2018 to update the situation and learn more about the developing 
plans. All of the interviews were transcribed by a professional typist and all the 
transcripts were sent back to the interviewees for their verification.   
Due to conjectured knowledge-practice gap in the topic of transfer pricing, it was 
important that issues could be raised by participants (based on their working 
experience) and thus, a semi-structured interview was considered to be more 
appropriate and applied in this research.  
 
Focus Group interview  
A focus group involves the combination of both interviews and observations (Collins 
and Hussey, 2003) as selected participants are gathered together to discuss the research 
topic. The group of people chosen will be related to the researched phenomenon. By 
listening to other people’s opinions in the group, each participant will be encouraged to 
talk about their own situation and opinions. The researcher is also a participant in the 
discussion and the job of the researcher is to introduce the purpose of discussion, to ask 
open questions and ensure the discussion concentrates on pertinent questions (Collins 
and Hussey, 2003).  
The focus group interview method was also adopted in the first case AMD. The 
advantages of holding this focus group meeting at the outset were that it helped the 
researcher explore a wide range of opinions and generate new ideas which could then 
be used to develop a more focused questionnaire for the one-to-one interviews (Fern, 
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1982; Collin and Hussey, 2003). The focus group interviews held at AMD included 
eight senior staff members from different financial departments such as global tax 
services, accounts payable and business analysis (the total number of managerial level 
employees in AMDGS is 45, so the sample proportion is 18%).  
Holding both individual interviews and focus group meetings only occurred in the case 
of AMD. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. The transcripts of the interviews 
were also sent back to the participants for their approval afterward.  
 
Documents 
Documents can provide explicit data and enable researchers to obtain written evidence 
(Creswell, 2003). Documents may include letters, minutes of a meeting, internal reports 
and public documents such as annual reports of a company from an official website and 
newspaper articles (Yin, 2003). Documents are relatively stable, exact, provide a broad 
coverage and include informed opinions. However, the bias inherent within documents 
themselves is unknown both in internally generated and public document such as press 
reports, and some confidential information may be blocked to the researchers for 
security reasons (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2003). Consequently, documents were only used 
as complementary sources of data in this research to triangulate opinions expressed in 
the interviews and provide background information.  
The documents used in this research include the information from each organization's 
official website, annual reports, organizational charts, and some government 
documents. In DHL the researcher was given access to additional documentation, 
namely a copy of the service level agreement between the DHL SSC and its internal 
customers; the details of this contract will be explained in Chapter 6.  
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4.3.4 Data Analysis 
The data analysis of qualitative research mainly involves the deep interpretation of 
collected evidence, which is usually contextual data. Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that 
researchers who undertake a multiple-case studies should first analyze ‘within-case’ 
data and then search for any cross-case patterns. Researchers should be familiar with 
each case as a ‘stand-alone entity’ and write up their findings for each site, although the 
writing may be a pure description rather than emerging insights. Creswell (2003) listed 
several generic steps when analyzing qualitative data. First, the data collected should 
be organized; this includes transcribing recorded interviews, sorting and arranging 
documents. Second, researchers should read through the information and get a general 
sense of the data. Third, segment the information into categories before labeling these 
categories with a term, which is also called “open coding” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
This coding process summarizes the data (Collins and Hassey, 2003) and provides 
researchers with a preliminary framework of analysis. The fourth step is to describe the 
setting and generate themes, which are major findings of qualitative research according 
to Creswell (2003). This allows the researchers to be familiar with the cases and identify 
the different patterns of individual cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In order to improve the reliability and validity of case study, cross-case analysis is also 
essential for multiple-case research. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 540-541) stressed the 
importance of looking through data in divergent ways. He suggested three tactics of 
doing this, as outlined below:  
• “One tactic is to select categories or dimensions, and then to look for within-
group similarities coupled with intergroup differences.” 
• “A second tactic is to select pairs of cases and then to list the similarities and 
differences between each pair.” 
• “A third strategy is to divide the data by data source.” 
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This research will follow the first tactic suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) and combine it 
with Yin’s (2008) suggestions of “pattern matching” and “cross-case synthesis”. The 
researcher firstly did the “open coding” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) and re-constructed 
and organized the data in each case with the aim of searching for different categories. 
This process enabled the researcher to give a detailed description of each case, which 
are presented in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. At this within case analysis stage, data analysis and 
data collection were interactive which helped to increase the reliability and validity of 
data. The preliminary results of the analysis of each case also guided the researcher to 
go back to the case organizations and collect subsequent information. After that, the 
findings across individual cases were aggregated and synthesized to probe whether 
there are similarities or differences between different cases. The results of cross-case 
synthesis which were based on empirical evidence were then compared to the 
conceptual framework developed from the theories in Chapter 3 (section 3.6). More 
detailed discussion will be presented in Chapter 8.   
 
4.4 Research Evaluation Perspectives 
4.4.1 Reliability 
Reliability is one aspect of the credibility of the findings (Collins and Hussey, 2003) as 
it indicates whether the evidence collected is independent of the researcher (Ryan et al., 
1992), that is to say, the extent to which subsequent researchers could get the same 
evidence and arrive at same findings if they follow the same steps of the earlier 
investigator (Yin, 2008). Yin (2008) also suggested that one way to approach reliability 
is making “as many steps as operational as possible” (p.38) as if someone is always 
looking over your shoulder during the research process. In this enquiry, a detailed 
research protocol was used, and the author's supervisors were always double check or 
audit the evidence and conclusion.  
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4.4.2 Validity 
Validity is the extent in which the data and findings of the research can be considered 
‘true’ and ‘accurate (Collins and Hussey, 2003; Ryan et al., 1992). The validity of 
interpretive research has two aspects: authenticity and plausibility. Authenticity means 
having a rich description which proves that the researcher has been ‘in the field’ to 
collect data (Parker, 2012). Lukka and Modell (2010) argued that if the explanation is 
on the basis of ‘emic’ understanding and rooted in an actor’s ‘life-world’, then it could 
be claimed as ‘thick’ explanation. This approach is based on the subjective 
interpretation of the phenomenon and, during this process, inconsistencies and 
irrationalities should not be avoided but positively sought and embraced (Lukka and 
Modell, 2010). Using multiple sources of data and establishing a chain of evidence 
could help to gain a ‘thick’ explanation (Yin, 2008). Plausibility means that the 
argument(s) make logical sense to the reader and relates to the assessment of the 
credibility of the explanation (Lukka and Modell, 2010, Parker, 2012). This process 
requires an ‘etic’ explanation, i.e., informed by theories. Interpretive research 
(especially in management accounting) is argued to straddle between both objective 
and subjective research paradigms (Kakkuri-knuuttila et al., 2008). The validation of 
interpretive research is an on-going process and in order to achieve both authenticity 
and plausibility which are inter-dependent, it is a challenge for researchers to balance 
emic and etic perspectives in the explanation (Lukka and Modell, 2010).  
One practical way to increase the validity of research is by working with other 
investigators. In the course of this enquiry, the researcher worked within a community 
of other doctoral students and both staff and students in the Research Centre for Global 
Sourcing and Services in her business school, as well as her two supervisors. In so 
doing, biases caused by the personal characteristics of an individual investigator could 
be reduced (Ryan, et al., 1992). Moreover, another approach was also applied to 
increase the validity of this research, which was feeding back the researcher’s 
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interpretations of the evidence to the interviewees in order to improve the validity of 
the findings (Ryan et al., 1992). After receiving the transcripts, the interviewees of both 
DHL and MyCSP have sent back the transcripts again with their comments and 
corrections. Furthermore, the written-interpretation was also sent to the interviewees 
for their verification. In AMD, in spite of written interpretation, a face-to-face meeting 
was held with the vice president of the SSC in the middle of research (2015) to present 
the interim findings and solicit her opinions on the researcher’s interpretation.  
4.4.3 Generalization 
Lukka and Kasanena (1995) claimed that there are three different types of 
generalization rhetoric in accounting: statistical generalization, contextual 
generalization, and constructive generalization. In most cases, the word ‘generalization' 
means ‘statistical generalization'. This generalization rhetoric is respected by most of 
the mainstream accounting researchers, who use the mathematical/statistical method to 
collect results from a sample and then seek to generalize the results to a larger 
population. As the number of cases in one study is usually limited, the results or theory 
concluded from a case study could not be statistically generalized and therefore do not 
likely represent a larger population than the original sample (Hodkinson and 
Hodkinson, 2001). However, a successful case study could gain either contextual or 
constructive generalization by using appropriate triangulation of data: thus, the validity 
of the case study could be broadened. If researchers provide a "meaningful and 
convincing connection of the study with the real-world phenomena surrounding the 
case" (Lukka and Kasanena, 1995), the results could be ‘theoretically generalized’ 
(Ryan etc., 1992) which means expanding our understanding of theories. The purpose 
of a case study is not, necessarily, to test an hypothesis empirically by using a large-
scale sample, but rather to generate an hypothesis that can be tested in the future 
(Scapens, 1990). This is the process used to contextually generalize the results. The last 
type is constructive generalization. The result of a constructive research approach is the 
solution to business problems. If the proposed solution is implemented and functions in 
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the real world, the credibility of the study is enhanced, and it is argued that the solution 
may also work in another similar organization (Lukka and Ksanena, 1995). 
This research applied a case study approach to investigate the recharging mechanism(s) 
applied in the SSC model. Although the number of cases was limited, with the 
triangulation of data sources and detailed interpretation of collected data, it is believed 
that the results of this study could help to refine the existing theories of cost allocation 
and transfer pricing and provide some guidance to other SSCs in practice. This could 
be regarded as contextual and constructive generalization of the results of this study.   
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the different research paradigms that are commonly used in 
management accounting research and has discussed the core philosophical assumptions 
adopted by the researcher in this study. The chapter argues that the choice of research 
method should depend on the underlying philosophical assumptions and the purpose of 
the study. With this in mind, an interpretive approach with specific emphasis on the use 
of case study approach was chosen so as to provide the researcher with an in-depth 
understanding of recharging practice in three case organizations. In addition, the 
overview of case study method was presented, with the discussion of both its 
advantages and limitations. Furthermore, the data collection and analysis process were 
also described. With this discussion of research methodology and methods, the next 
three chapters (Chapter 5, 6 and 7) will present the recharging practice of each case 
organization and discuss the behavioral effects of recharging mechanism.   
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Chapter 5 AMD Case 
5.1 Introduction 
An exploratory case study of AMD was conducted to understand the application of the 
recharging mechanism in practice. This chapter starts by setting out background 
information for both the AMD group and its SSC (in section 5.2), and this is followed 
by the research activities undertaken for this case. Section 5.3 discusses the governance 
strategy of the company and SSC recharging mechanisms, including the recharging 
method, recharging basis and targets. As time went by, the researcher was fortunate to 
be allowed to interview the CFO of AMD Group to explore the head office perspective 
which generated some surprise findings - explained in section 5.4. The chapter closes 
with the discussion of the lessons learnt from the AMD approach of recharging support 
services.   
5.2 Background information 
5.2.1 Overview of AMD 
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. (AMD) is a multinational company providing 
semiconductor processors, together with relevant support technology and services to 
PCs, tablets, cloud servers and other intelligent devices9. AMD was incorporated with 
$100,000 and established its headquarters in Sunnyvale, California on 1st May, 196910,  
going public in 1972. Nowadays, AMD is a very large semiconductor company with a 
number of different production and distribution facilities around the world and net 
revenue of $5.38 billion (AMD, 2017). Its activities are essentially designed in the US 
and manufactured in Asia and sales globally. With a focus on a relatively narrow range 
                                            
9http://www.amd.com/en-gb/who-we-are/corporate-information 
10http://www.amd.com/en-gb/who-we-are/corporate-information/history 
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of technology and tight control over processes, it is not surprising that the company’s 
structure reflects the U-form organization with tight oversight from the head office.  
5.2.2 SSC of AMD group  
In 2002, the corporate11 of AMD decided to apply the shared service model (SSM) and 
set up four Shared Services center (SSC) in the US, Malaysia, Thailand and Germany. 
Each SSC was responsible for providing business support services to regional 
customers (business units) across AMD. The motives for AMD to set up an SSC in the 
first place include cost reduction, standardizing processes, improving service quality, 
and generally increasing efficiency and effectiveness of support service so as to 
maximize shareholders' value. Among these, cost reduction was the most frequently 
mentioned by mangers and hold up to be one of the most important motivation for 
SSCs. Initially, there were two SSCs in the Asia-Pacific region. Most of the accounting 
and financial activities of the Asia-Pacific region were undertaken by the center in 
Malaysia, while account payable activities were dealt by the center in Thailand. In 
2004, the center in Malaysia took over the account payable services from the center in 
Thailand and then started to extend its services to internal customers outside the Asia-
Pacific region. Between 2008 and 2009, the activities of the other two SSCs (US and 
Germany) were also transferred to the Malaysia center, and the name of the center was 
changed from ‘Asia Accounting and Financial Services Centre' to ‘Global Services 
Centre'(GSC). 
The single GSC of AMD is now located in Penang, Malaysia and provides general 
financial and accounting service such like global payroll, global tax service and other 
support services to internal customers across AMD Inc. The number of employees in 
this GSC has increased from 13 in 2002 to over 250 in 2014. In terms of the array of 
services it now provides, FA1 said: 
                                            
11The interviewees refer the head office of AMD as the corporate, which is located in the United States.  
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We started as a transaction shop, basically doing Accounts Payable (AP), General 
Ledger (GL) and Fixed Assets [accounting]. Now we have moved up the value 
chain, we [now] do business analysis, global tax and internal audits. (7th January 
2015) 
Despite being a large international company, AMD is a traditional function-based 
organization. Its facilities are all around the world, but they are organized according to 
different functions. For instance, AMD has its manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, 
China; test and assembling facility in Suzhou, China and its Global Service Centre in 
Penang, Malaysia. Only the sales & marketing function is country based. Figure 5.1 
shows the organizational structure of AMD Inc.  
 
Figure 5.1. Organizational structure of AMD Inc.  
The benefits of applying a function-based structure include: enhancing the control of 
the head office, ensuring the strategic alignment and coordination between different 
countries and functions (Chandler, 1962). The vision of the GSC is to provide the best 
‘in-class’ services to its customers within AMD and the corporate (the head office). The 
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customer orientation of the GSC is only internal at this stage and according to the 
interviewees, there is no plan to expand its business to external customers in the 
foreseeable future. 
According to FA1, by consolidating support service activities in the GSC and 
standardizing processes, the cost has been reduced by almost 10% every year. 
Standardization also enables different facilities of AMD to share information in the 
same system (there used to be 200 different systems in use in AMD). But achieving 
cost reduction target is not enough in itself for the GSC, FA 1 said: 
Setting up a shared service center is not all about centralization; it is about moving 
[services from divisions] and then improving [them]. (June 2015)  
The GSC regularly benchmarks its costs and service quality with the SSCs of other 
companies and outsourcers. Moreover, attending practitioner roundtables has also 
helped them to learn from other SSCs and thereby to continuously increase its service 
quality and efficiency. 
5.2.3 Research Activities  
In one of the practitioner roundtable events held in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia in 2013, 
the researcher got a chance to meet one of our key informants in AMD, the Vice 
President of AMD Global Service (FA1). She was available to talk and at the end 
invited the researcher to visit the Global Service Centre of AMD (GSC), which is 
located in Penang, Malaysia. In June 2014, the researcher visited the GSC, the finance 
director (FD1) firstly made a one-hour introductory presentation of the AMD group and 
the history of the GSC. The GSC is the only shared service center of AMD group and 
it provides financial, global payroll, global tax, marketing operations and HR services 
to internal customers across the group. Following, a one-hour group discussion was 
held with eight senior staff12 from different financial departments at the GSC. The 
participants explained the recharging mechanism applied by the GSC and discussed its 
                                            
12 The information of participants is presented in Appendix 
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effects from their respective points of view. It was surprising to find that the GSC of 
AMD does not recharge any of its cost directly to the internal customers because the 
service provided to different facilities13 are all charged to the corporate in the United 
States (the head office), without any further allocation. Following the exploratory 
discussion, the last activity undertaken on the visiting day was an interview with the 
vice president of the GSC (FA1) who provided further information about the recharging 
process. All of the interviews and discussions were recorded and transcribed by a 
professional typist and a copy was sent to the interviewees to check whether their views 
had been recorded correctly.   
In January 2015, the researcher got another chance to visit Malaysia for a further 
meeting with FA1 and the researcher showed the interim findings to her to ensure the 
views and opinions expressed before had been interpreted correctly. One of the 
researcher’s supervisors also attended this meeting. During the meeting, FA1 gave more 
details about the recharging process and explained how the cost of the GSC is actually 
absorbed by the head office and not recharged directly to the facilities. After this 
surprise findings we asked to interview representatives from either the customer 
divisions of the GSC or the head office, FA1 was very kind to introduce the CFO of 
AMD Group (FA2) and arrange for a video-conference. On 22nd April 2015, a formal 
interview with the CFO based in the US was held by Skype and both the researcher and 
one of her supervisors attended. He answered the questions about the recharging 
process from head office's view point.   
5.3 Recharging Practice of AMD GSC 
The GSC of AMD employed a cost-based recharging method (full cost plus an uplift to 
provide for local tax). The mark-up percentage depends on the tax requirements of local 
authorities.  
                                            
13 ‘Facility’ is the word used on AMD official website, which is interchangeable with ‘division’ 
‘center’ and ‘business units’. 
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Our tax people decide upon it because they have to do what they call a functional 
base analysis with other companies to see where we stand. So they will give us the 
percentage. (FA1, June 2014) 
The CFO of AMD confirmed this:  
And for Malaysian and partly US’ tax purposes; we have the plus transit 
mechanism that is set up in terms of how much mark-up you could have, although 
we’re on a tax holiday, with the tax incentives we have when we set up the 
organization. (FA2, April 2015)  
At the end of every month, the general ledger accountants at the GSC will perform the 
computation of actual expenses and they will book the entries. However, instead of 
recharging directly to the facilities that receive the services provided by the GSC, the 
GSC recharges these to the AMD head office.  
When we say chargeback, the only one is corporate. Every one charges back to 
the corporate. We do not charge back to the functions. The corporate are the 
profit-based entity. The only one who receives the revenue or owns the revenue. 
That is why we charge them, that will be profit, costs. There is no reason to charge 
function units differently. (FD1, June 2014)  
This recharging process is consistent with the function-based U-form organizational 
structure of AMD. Not only the GSC but all the other facilities in the AMD group are 
cost centers, they recharge the corporate for any expenses and costs incurred. Financial 
statements are prepared at a corporate level and the corporate is the only facility that 
generates revenue. 
As shown in figure 5.2, after absorbing all the costs from the GSC, the corporate would 
not allocate the costs to the service purchasing facilities because it is only at corporate 
level that revenue is received and costs are matched. The CFO explained: 
So essentially, for example, large engineering or sales or marketing organizations 
that the SSC are supported, the SSC does not charge them for the services. Those 
costs of the SSC largely roll up to me…… 
……essentially, if you look at it in the Labuan (one internal customer division), 
they had been provided the service by SSC and they don’t have to pay for it directly 
because they had their own budgets to conduct whatever engineering work they 
want to do. There is no direct charge back to them about how many services they 
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have got from SSC and how much they will get charged per transaction in dollars 
or a percentage basis. There’s no internal allocation that we do. (FA2, April 2015) 
 
Figure 5.2, The recharging process of the GSC 
In terms of the recharging process, the internal customers receive the services ‘for free'. 
Therefore, the recharging process would not directly have any effects on the managerial 
behaviors of the customers because they "do not feel the payment". But the constraint 
of internal customers’ behaviors comes in as the budget that is set for the GSC. At end 
of each year, the GSC has to establish the budget for the next year, which also has to 
achieve the cost reduction target set by the corporate head office. The corporate 
undertakes benchmarking all the time, directly with other companies with SSCs as well 
as through other consulting firms (e.g. Hackett). The CFO of AMD said the budget for 
the GSC every year is “fairly tight”. Setting cost reduction target is a good measure 
from head office’ point of view. It is the GSC’s responsibility to ensure the internal 
customers don’t waste the resource or over-utilize the services.  
Corporate
Business 
Services
R&D
Design Sales Manufacturing
Singapore Austin, US
Houston, 
US
Seoul, 
Korea
Amsterdam, 
Netherland
Suzhou, 
China
Penang, 
Malaysia
……... ……...
Supporting Services
Recharging
Cost Reduction Target
 114 
The cost reduction target that the GSC should meet every year is set by the corporate 
without any negotiation and argument, represented by arrow in figure 5.2. It is an 
“order” from the top. During the year, the corporate head office will constantly monitor 
the process and assess how the GSC can get to the target. When there is over or under-
spending against the budget, the controllers of the GSC will need to explain the variance 
to the corporate. According to the interviewees, it is rare that the corporate head office 
would doubt or challenge the GSC's recharging figure because the recharging method 
has been consistently applied for many years and cost control is expected in the 
budgeting process. By the time the charge is made, it is too late for action. 
SLA and the governance within AMD 
Whilst the operation of the GSC looks to be under the direct control of the corporate, 
different Service Level Agreements (SLAs), according to different types of services are 
signed between the GSC and its customers. Detailed KPIs are included in the SLAs to 
assess the quality of each services. For instance, the process time for processing a trade 
customers’ claim is 30 days and the book should be closed on time and without any 
errors. There is one performance indicator called “First Pass Yield” applied in the GSC. 
Taking Account Payable transaction, for example, the "First Pass Yield" means every 
instruction comes in exactly as required and then flows through into the AP account 
without any manual intervention and without anybody having to follow up issues that 
outside of the normal processes. If there is any dissatisfaction about the service, the 
internal customers will feedback to the VP of the GSC or one of his/her staff. Moreover, 
the GSC holds quarterly meetings with the internal customers to explain how the GSC 
is performing. In order to quickly react to the changing business environment and 
customers' requirements, KPIs are reviewed quarterly by both the GSC and internal 
customers. 
General business needs do change from time-to-time. The obvious thing is we need 
to review the (SLA) to see [that] the service we were performing and also to see 
whether the KPIs are still intact or not. So we need to revise them according to 
what may have changed as well as because the service may have shifted direction. 
(MA2, June 2014) 
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The relationship between the GSC and other facilities are mainly governed by the SLAs 
but at the same time very co-operative, because they have the impression of belonging 
to one organization due to the use of the term ‘intra-partner’ here and frequently 
mentioned “doing the best for the company overall”. There are spaces for negotiation 
if there is disagreement between the GSC and internal customers. Discussion and 
negotiation will continue until the new agreement is achieved and an issued SLA is 
signed by the VPs of all relevant parties.    
It is just that eventually, you do not treat them as a total outsider. They are part of 
the AMD group. That is, we would say they are still a good business partner to 
you. (FD2, June 2014)  
We have to build a relationship with them because we need to understand what 
they are doing and how we can actually help them and create value for them. We 
need to treat them as intra-partner colleagues. (FD 2, June 2014)  
The governance in AMD is hierarchy-based and the strategy application process is top-
down. Major decisions, like the transfer pricing strategy for internal transactions, are 
made by the corporate (US). The application of this top-down approach to mandating 
decisions proves that all of the units within AMD, including the GSC, are independent 
business units under a corporate umbrella. The centrally controlled governance 
mechanism and a trust-based relationship between the GSC, its internal customers and 
the corporate (US) makes it possible for AMD to apply such a simple recharging 
mechanism, which is that all facilities charge back costs to the corporate (US). FA1 
said  
We belong to one company; there is no need to put your money from your left 
pocket to your right pocket. (FA1, January 2015)  
The GSC does not provide services to any external customer and from the internal 
customers’ perspective also, they do not have the right to choose between the GSC or 
outside service providers. Internal customers could benchmark the service and the costs 
with other service providers and raise any doubt they may have but they can not switch 
service providers. Should the doubt scenario occur, the GSC can trace back and provide 
‘fact-based information’.  
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There is proof of our expenses and everything is traceable and auditable. Even the 
calculation method is extremely stable. This has been established for many years 
since they have had the subsidiaries. (MF2, June 2014)  
 
5.4 The head office perspectives 
The researcher was very fortunate to get the chance to interview the CFO of the whole 
AMD company, which greatly enriched the data from a different perspective.  
The original motivation of setting up the SSC from the CFO's point of view was to 
make sure there is consistency from an accounting standpoint. Standardizing the 
processes and centralizing to a single center ensures that the corporate gets the 
consistency across all the information and data on a global basis. Natural benefits flow 
from that such as the consistency of processes and this means that corporate strategies 
and policies can be implemented in a very consistent manner for employees across the 
world. 
There are two ways for the head office to measure the success of the GSC. The first is 
from the cost perspective in line with reducing budget targets. The other measurement 
is from the quality perspective. The CFO says that he tries to go to every facility of 
AMD at least once a year and during his stays, he barely hears ‘bad’ complain about 
the services provided by the GSC. Moreover, a survey about service quality is sent to 
internal customers every year to check whether they are getting the service level 
supports that they need.  
Beyond reduced cost and better services levels, a further key benefit of centralizing the 
information and data in the GSC is to enhance the control of the corporate and help the 
governance and compliance of the organization. The critical role played by the GSC in 
the corporate governance is reflected in three aspects. Firstly, good measurement and 
control of cost. By centralizing and summarizing financial data within the GSC it is 
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easier for the corporate to access the financial data and understand the cost structure. 
The CFO gave an example of this.  
For example, if I want to understand in a very independent and objective manner 
such as from a travel standpoint, how many people are travelling by different 
locations and who’s travelling you know business class versus economy or the 
donations we are giving to different organizations and universities, I can go to the 
shared services organization and they will pull the data. I can get the information 
essentially unfiltered because by the same token, there is no vested interest for 
them. (FA2, April 2015) 
Secondly, consistent application of new policies. Given that the GSC is the only source 
of data within AMD, it is easy for the corporate to identify exceptions to the policy and 
change things to stop non-compliance. The CFO said that the GSC helps from a 
governance standpoint as it has all process, information reflect to policy application 
happening under one roof.   
Finally, during the auditing process, the GSC is independently reporting to the internal 
audit functions, which is also located in Malaysia. This ensures the independence policy 
and helps from an overall governance standpoint. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter explores the recharging method applied by an SSC based on interpretive 
research on the GSC of AMD. Although AMD operates across the world, it is 
essentially fairly tightly controlled, function-based U-form organization. According to 
Eccles’ (1983) classification, AMD could be regarded as co-operative organization 
with a high level of vertical integration and a low level of diversification. For this kind 
of organization, the processes within the company are always top-down. According to 
Eccles (1983), the head office mandates divisions to purchase from inside providers 
and transfer pricing is either full-cost or cost-plus. The findings in AMD are consistent 
with the argument made by Eccles (1983) in the manner that the GSC of AMD uses the 
cost-based method to set the recharging amount for the support services it provides to 
its internal customers. The recharging number is reported to and absorbed by the head 
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office without further allocating to the service consuming facilities, rather than the 
service purchasing centers paying directly for the services they have consumed. The 
relationship between the GSC and its customers is very cooperative and there are 
detailed negotiated SLAs between them. The top-down management system appears to 
enable a cooperative atmosphere within the group’s departments because they are not 
being set against each other on costs but they do need to care about service delivery 
setting and monitoring, which they do have a direct input to. 
Although there is no direct recharging from the GSC to its customers, there is still an 
indirect influence from recharging on the behaviors of the GSC’s customers. With the 
standardized processes and information gathered in the GSC, the behaviors of both the 
GSC and its customers are monitored by the head office. Every year, the GSC is given 
target cost reduction numbers from the top and they have to achieve those targets while 
improving the service and meeting existing performance levels for their internal 
customers. Each division will also have its own cost reduction targets and thus, will 
seek better support services to make their operations to be more effective.  Head office 
will also be aware of the SSC’s budgeted activity/costs for each division and will be 
able to monitor any variances between actual and budget spending which may arise due 
to suboptimal behaviors on the part of the SSC or departments. Thus, the recharging 
mechanism in AMD plays a role in the Group’s integration process to motivate bottom-
level employees to achieve overall organizational goals (Watson and Baumler, 1975; 
Spicer, 1988; McAulay and Tonskins, 1992).  
As the CFO revealed, so long as head office have detailed information on: 1) the SSC’s 
overall cost against budget target and 2) each division’s actual use of SSC resources, 
and so long as divisions have an incentive (their own cost reduction targets) to work 
with the SSC to improve service delivery/quality then this constitutes an appropriate 
governance strategy.  
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Chapter 6 DHL case 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the case undertaken at DHL Express. As a large multi-national 
company, the SSC model has been introduced into DHL group for over 10 years now. 
During this period of time, the recharging mechanism applied in DHL group has 
changed from transfer pricing approach (direct recharge) to cost allocation approach 
(indirect recharge), following a change of organizational structure in 2015. This 
dynamic recharging mechanism make this case attractive and interesting. This chapter 
starts with the profile of Deutsche Post DHL group, DHL Express and the introduction 
of its SSCs, which is in section 6.2. Following that is the detailed description of 
recharging process for the financial support services provided by its SSC. Both the 
recharging mechanism applied before and after 2015 are discussed, together with the 
influence of recharging mechanism on the behaviors of both SSC and its customers. In 
order to triangulate the source of empirical data, the views of customer of SSC are also 
discussed in section 6.4. This chapter closes with a small summary.  
 
6.2 Background information 
6.2.1 Overview of DHL Express  
DHL Express is part of Deutsche Post DHL group, one of the biggest postal and logistic 
companies in the world, with revenues of around €60 billion and well over 300,000 
employees. There are two primary business lines within the group: Deutsche Post, and 
DHL, as shown in figure 6.1. The latter comprises three divisions with the same brand 
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identity; DHL Global Forwarding and Freight (GFF)14, DHL Logistic and Supply 
Chain (LSC)15 and DHL Express. The latter, Express, specialized in the fast delivery 
of parcels across the world. Operating across 220 countries, Express was the most well-
recognized business in the DHL group and by any standard, it was an exceptionally 
complicated business. For example, an average billable end-customer transaction was 
around €30, but this guaranteed delivery to almost every location on earth. 
Reflecting a decentralized approach to corporate management, all four main divisions 
(Deutsche Post, Express, LSC and GFF) essentially operated autonomously as in a 
typical Chandlerian multi-divisional model (Chandler 1962). Within the primary unit 
of analysis, Express, there were four regional business divisions (Central Europe, 
Eastern Europe, America, and Asia-Pacific) and around 220 countries variously 
reporting into those regions. However, due to the nature of their interlocking global 
operations, certain aspects of DHL’s three divisions were coordinated by DHL’s Head 
Office (HO). For example, a common infrastructure (e.g. a large fleet of aircraft) was 
shared, as well as a common approach to key customers (e.g. banks with global 
operations). These activities were reflected in a ‘network’ fee that was levied by the 
head office on the turnover of all operational units. Inevitably, the work of the three 
divisions, plus the four regional divisions of Express and their subsidiary countries, cut 
across each other. In TCE terms, it was clear that although the services that DHL offered 
could, in principle, have been coordinated through myriad market transactions between 
countries and between divisions, yet the internalization of cooperative transactions 
supported by the overall group identity and processes, all underpinned by hierarchical 
coordination, offered customers both efficiency and security. In short, the global 
marketing image and platform of resources combined with the integrated nature of the 
business and local (county-level) accountability was a key source of competitive 
advantage. 
                                            
14 Global Forwarding and Freight deals with all the slow transportation services - mainly shipping 
containers. 
15 Logistic and Supply Chain provides warehouse facilities for customers to store goods which DHL 
will deliver to the end customers.  
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6.2.2 SSC of DHL Express 
Apart from the four operating business units, the group also have a supporting unit 
which is called Global Business Services (GBS), providing legal, finance, HR, IT, and 
procurement services. The resources to provide each of those activities were 
disentangled from regions/countries and clustered into four operating centers, Central 
Europe, Eastern Europe, South America, and Asia-Pacific (comprising Africa and the 
Middle East). 
Figure 6.1 shows the group’s structure in 2013 with the GBS depicted as oval shapes 
with dashed lines representing the recharging lines to front facing divisions. In addition 
to economies of scale, together with the opportunity to employ top experts (Herbert and 
Seal, 2012), the GBS operation encouraged the standardized of systems, protocols and 
procedures across the group. MA1 reported that costs had been reduced significantly 
(in the region of 10% yearly) between 2006 and 2013. 
In 2015, financial services which used to be part of GBS were moved to DHL Express 
since Express was the only customer that purchased financial services from GBS. The 
finance function of the other two business units within DHL (DGFF and LSC) were 
outsourced to external service provider either HP or Accentua, mainly because of cost. 
For DHL Express, some financial activities like cash collection are considered as the 
core business within Express thus they are centralized and kept within regional SSC. 
Other functions like IT, legal tax and HR are still operated within the GBS. Since the 
focus of this research is the recharging mechanism applied by SSCs in the extent of 
financial services, the research object of this study will be financial SSC (FSSC) within 
DHL express instead of GBS of Deutsche Post DHL group. 
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Figure 6.1 Group structure and business support services before 2015 
Financial activities in DHL Express comprised two types. 1) Transactional activities 
that could be organized into computerized workflows, such as in finance accounts 
payable. 2) Transformational activities which are higher-level and less routine, such as 
maintenance of the general ledger, the preparation of financial reports and management 
accounting activities. Different recharging approaches are applied to different types of 
financial activities, which will be discuss in more details in section 6.3. The next section 
6.2.3 will explained the research activities undertaken for this case study in details.  
6.2.3 Research Activities  
The first field interview was with the CFO - Asia Pacific (MA1), for Deutsch Post 
DHL’s GBS in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) in 2013. The company’s attraction as a 
possible case study on SSC recharging practices had been identified by a contact at one 
of the CIMA-Loughborough SSC Forums. As with this and all subsequent interviews 
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the discussion was recorded and transcribed by a professional typist, a copy of the 
transcript was then sent to the interviewee to confirm that their views had been 
represented correctly. The insights provided by the informant (MA1) were extremely 
useful in guiding the literature review, unfortunately, she moved on and despite a 
number of requests it was not possible to connect with her successor.  
During an industry SSC practitioner event in 2015, the researcher was fortunate to meet 
another senior finance executive at Deutsch Post DHL who became the key informant 
(MA2) in the second phase. He was the CFO of the Centre of Excellence (CoE)16, within 
a division specializing in the fast delivery of parcels across the world, known as DHL 
Express. Following informal interviews to understand the background and suitability 
of the context for the researcher’s enquiry, the first formal interview was by video-
conference and lasted around one hour (with one supervisor). MA2 explained how the 
Group’s approach to sourcing professional support services had changed significantly 
since 2013 and now comprised a mix of sourcing models within a fluid approach to 
charging methods, as individual activities were migrated and optimized. The researcher 
was intrigued how this actually worked in practice and readily accepted his invitation 
to visit DHL Express’s FSSC in a central European city, Maastricht. The researcher 
spent two days conducting interviews, inspecting documents and generally getting a 
feel for the FSSC’s operation and its relationships with its client partners. Interestingly, 
some activities were now outsourced and the researcher was allowed to sit in on a 
liaison meeting with a BPO supplier. Formal interviews of around 45 to 60 minutes 
were held with four other finance staff as follows: 1) the CFO of the FSSC in the 
Western Europe Region (MA3); 2) a senior controller of the CoE (MA4); 3) the 
manager of the Global Pricing department (MA5), and 4) a junior controller within the 
CoE (MA6). Theses research activities help the researcher get insights about the 
recharging practices undertaken within SSC. However, all the information was 
provided by the employees from the SSC, which might be one-sided. The researcher 
                                            
16 Centre of excellence is part of FSSC, which gather the specialists and do controlling, reporting and 
other management accounting work for the internal customers (countries) within European region.  
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was keen to approach either the contacts from the internal clients of SSC, which would 
significantly strengthen the information gathered before. Therefore, a request was sent 
to MA2 again in 2018, asking whether there is any change of DHL Express since 2015 
and the possibility to get contact to the internal clients. It is fortunate for the researcher 
to reach the CFO of DHL Express UK (MA 7) and Finland (MA 8), who has used the 
support services from the SSC for several years. Two video-conferences were held in 
July 2018 and both of them were recorded. The transcripts were sent to the interviewees 
for their confirmation.  
 
6.3 Recharging for support services provided by SSC in DHL 
Express 
6.3.1 Motives for Recharging  
As explained earlier, there are two types of activities undertaken within the GBS of 
Deutsche Post DHL: transactional and transformational. The calculation basis of 
transactional activities could be expressed as individual task units, for example, raising 
a customer’s invoice. Processes were subject to scientific work principles and 
‘atomized’ into individual transactional tasks. Consequently, resources (and their cost) 
were largely made variable to accommodate changes in business demands – at least the 
scale of the SSC. In terms of transformational activities, they could only be measured 
at the level of the number of full-time equivalent staff employed in an activity over a 
month (FTE). These activities were more role- than process- based. As higher-level 
salaried staff were employed, the cost was largely fixed. Whilst these broad 
categorizations of activity profile and the consequent basis of recharge make sense from 
a management perspective, it should be noted that there is something of a tension in the 
arbitrariness of such delineation. This is because the essential rationale of the SSC 
model is to transform all activities into processes and, in turn, to make their cost 
 125 
behavior variable, at least to individual client units. Figure 6.2 depicts the matrix 
arrangement of the centers v. functions together with the recharging of process streams 
and cognitive activities to individual countries, based indicatively on two examples 
from finance, payroll processes and general ledger activities respectively.   
 
Figure 6.2 GBS Matrix Structure and Recharging Practices GBS 2006- 2015  
The GBS employed a transfer pricing system with activity-based recharging in pursuit 
of the following aims: 1) to encourage process standardization by charging extra for 
any system variations on the part of divisions; 2) to raise cost consciousness on the part 
of internal customers and thereby drive good behaviors such as adhering to input 
deadlines and protocols, and 3) to encourage the GBS to benchmark itself across the 
four centers and external third-parties (BPO and SSC) to improve both cost efficiency 
and service quality.  
This approach to pricing encourages us to benchmark ourselves with external 
parties as well as between centers. … despite the fact that we are a captive shared 
service center.  
…Recently, there are more and more comparisons happening and more and more 
concerns and challenges raised by our clients, saying they want to get more 
competitive rate. We are [also] slowly compare ourselves with third parties. 
Though we are not [quite] at that level yet, we are slowly closing the gap. There 
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are lots and lots benchmarking [activities] that we have done from the quality 
perspective and also from the cost perspective.” (MA1, January, 2013)  
 
The GBS operated on the basis of achieving a ‘zero profit’ each fiscal year for each 
function. At first sight, this might appear nonsensical, as the aim was to break-even and 
not actually make a profit from services. However, the use of ‘profit’ as a headline 
label, and a financial target, signaled to both the SSC and its clients that business 
support services were now a quasi-commercial operation. Any ‘loss’ would clearly 
signal that something had gone wrong, either in the original estimation of cost/activity, 
varying business activity, or inefficiencies on the part of the SSC or business units. 
Such negative variances would require an explanation to senior management. It was 
also noticeable that in the transcripts MA1 also used the term ‘prices’ rather than 
‘costs’, which indicate the market orientation. 
6.3.2 Finance operations and activity-based recharging 2006-2015 
The FSSC recharged the costs of each activity stream, e.g. payroll, order-to-cash, etc., 
out to each of the 220 countries based as follows.  
 1) For transactional activities: Actual process volume multiplied by the actual 
average cost per unit per month. This was possible because the computerized workflow 
system recorded how long it took to process an individual transaction (e.g. a sales 
invoice) on average, together with the number of such transactions per country (of 220) 
per month.  
 2) For transformational activities: The actual number of FTEs employed on an 
activity over a month (say, preparing financial reports).  
For both types of activities, the recharging basis is set out in each county’s SLA, as 
MA1 explained, ‘It is not one standard flat rate applied to all these. No, we do not do 
that.’  
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Whilst the operation of the recharging system and the pricing basis appears both 
complicated and contractual, in reality the basis of the recharges to each client country 
were agreed in the annual budget preparation cycle. It should also be noted that 
Deutsche Post DHL is an exceptionally complicated business in that its average end-
customer transaction is around €30 from 220 countries to (almost literally) everyplace 
on earth. At the time of the first interview (2013), the number of employees of GBS for 
Asia-Pacific region was over 700, with expectation to increase in the following years, 
as new word received from business divisions. Consequently, the scale of business 
operations and support functions in the back office follows this scale and complexity.   
This needs to cope with end-user complexity and country-specific operational 
prerequisites, dictated that, whatever rational/commercial logics might ordinarily be the 
case, there was a need for local accommodations to be made between the GBS and its 
clients. For example, a country may need additional checks on its purchase ledger 
processes (say, for local anti-money laundering legislation) or that its monthly accounts 
should be produced faster than average or presented in a certain format. Such variations 
would incur additional charges. On the other hand, the client may make suggestions to 
the SSC to improve its processes and/or reduce its costs.  
Every month, the FSSC would calculate each customer’s actual resource consumption 
by service stream and compare this with the budget amount. If there was an over-run 
of actual cost to budget, perhaps as the result of increased work volume or client 
inefficiencies, the FSSC would contact the customer directly to discuss whether they 
would agree to absorb the over-budget amount. If there had been a new ‘alignment’ (i.e. 
actual volumes or costs had varied structurally, say, through the acquisition or disposal 
of operating units) then the budget estimates for the following months would be 
adjusted.  
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6.3.3 DHL Express’s SSC model after 2015 
i) Transactional activities 
By 2015, the GBS operation, was considered to be mature in that the migrated activities 
had been optimized in terms of process efficiencies and human behaviors had improved 
on the part of both the SSC and its client countries. Consequently, the scope to achieve 
further efficiency savings had diminished and the three, more specialized, main group 
divisions (Deutsche Post, LSC and GFF) chose to transfer their individual requirements 
to a couple of large BPO vendors. This not only disentangled those volume activities 
that were now effectively commoditized but promised further savings through the 
vendors’ larger resource base and expertise. Indicative of the ‘coordinated’ but still 
essentially decentralized nature of the group, DHL Express, as the largest division, 
presented a case to Deutsche Post DHL’s top management that it should be allowed to 
take responsibility for its own finance activities, on the basis of maintaining close 
working ties between finance operations and business units. Henceforth, finance 
activities are referred to as DHL Express Finance SSCs.  
Due to the change of organizational structure, the recharging for the financial activities 
provided by FSSC was changed from transfer pricing (activity-based charging to 
countries) to cost allocation (charge through the regional head office). There are two 
reasons for this change. First, as no other divisions were involved there was not the 
same concern that DHL Express might be charged unfairly by the FSSC vis-à-vis the 
other divisions, at least for finance services. Second, it was felt that in trying to drive 
further improvement in the behaviors of the SSC and its clients there would likely be 
only diminishin efficiency returns, given the significant administration burden 
(transaction costs) and potential for disputes under the activity-based system.  
We just do not want to have it too complicated with invoices and amounts flying 
around because you have [sales] billings out of (a South American country) and 
collections [of sales billings] out of our Central Europe center, plus some stuff 
[other finance activities in another European county]. Then you will get all 
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kinds of SLAs and charges internally. All finance costs are grouped and now 
[post 2015] they send just one single invoice to the country, [thereby] reducing 
the workflow - and it is not even an invoice, it’s a management booking! …A 
few years back it was different, and it was really an ABC [Activity-based 
costing] model with a lot of [different] volumes and products. (MA3 – Emphasis 
added as per recording, August 2015) 
All transactional activities are now based on annual estimates of cost, based on the time 
workers have spent on each activity for each country on an average FTE cost per year. 
Data is gathered either from self-completed time logs or generated automatically by the 
workflow systems. Charges are not sent direct to countries but instead to DHL 
Express’s own head office which then recharges individual countries, (as shown by the 
dashed arrows in figure 6.3) after consolidating all the costs from individual SSCs a 
single invoice is sent each month to each country thereby, reducing administration and 
making it easier for the head office of DHL Express to manage the group’s usage of 
business processes at the level of individual countries.  
 
Figure 6.3, Recharging mechanism applied in DHL Express after 2015 
The move from transfer pricing to cost allocation may appear as if senior management 
was now not so concerned about efficiency and cost savings but they argued that this 
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was not the case. The change in the recharging mechanism had two further aims. First, 
the head office of DHL Express was now the ‘big’ customer of the FSSC and had the 
leverage to apply pressure to reduce cost and improve service in the way that individual 
countries could not. Second, it gave DHL Express’ senior executives a view across the 
business, so that they could bear down on countries that were not so-operating in 
pursuing efficiency. For example, a country that happened to be performing well in its 
main delivery operations might not be so concerned about its use of business services 
(and the charges it receives).  
During the course of the enquiry the researcher formed the feeling that, in line with the 
federal nature of the group, the divisional, regional and country managers were 
empowered to do what they thought was best for their business. However, there was 
also a feeling that the influence of senior management of DHL Express was 
omnipresence.   
During budget period, we of course get targets from global. They put all the numbers 
together globally, then they say ‘we need this much where can we save it, or there are 
opportunities to reduce the cost [in other ways]. That is the only guidance that we get. 
(MA3, August 2015)  
By being able to benchmark usage across all the centers and the countries, the head 
office of DHL Express could exert influence on individual countries to improve overall 
divisional performance.  
A country will know how many FTEs they are using, … if they want a lower price, 
they should look at their processes and try to make it more efficient themselves. So 
then we can put less FTEs on the service and they pay less. (MA3, 2015)  
The way that you would be able to measure your performance is during the 
negotiations in the budget period. This is something they agreed, so we are not 
challenging each other……The head of pricing or the head of controlling for 
Europe have the responsibility to bring efficiency to his own part. So we don’t 
need to challenge each other. (MA3, May 2018) 
In line with this streamlined approach, the annual budget for each country is now 
estimated on the basis of the FTEs required by month only. For example, if, say, France 
requires 15 FTEs, the recharging amount will be the number of FTEs required at the 
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average cost per FTE (across all the centers) plus, the SSC’s overheads such as cost of 
the building, electricity etc., again allocated on an FTE basis. There is also an allowance 
made to pay tax (around 5%) in a center’s local domain. This becomes the ‘fully loaded’ 
cost for France and is seen as ‘fair’ (Eccles, 1985) to all parties. MA3 said:  
We know how many FTEs we have and we know how much time we spend on each 
country and that’s quite straightforward. It’s a very simple model that we use now. 
(MA3, August 2015)  
Whilst the managers in the DHL Express division now talk about simplicity, collegiality 
and ‘cost’ rather than ‘prices’, the SSCs still operate under a ‘zero profit’ strategy. If 
actual expenditure is below the budget number after deducting any tax payments 
actually made to local authorities, the “profit” element will be credited back to the 
individual country. If the expenditure is over the budget number for a country, but 
within a 10% band, the “loss” will be charged back to the global head office and will 
be redistributed across all the countries at the end of financial year. This is perhaps a 
case of ‘heads you win, and tails you win’ at an individual level but it rewards individual 
countries that contribute to efficiency savings, while avoiding the negative effects that 
might arise from a ‘blame game’ culture when there is a loss overall. 
The annual budget divided into months is used as the basis for recharging except where 
there might be a structural variation, say, greater than +/- 10% of the current year’s 
budget amount; in that case, the budgeted cost for the following next year will be 
adjusted through negotiation and signed off in the annual agreement of service 
procedures and performance in the SLA. Previously under activity-based-costing it 
would be subsequent months that were also adjusted to affect cost, and thus, behavior 
faster. The CFO of the FSSC in European (MA3) said: “we do not make monthly 
adjustments anymore for actuals.” Now … there is monthly review meeting, about the 
quality of service and other discussion around KPIs.” The annual updating of the SLA 
formalizes and embeds improvements in the SSC’s systems and performance and thus, 
acts in a ratcheting manner. 
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ii) Transformational activities 
The two types of activities covered; 1) rule-based control activities, such as month-end 
close routines which are undertaken by Centre of Excellence (CoE) or, 2) pricing and 
decision-support services, undertaken by Global Pricing department. A generalization 
might see both of these as more akin to aspects of management accounting/business 
partnering. However, there can be tension in ‘local’ services being performed remotely 
and some countries had opted to take responsibility for pricing services themselves. 
Another difference is that controlling and pricing services are not compared to external 
benchmarks.  
It is a natural effect, and that is quite important. Controlling is an activity which 
requires you to know the business. Therefore, external parties [BPO] are not 
considered, but we do compare [the FSSC] to internal costs.” (MA2, August 2015). 
Because these management accounting services used to be performed in countries, the 
recharge mechanism is activity-based and operated in a similar manner to how the 
charges for GBS were calculated up until 2015. After transferring the activities to CoE 
or Pricing department, the recharging for the activities will be calculated based on the 
usage of FTEs.  
The charge is always FTE based, so they measure the quantity of activity they do 
and it could grow or reduce for pricing it can go up and down, depending on the 
volume that they will need to treat.” (MA2, May 2018).  
Like general financial activities, the recharging number is a budget number which is 
adjusted once a year. The budget negotiating process start in June or August each year 
and the final adjusted budget number for the next year will be agreed and signed at the 
end of January.  
Before 2017, the CoE and pricing departments directly recharged countries for their 
services with a monthly ‘fixed’ number and there is high transparency of information. 
Any variance between budget and actual costs which was treated as loss is recharged 
centrally. As explained by the CFO of CoE “we charge centrally to the headquarter 
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‘loss bucket’ which is then recharged as an overall overhead back to our individual 
countries”.  
However, when the researcher interviewed MA2 in 2018, the activities undertaken in 
CoE are considered as headquarter activities. That means the costs of CoE are now part 
of headquarters’ overhead (referred by them as ‘network fee’) which will be allocated 
to each country along with the other costs of corporate membership e.g. marketing, 
head office services etc. Also, according to the information provided by MA2, no legal 
invoice will be sent to the country during the recharging process, which means the costs 
of CoE will not be included in the calculation of operating EBIT of each country. DHL 
Express views the costs of the SSC are non-controllable costs as far as the countries are 
concerned. But for transparency purposes, the costs of each function are listed line-by-
line in management books. At the same time, each country has its own vision or target 
each year, if they can have support services cheaper, they will negotiate with the SSC 
to reduce costs.  
6.3.4 SLA and Governance  
As the semi-autonomous business unit within the company, although the SSC of DHL 
Express only provide service to internal customers and has no intention to expand to 
external customer e.g. to support other companies, it still enjoys a high degree of 
autonomy like normal division within an M-Form organization.  
We are quite free in handling the things we want to handle them. And of course, 
during the year we have also the monthly calls where we follow up on managing 
the cost and doing the things we do, we’re quite free in deciding that on our own. 
Head office is not interfering or looking into our books or what we are doing. We 
just need to explain our figures and explain the variances.” (MA3, August 2015) 
According to the interviewees, within DHL Express, there are no hard-and-fast rules 
that say that internal customers of SSCs have to purchase support services from SSCs. 
In terms of general financial services, they could choose external service providers but 
this decision has to be approved by higher level managers. This has not happened before 
but the CFO of SSC in Maastricht (MA3) expects that there will be some discussions 
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and the customer should have solid reasons for doing this because there will be money 
given out of DHL Express to the third party. In general, the decision whether to choose 
captive SSCs or external parties needs to fit the strategy of the company. In terms of 
transformational activities such as controlling services provided by CoE or the pricing 
service provided by key accounting pricing team, the DHL Express of each country 
could choose to do these tasks by themselves or ask the teams of SSCs to do that for 
them, according to the information provided by the represents from the SSC.  
In terms of the relationship between SSC and its internal customers, there are very 
detailed and well-documented SLAs between two parties. The content in the SLAs 
includes the parties to the agreement, scope of agreement, agreed service levels, 
recharging basis and other issues about service management. The most important part 
of the SLA is the explanation of KPIs. The SLAs that are applied within DHL Express 
have one standard framework but KPIs depend very much on local country 
requirements. The SLAs could be seen as seeking to achieve the combination of 
standardization and customization. Whilst, most of the terms in SLA have stayed the 
same but KPIs are updated annually. Also, KPI reports are sent to the customers on a 
monthly basis to provide them with updated information about delivered service quality 
and achieved timelines. Despite the KPIs agreed in SLAs, customer satisfaction surveys 
are also used to measure the performance of SSCs. For example, the bonus of the CFO 
of the SSC in Maastricht (MA3) is 100% variable and it is linked to the performance of 
the SSC and DHL Express.  
Generally, the relationship between SSC and its customer is co-operative. As long as 
costs continue to reduce, and efficiency improves, the client countries will not be 
unduly concerned with the recharging amounts. If in some cases, individual countries 
have doubts, or conflict occurs between FSSCs and client countries, disputes can be 
escalated to higher level management on both sides, such as the head of each country 
to arbitrate with the head of the SSC.  
If there is a conflict, of course, the agreement I have is with the head of pricing in 
the countries. They need to get in contact with me. If we do not agree on that, well 
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it needs to be escalated in the country probably to the head of marketing or even 
to the country managers and then with my boss. (MA5, August 2015) 
6.4 Customer perspective 
As mentioned before, the setting up of an SSC creates an intra-firm seller-buyer 
relationship. Within the DHL Express case, the SSCs provide supporting services to 
countries and send them billings either directly or through the regional head office. The 
previous sections explained the recharging and governance mechanism applied in DHL 
Express based on the information collected from the interviewees from SSCs. This sub-
section will discuss the recharging and governance process from customers’ 
perspective. This is to triangulate the source of the data and increase the internal validity 
of this case study.  
6.4.1 Mandated decision  
After the establishment of SSC, the decision to mitigate financial activities to the SSC 
or CoE was mandated by the regional head office. The business units of DHL Express 
in each country said they do not have the choice to either undertake the services within 
their countries or outsource to the external parties. This is inconsistent with the evidence 
collected from the FSSC.  
It was an order from the head office which was started many years (ago) when we 
were thinking how we can be more efficient, how we can do more standardization 
and of course then there was the cost of finance and all of other topics. (MA 8, 
July 2018)  
Although the initial decision to use SSC or CoE is mandated for the core services, the 
customers of the SSC still have the autonomy to transform more activities to SSC. The 
CFO of DHL Express UK (MA7) explained that if they identify good individuals in the 
FSSC who can do the work or know that FSSC is doing something for other countries 
that the UK operation could benefit from, they will approach the FSSC and ask them to 
take on the work. This negotiation process is just between the FSSC and countries, 
without any intervention from the head office.  
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6.4.2 SLA and performance measurement 
According to the information gathered from FSSC, there are detailed SLAs signed 
between the countries and FSSC, covering the agreement period, agreed service level, 
KPI target report, recharging basis and process and change management. The FSSC 
and its customers have full autonomy in the process of negotiating the terms and 
conditions in the SLA. The head office will not take part in this process, but they will 
be informed when the SLAs are signed. Internal audit will check how the SLA works 
occasionally. However, not all of the customer will check SLAs in detail. In this case, 
the CFO of DHL Express Finland (MA8) takes SLAs seriously, but the CFO of UK 
company (MA7) only knows that the SLAs exist but he admits that he never looks at 
them.  
In the view of the CFO of UK (MA7), if financial activities are outsourced to a third-
party company, they would be nailing the outsourcers to what’s agreed in the SLA. But 
because SSC is an insourced service unit, the management might be more softly. The 
story in Finland is complete opposite. The CFO of Finland reviews (MA8) the SLA 
every year and tries his best to attend every meeting with the SSC.  
After the SLAs are signed, there is a monthly performance call between SSC and its 
customers, following up the KPIs and discussing the quality of service. There is a 
“traffic light” system used in DHL Express for customers to evaluate the performance 
of SSC. MA 8 explained more about this: 
….At the end the call, I will give them a traffic light. If everything’s OK, I give 
green and if there is something that we need to consider, then it’s yellow; and if 
everything went really bad, then it’s a red. And it’s a red, then they (SSC) need to 
also report to the global and there is some issue. (MA 8,July 2018) 
Apart from monthly call, if the internal customer has any problem or find any mistake 
during daily operation, they could report it in the system immediately. The FSSC will 
reply and follow up every single query until the problem or mistake is fixed. The 
working relationship with FSSC is very co-operative, which is consistent with the 
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feedback collected from FSSC. The customer acknowledged that continuous 
improvement has achieved through the cooperation between SSC and countries.  
6.4.3 Recharging Practice 
The countries which are internal customers of FSSC receive recharging amount of each 
financial activity every month, which is a fixed number agreed during the budget 
process. The budgeted recharging amount sent to countries is not just a lump-sum 
number but with the details of the spending in each financial activity. In terms of this, 
MA8 added some comments: “So all of these lines are separate. I see the amount of 
what I pay for the billing then I see the amount with that I pay for the SLA, for the CoE.” 
The budgeted recharging amount is finalized at the end of every year between the SSC 
and the head office, rather than SSC and its customer.  
During the daily communication and cooperation, countries have background 
information about the number of FTE that provide services to them and the average rate 
per FTE. Before the budget meeting, there is a timeframe when the countries are asked 
to give feedbacks and comments to the head office about the recharging amount. For 
some instance, countries might ask FSSC to undertake more activities or ask that they 
reduce the usage of FTE through automation. If there is a change like this, countries 
will raise this matter with the head office and head office will do the negotiation with 
the SSC to adjust the budget number for the next year. The two countries we spoke to 
admit that during the negotiation process, there is not much they are involved or could 
do at this moment. They have the chance to raise their concerns but what they focus 
more on is to control their own cost and follow the DHL Express’s global strategy.    
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher discussed the recharging mechanism applied in DHL 
Express for both SSC and its customers’ perspective. The FSSC of DHL Express use 
cost-based recharging method. Before 2015, all the costs incurred in the GBS were 
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calculated according to different activities and directly recharged to the customers 
based on budgeted amount. This amount was adjusted monthly and any ‘profit’ made 
by the GBS was sent back to the customer divisions. After 2015, the recharging 
mechanism applied by the FSSC of DHL Express changed from transfer pricing (direct 
recharge) to cost allocation (indirect recharge), which means the costs started to 
recharge through the head office. The costs of the FSSC are calculated based on the 
number of FTEs and recharge monthly to the head office. The budget-based system is 
still applied but the monthly adjustment is replaced by annually review. For 
transformational activities (management accounting activities), the recharging 
mechanism has also been changed from direct recharge to indirect recharge since 2017. 
No matter which approach is used, as the customers of SSC are aware of the existence 
of costs, their behaviors are influenced, either by the internal pricing mechanism or the 
control of the head office.  
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Chapter 7 MyCSP Case 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the case undertaken at a UK-based pension administration 
organization MyCSP, which operates as a shared service model. MyCSP is particularly 
interesting from a recharging perspective because it was conceived as a captive SSC 
within a large scale government agency but after a privatization sale to a private equity 
investor, MyCSP is now operating as a fully independent business. It has a totally 
market outlook and seeks to make commercial profits yet, intriguingly, its management 
still embrace the ethos and practices of the SSC model. An innovative mutual 
ownership model between government, employers and the private sector investor 
ensures that the business tone is about mutual adjustment to achieve greater efficiency 
and better customer service. This chapter starts with the introduction of the background 
and history of this organization in section 7.2. Section 7.3 provides the details of the 
recharging mechanism implemented in this organization. The recharging process of 
MyCSP varies according to different types of services (the service covered in the core 
contract and additional customized services). Since it is difficult for the researcher to 
get access to the client of MyCSP (the Cabinet Office or central government 
departments), the structure of this chapter is slightly different compared to the previous 
two cases. The behavioral effects of recharging are discussed in section 7.4. The chapter 
closes with a short summary.  
7.2 Background Information 
7.2.1 Overview of MyCSP 
My Civil Service Pension (MyCSP) is a pension mutual company17 which administers 
civil service pension schemes on behalf of around 250 central government 
                                            
17 http://www.mycsp.co.uk/schemes/the-partnership-model.aspx 
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organizations such as the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) and Ministry of Justice (MoJ). MyCSP which was founded in April 
2010 along the lines of the shared service model within the DWP. As a standalone 
financial entity, one would expect MyCSP to be cast as a commercial third-party BPO 
provider, along the lines say of Serco PLC or Capita PLC. Yet, senior management still 
chooses to describe the company as projecting the ethos and practices of an SSC. This 
might appear surprising but can be explained by the company’s heritage and an 
innovative mutual ownership model.   
 
Before 2010, pension services of central government organizations were provided by 
multiple administrators within major government departments on eleven different sites 
and a couple of private sector organizations around the country. In April 2010 MyCSP 
was formed as an SSC within DWP, providing services to DWP, the Cabinet Office and 
any central government organization where employees belong to the Civil Service 
Pensions Scheme. In February 2011, MyCSP moved out from DWP and started to be 
part of the Cabinet Office (Crosland and Davy, 2011). On 1st May 2012, a new financial 
entity was created and MyCSP Limited became a management-led buyout and the first 
mutual government/private sector joint venture. The UK Government own 35% of 
MyCSP’s shares, the private sector partner Paymaster (part of the Equiniti Group) own 
40% and the remaining 25% is held in a trust for employee partners18. The legacy 
pension administration services were provided on eleven sites in 2012 and there was an 
acknowledgment from the outset that there were opportunities to make substantial cost 
savings in infrastructure and staffing. Over time, efficiency savings have enabled the 
workforce to be reduced and nine sites closed with only two sites19 (Cheadle and 
Liverpool – approximately 30 miles apart) remaining by 2015.  
As the venture progressed and proved successful, the Government reduced its holding 
                                            
18 The Employee partners’ stake in the Company is held in trust by MyCSP Trustee Company Ltd, 
known as the MyCSP Trust (information from www.MyCSO.co.uk)  
19 There used to be four sites which are Newcastle, Worthing, Cheadle, and Liverpool but the 
Newcastle and Worthing sites were closed by 2016.  
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to 24% and Equiniti, now with majority control, increased to 51%, with 25% still held 
by employees (effective from around 2015). It is worth noting that all the employees at 
the time of the buyout transferred to MyCSP with protected employment rights although 
they were no longer civil servants in law. Thus, whilst operating as a new ownership 
structure, MyCSP retained the extensive administration knowledge and experience that 
MyCSP had gained in the public sector, but with the added advantage of bringing in 
new commercial and technical experience from the private sector partner (Equiniti). 
The new ethos for MyCSP has put customers at the heart of processes and then to grow 
as a commercial business with new clients and service offerings.  
Currently, MyCSP provides pension administration services, injury benefits services, 
compensation schemes service and some consulting and training services to 250 
customer organizations of MyCSP, referred as ‘employers’ by MyCSP. Also, an 
individual employee of MyCSP’s 250 client organizations could also access the service 
provided by MyCSP, referred as ‘members’. The total number of pension scheme 
members is 1.5 million. MyCSP is now the third largest UK pension scheme 
administrator and its turnover has exceeded £40 million with target yearly growth of 
31%.20  
7.2.2 Research Activities 
In one of the practitioner roundtables (CIMA-Loughborough SSC forum) that had been 
held quarterly in UK, the researcher met the key informant in MyCSP, the financial 
controller of MyCSP (FA1). After a discussion with him, the researcher got to know 
that MyCSP is formed as a shared service center of the Cabinet Office. However, it is 
an independent company with shares controlled by the private sector. It has the 
commercial ambition in the future to serve as a third-party service provider. FA1invided 
the researcher to visit one site of MyCSP which is located in Cheadle. In May 2015, the 
researcher visited the Cheadle site and interviewed the general manager of the site (FA2) 
                                            
20 All background information about MyCSP came from the slides “Introducing Pricing in MyCSP” provided by 
the financial controller of MyCSP and the official website of MyCSP.  
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and FA1. There were also some informal discussions between other staff and the 
researcher, which were not recorded. FA2 introduced the general information of MyCSP, 
including the activities undertaken in MyCSP, the size of the company, its relationship 
with customers (employers, members, and the Cabinet Office) and its recharging 
mechanism. After that, FA1 has given the researcher a more detailed introduction about 
the recharging mechanism applied in MyCSP, based on the slides he prepared. The 
interviews with both FA1 and FA2 were recorded and transcribed by the professional 
typist. The transcripts were sent back to the interviewees for their approval and 
confirmation. According to the data collected from the interviews, the researcher 
realized that MyCSP has a seven-year contract with its only client—the Cabinet Office 
which will be expired in 2019. Therefore, in order to get updated information about the 
contract, MyCSP and its recharging mechanism, the researcher re-contact FA1 in 2018. 
Another skype interview was undertaken, and the transcript was also sent back to the 
interviewee. The limitation of this case is that the researcher does not have any access 
to the only client of MyCSP—the Cabinet Office, thus, the data of this case was only 
based on the information provided by MyCSP.   
 
7.3 Recharging mechanism 
The first and only major contract that MyCSP has is the one signed by the Cabinet 
Office on behalf of 250 central government organizations for 7 years in 2012. This 
umbrella agreement sets out the broad service agreement between 250 public sector 
employers which offer Government pensions and the Cabinet Office. In turn, their 
employees have access to the pension administration services provided by MyCSP.  
Although contractually the Cabinet Office is the sole client of MyCSP, setting market 
price tags on the pension administrative services is still necessary for MyCSP because: 
1) the costs incurred by MyCSP need to be covered; 2) in some situations additional or 
customized services are required which are not included in the contract signed between 
MyCSP and the Cabinet Office and 3) with a major shareholder which is a commercial 
 143 
company, MyCSP has adopted a market-orientation in its corporate culture, necessary 
when MyCSP starts to seek work outside the Civil Service. Hence, management is keen 
to talk the rhetoric of the market whilst acknowledging that for an extended period of 
time the company is effectively an extension of government bureaucracy. An outline of 
the recharging process is shown in the following figure 7.1. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Recharging process of MyCSP  
 
There are two broad types of MyCSP services, ‘core pension services’ and ‘additional 
customer service’. The core pension services are set out in the contract which is agreed 
and signed-off between MyCSP and the Cabinet Office on behalf of the 250 employers. 
The contract covers general pension administration services, such as the maintenance 
of member records, pensioner payroll, and final award calculation. If the employer or 
member requires any special service that is not included in the core contract, there will 
be a special statement of work signed between MyCSP and the employer or member, 
which then works as a mini-contract for the particular piece of work. The recharging 
mechanism varies according to these two different service types and the next section 
will explain two recharging processes separately. 
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7.3.1 Core pension service 
Contractually, the Cabinet Office is the only client of MyCSP and thus the Cabinet 
office is the only one who directly pays MyCSP for pension administrative services on 
behalf of the employers. Recharging is based on the annual budget (activity volume and 
price) for the services covered in the core contract. The payment from the Cabinet 
Office is still the main source of income for MyCSP and must thus, cover almost all the 
costs incurred in the provision of pension administration and pensioner payroll. The 
customers were inherited from the Principal Civil Service pension scheme, as were the 
costs. FA1 said: 
We inherited the same buildings, the same infrastructure, the same staff, everything 
was an inherited position. It wasn't a scientific pricing piece there. It was purely the 
costs to run the business. (May 2015) 
 
Employers sign participation agreements with the Cabinet Office to gain access to 
pension administrated services provided by MyCSP. These services used to be provided 
by the Authorized Pension Administration Centre (APAC) and the service fees were 
negotiated between the individual employer and APAC. After the formation of MyCSP, 
the service agreements signed between APAC and the employers were fed into the 
Cabinet Office without any change of terms and conditions. Therefore, the recharging 
fee of pension administrative services reflected the original one. This recharging fee 
varies according to different employers as the more members (employees of 
organizations) the employer has, the more pension charge will be. None of the 
employers pay MyCSP directly as the service provider but are instead paying the 
Cabinet Office.  
 
The amount that the Cabinet Office pays to MyCSP does not only cover its operating 
costs but also has a profit element built into it. This margin depends on the value that 
MyCSP could provide to the government which reflects the estimation of improvement 
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in efficiencies during the life of the contract. After taking views from industry level and 
consulting advisors, profit margins were negotiated and agreed between MyCSP and 
the Cabinet office when the core contract was signed in 2012. Also, there is also a 
chance for MyCSP to make additional profits.  
 
If we can make additional savings from the budgeted costs, such as not filling 
vacancies as anticipated, hence creating a reduction in staffing costs, we will 
generate additional profit from the originally budgeted amount. (FA1, September 
2018) 
  
7.3.2 Additional Services 
Any service that is not included in the core contract will be charged as additional 
directly by MyCSP to the service buyer (employer/member). This service could be 
required by either the employer, which is the central government organization, or the 
member who is the employee of the government organization or even the Cabinet 
Office. For example, employers could be considering a proposal to make people 
redundant, and thereby need to ask MyCSP to calculate the effect of early retirement 
and redundancy payments. This is above the terms in the core contract thus another 
statement of work will be signed between MyCSP and the employer, which works as a 
mini contract. The other type of additional service that may be required by individual 
members is ‘pension sharing'. If one member gets a divorce, MyCSP will do the 
calculation of how much of the pension each party could get. Before the establishment 
of MyCSP, employers or member used to demand these services within the organization. 
Each organization used to have its own way to deal with this requirement and its 
particular method of calculating relevant costs. Nothing was contractual. However, 
MyCSP has market-orientation since it became a joint venture company in 2012, thus 
it is necessary for them to build a pricing model for these additional services. Before 
doing that, there were some tasks to be finished: 1) to understand the cost bases of 
eleven sites and take an assessment of the time it took to do particular tasks; 2) to 
formalize the service providing and recharging process and make it contractual; 3) to 
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develop process maps to describe services; 4) to standardize the recharging processes 
applied in different organizations and 5) to establish the cost of service by assessing 
resource time and staff grade used.  
For non-core services required by the Cabinet Office, the additional charges need to be 
re-negotiated between MyCSP and the Cabinet Office. While the standardization work 
was still in process, MyCSP has developed a ‘rate card’ for additional service for the 
cost of staffing and has applied it very simply. The cost of activity equals to the rate 
times the time it takes to do a particular task and therefore MyCSP could work out the 
recharging price.  
The rate card allows us to charge for projects and other non-core work on a time 
and materials basis and has the advantage of not having to negotiate the time 
element for each piece of work. It is broadly based on graded salary plus profit 
margin and is used when our own staff is being used. If we use third parties to 
support the delivery of a service we can use a pass-through, plus an agreed mark-
up margin. (FA1, May 2015)  
 
The ‘rate card' can be used as a basis for negotiation but if there is a major project it 
could lead to a higher cost than the Cabinet Office is prepared to meet. Whilst, 
recharging for these non-core services might only result in a modest source of income 
to MyCSP, nonetheless, such income can be significant in terms of increasing overall 
profit if income from the core contract has covered all the fixed running costs. Hence, 
MyCSP may be prepared to negotiate a lower rate for such ‘marginal’ income’ to come 
to an acceptable price for both parties. To instigate additional services, employers or 
individual members (say, a statement of entitlement in a divorce case) must complete a 
formal request for service form for which MyCSP bills directly.  
 
7.4 Behavioral effect of recharging mechanism 
7.4.1 Governance mechanism 
The governance in MyCSP is a hybrid style combining market- and hierarchy-based 
thinking, but this is somewhat imperfect. On one hand, there is only one client with a 
 147 
stake in the business, together with the fact that almost all employees are former civil 
servants and likely feel aligned with their end customers who are still public sector 
employees. On the other hand, management propounds the customer service ethos and 
point to tough annual negotiations over price and performance with the Cabinet office. 
Moreover, the whole company lives in the shadow of the finite contractual lifespan of 
seven years and the need to not only renew the main contract but to acquire other 
pension business.   
Firstly, after consolidating the operations of the different SSCs and forming MyCSP as 
an independent company, it has only one client now. The manager of MyCSP added:  
We now only have one customer which is the Cabinet Office. Cabinet Office now 
technically has the client relationships for all 300 of those employers (customer 
organizations). We service the employers, Cabinet Office manage, instead of 300 
different service level agreements, just manage one contract that’s between 
themselves and MyCSP for delivery to all of those 300 employers. (FA2, May 2015)   
 
Although MyCSP now provides services to 300 employers (up from the original 250), 
it is only answerable to the Cabinet Office and aims to stick to the contract signed 
between them. Everything including the service type, the customers and the facilities 
are inherited from the Principal Civil Service pension scheme. Most of its customers 
are central government organizations but there are some exceptions. If one customer is 
not a government organization but is part of the Principal Civil Service pension scheme, 
it is still a client of MyCSP under the Cabinet Office remit. The initial contract signed 
between MyCSP and the Cabinet Office is for seven years which will be due to expire 
in April 2019 but an extension for two years and eight months has been agreed as at 
August 2018.  
 
Secondly, MyCSP used to be part of the Cabinet Office (as the SSC of DWP) and 
although it is legally an independent firm now, it is still under the control of the Cabinet 
Office. The negotiating power between the Cabinet Office and MyCSP is imbalanced.  
We were part of Cabinet office. The person negotiated our part was actually a senior 
civil servant within Cabinet Office. How independent were they really to make 
decisions? (FA2 May 2015) 
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MyCSP has no power to walk away from the negotiation. If it loses the contract with 
the Cabinet Office, it will have no customers, no revenue and no profit. FA1 commented:  
If you are a normal private sector company and you try to have a deal with 
somebody, the price isn’t suitable for you, you have got the leverage to say that I’m 
walking away now and you will get no service. We couldn’t do that, they (Cabinet 
Office) have all the power over us and therefore they could drive down whatever 
they wanted and what we can do is only accepting it. (FA1, May 2015) 
 
Since 1st May 2012, the investment from a private sector has been brought and in 2018, 
the proportion of shareholding of the private sector has increased to 51%, which makes 
it the controlling shareholder. Although MyCSP is dealing with a single client (the 
Cabinet Office), it has adopted a market-orientation in its daily operation. Firstly, it is 
possible for MyCSP to make “profits” although all its charging is budget based. The 
recharging amount to Cabinet Office which is agreed in the core contract has a profit 
element built into it. This recharging amount started off with the initial costs of MyCSP 
and assumed a level of efficiency improvement was achievable. For instance, over the 
contract period, MyCSP gets down to effectively half the unit price per member. If 
MyCSP could make additional savings from the budgeted costs, MyCSP will generate 
profit from the originally budgeted amount, the Cabinet Office could also benefit from 
this: 
If the profit achieved on the core contract is more than 2% over the projected profit, 
any additional gain (profit) is split between Cabinet Office and MyCSP. (FA1, 
September 2018) 
 
Unlike in 2012 when MyCSP was busy on the transformation of the service for Cabinet 
Office, MyCSP is now starting to look outside the Civil Services. For example, MyCSP 
continues to introduce innovation and is developing a “self-service” solution and a 
platform that will be more adaptable to a multi-client environment. Also, MyCSP has 
achieved ISO 9001 and ISO 27001 quality assurance standards, which they believe 
could provide some competitive advantages in future bids. All of these efforts reflect 
that although MyCSP is still working with a single client, it is keen to raise its profile 
in the wider business community.  
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7.4.2 Behavioural Effects 
Pension scheme members used to get the pension administration service by filling and 
submitting an ‘internal’ request form instead of completing a commercial contract. 
Therefore, the members do not have the perception to pay for the services. FA1 said: 
They weren’t used to paying for the service, so then they view it as expensive when 
you first introduce the price. Because they haven’t done any market research as to 
what the price would be, it’s just a price when there never was one. Therefore, by 
default, it’s expensive. That’s the perception. (FA1, May 2015) 
 
For service activities written in the core contract, the members still do not feel any 
payment because the agreed amount is paid by their employers to the Cabinet Office. 
The only concern to them is that the service should be in their way. However, in terms 
of an additional service required by an individual member, the perception has to be 
changed. There is a statement of the work signed between MyCSP and themselves, 
which act as a mini commercial contract. The delivery of the service provided by 
MyCSP needs to be paid now thus the member’s expectation of the service quality is 
high. The relationship between members and service providers has changed from 
relational to contractual thus the behaviors of members are also restricted by the terms 
and conditions of the contract. Ideally, the existence of payments will influence the 
behaviors of members since their co-operation is necessary for the successful delivery 
of high-quality service. But this influence on MyCSP is very weak. The possible 
reasons are: 1) the customers still expect a bespoke service and they do not want 
standardization, thus any standard service provided by MyCSP is treated as a poor 
service; 2) the existence of a disconnection between MyCSP and customer 
organizations. Customer organizations access services through the Cabinet Office and 
MyCSP is only answerable to the Cabinet Office for the core contract. Thus, if MyCSP 
intends to change a customers’ mind-sets, the communication or negotiation is not 
directly with the customer organizations but through the Cabinet Office. The influence 
of recharging on the behaviors of customer organizations relies heavily on the reactions 
of the Cabinet Office. If the Cabinet Office is not supportive, the change of customer 
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perception is very difficult to achieve because of an imbalance of power between 
MyCSP and the Cabinet Office. 
On the other side, the behavioral effects of recharging on MyCSP is strong. The 
recharging amount is based on the budgeted number which means during the contract 
period, the cash inflow to MyCSP every month is fixed. MyCSP has to operate within 
the budget and at the same time, ensure the service quality. Each month, MyCSP has to 
produce a Service Deliver Review to Cabinet Office, which provides a qualitative view 
of all-around services and is used as a support document at a monthly contract 
management meeting. Moreover, 25% of shares are owned by the trustee company on 
behalf of employees. Although these shares are not freely traded in the open market, 
there is dividend payment if MyCSP makes profits during the year. 25% of the profits 
is attributed to the trustee company and this will be a bonus for all eligible employees. 
This motivates employees of MyCSP to make efforts to achieved agreed targets and 
increase efficiencies as large as possible since it will enhance their own economic 
benefits. During this process, the Cabinet Office could also get benefits in the long-
term.   
7.5 Summary 
This chapter explained the recharging mechanism applied in MyCSP. MyCSP used to 
be a captive SSC in DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) but has been a mutual 
joint venture since 2012. It has only one client which is the Cabinet Office but actually, 
any employer (central government department) or member (individual employee of 
customer organization) of Principal Civil Service Pensions Scheme benefit from the 
service provided by MyCSP. General pension administrative services are covered in the 
core contract signed between MyCSP and the Cabinet Office. However, employer or 
member could require additional service from MyCSP. Statement of work which works 
as a mini contract would be signed. The recharging for core contract activities is based 
on annual budgets while the recharging for additional service required by an employer 
or member is based on ‘rate card'. The rate is based on the ex-ante negotiation between 
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MyCSP and the Cabinet Office. The main motive of setting-up MyCSP is to improve 
working efficiencies of both the Cabinet Office and central government department, but 
operating cost would be reduced afterwards. The influence of recharging on the 
behaviors of customer organizations relies heavily on the reactions of the Cabinet 
Office but the influence on MyCSP is strong, because of the imbalance negotiation 
power between MyCSP and the Cabinet Office. 
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Chapter 8 Discussion  
8.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters presented the empirical results collected in the case 
organizations. The overall purpose of this study is to analyze the functioning of internal 
recharging approaches in the shared service context and the behavioral effects 
stemming from the various methods. This covers 1) the scope and operation of 
recharging process including the recharging basis, recharging targets and the 
functioning of the SLAs and 2) whether the chosen methods drive good behaviors of 
both the SSC and its customer divisions, thereby improving efficiency given the 
potential for agency problems within multi-divisional organization.   
To organize the analysis of the cases more logically, a continuum of recharging 
mechanisms was developed in Chapter 3, based on the integration of the theory of 
organizational structure, TCE and agency theory. The conceptual framework developed 
in Chapter 3 (section 3.6) provides the guidance for the analysis in this chapter which 
starts from the governance aspiration of each of three case organizations and then 
explains how each is related to the choice of recharging mechanism (either transfer 
pricing or cost allocation). Following on, three characteristics of transactions (asset 
specificity, uncertainty & opportunism, and bounded rationality) and their relationship 
to the recharging mechanism(s) used will be discussed. Finally in section 8.4, agency 
theory is used to analyze the behavioral effects arising from the recharging mechanism 
implemented in the cases, including the possible causes of agency problems in case 
organizations and their reaction strategies. The chapter closes with a short summary. 
8.2 Governance aspiration  
As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3), Williamson (1975, 1985) used TCE to explain 
how different firms organize their economic activities in particular ways, e.g. markets 
or firms (hierarchies) or hybrid. In traditional organizations, rule-based professional 
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support services are normally governed in line with hierarchical approaches. However, 
the establishment of an SSC aims to transform the orientation of support services to a 
market outlook i.e. an intra-divisional to inter-divisional orientation (Herbert and Seal, 
2012). Vosselman (2011) argued that there is an “internal client-supplier” (p.78) 
relationship between an SSC and its customers, that and this relationship has a “non-
hierarchical” (p. 78) nature.  
Thus, ‘internal transactions’ between an SSC and its customers might be expected to 
capture market characteristics and this suggests the appropriateness of transfer pricing. 
Yet, the findings in the case organizations show that relational governance with 
hierarchical control continues. The next sub-section will discuss the empirical findings 
from the three cases and explore: 1) the extent to which transactions are governed with 
a hierarchical or market orientation, and 2) how the governance aspiration influences 
the firm’s choice of recharging mechanism, that is either cost allocation, transfer pricing, 
or a hybrid mechanism. 
8.2.1 Hierarchical Orientation -- AMD 
In TCE, Williamson (1973) argued that an individual who derives ‘associational’ 
satisfactions may favor internal organizations. Transactions with high asset specificity, 
small volume, and high uncertainty are more likely to be held in-house and be governed 
within the organizational boundaries, in other words, within a hierarchy. An SSC that 
has a hierarchical governance orientation will not therefore, operate as a separate 
business unit and hence, project no market-based “buyer-seller” relationship. The 
findings in all three cases suggest that relationships between the SSC and service 
purchasing business units are governed simultaneously by divisional management 
through the SLAs and top management control through the visibility of the SSC against 
budget targets.  
According to Williamson’s classification, the AMD group has a hierarchical 
governance orientation, being structured in line with the various professional functions, 
with all resources under the control of the head office. The motivation of AMD to set 
 154 
up an SSC was to reduce operating costs through the standardization of systems, 
processes and procedures across the group rather than making economic profits, whilst 
also enhancing the visibility of the administrative overhead and hence enhance the 
control of the head office over the company. As ‘cost’ is the driving concern of the 
AMD SSC, the purpose of recharging is to break-even, i.e. to cover the total cost of the 
SSC’s operation. Practitioner authors such as Quinn etc. (2000) and Bergeron (2003) 
advocated that the SSC should be formed as an independent business unit within the 
organization, but the SSC of AMD is inconsistent with this assumption. Rather than 
acting as a semi-autonomous business unit, despite its status as a separate legal entity 
and its relocation to Malaysia, the SSC of AMD effectively operates as a part of the 
head office and recharges its costs to the head office instead of to customers. With no 
allocation to divisional units, the SSC of AMD should be regarded as part of head office 
and thus, a centralized service provider from the perspective of organizational structure. 
However, the SSC otherwise displays all the culture and outlook of a transforming, 
customer focus operation. 
With no direct recharging or cost allocation to purchasing units, the information about 
cost is hidden to the service consuming units even though this is apparent in the 
information supplied by the SSC to the head office. Thus, it is difficult for the SSC to 
directly influence management behaviors through the recharging process. In this case, 
the behaviors of service purchasing units will be monitored through oversight of their 
support costs by the top management. For the SSC of AMD, although the recharging 
number is based on actual cost and volume, the SSC is still controlled against budget 
numbers set annually in conjunction with head office. Budget targets are based on the 
cost reduction percentage set by the head office and informed by reference to external 
benchmarks along with the setting of broad operational goals for the SSC. Thus, 
budgets and operational goals could be treated as a tool within a firm’s system of formal 
control (Das &Teng, 1988) of the performance of the SSC. In the AMD case, 
management control plays a critical role in ensuring compliance with organizational 
strategy (Zimmerman, 2011). This will be explained in more detail in section 8.4.  
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8.2.2 Hybrid governance with market orientation – DHL and 
MyCSP 
In order to overcome the drawbacks of hierarchical governance such as low flexibility 
and extended response time, organizations could be expected to move to market 
governance model or at least a hybrid structure positioned between hierarchy and 
market. An SSC model makes it possible to set out contractual terms and conditions 
that influence the behaviors of divisional managers in the organization. Yet, not all 
SSCs can be expected to have a complete market-orientation as SSCs are essentially 
captive and thus, would ultimately tend to a hybrid governance mechanism rather than 
a market one. This type of governance style blurs the normal internal/external 
delineation of organizational boundaries, and likely requires management controls 
reflecting both hierarchical and market governance mechanisms.  
Within a market orientation, the relationship between the SSCs and the service 
purchasing business units is similar to a market-based ‘buyer-and-seller’ relationship 
governed by formalized contracts i.e. the mutually negotiated SLAs. In this study, the 
governance structure of both the SSCs in DHL and MyCSP displays an intention 
towards a market orientation.  
At DHL, for transactional activities before 2015 and transformational activities before 
2017, the relationship between the SSC and its internal customers was essentially 
governed by more formal internal contracts, i.e. SLAs between the SSC and its clients 
together with detailed transfer pricing, rather than by the intervention of head office. 
This is a case where the “invisible hand” of the market (Smith, 1776) is influencing the 
pricing mechanism and thus, the behaviors of both sellers and buyers. Yet, in practice, 
both parties operate within the same organization and the operation of both SSC and its 
customers are notionally independent. Indeed, the negotiation of detailed operating 
terms and the recharging mechanism were solely between the two parties to the contract 
and thus, independent of top management. However, any disputes arising in pricing or 
quality could be escalating up to higher levels of corporate management. At the end of 
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each accounting period, the billing for each type of service was sent directly to the 
divisional customers. So that they get transparent information about both the resources 
employed by the SSC and thus, can have a greater sense of cost consciousness. With 
details of service consumption, the behaviors of internal customers should be better 
motivated because more ‘consumption’ leads to a greater amount of cost recharged, and 
in turn lower divisional profits. Abdel-kjalik and Lusk (1974) argue that this is the way 
to stimulate the efficient allocation of resources. Yet, whilst not exposed directly to 
broader market focuses, the SSC within DHL does undertake regular benchmarking 
with its external service providers so as to calibrate its costs and performance and 
thereby improve its operational efficiency and service quality. This provides a good 
example of how a market orientation can be embraced without actually contracting out 
to a third-party.  
The features of hierarchical governance are reflected by the management control of 
DHL’s head office and the “zero-profit” strategy of its SSC strategy. The head office 
sets the budget figures for each division, including the SSCs. Any variance between the 
budget and actual result needs to be explained by the SSC. In accordance with the “zero-
profit” strategy, any “profit” of the SSC (when actual expenditure turns out lower than 
budget) is given back to the customer divisions because actually making “profits” from 
support functions is not one of the operating goals of the DHL SSCs. 
The intriguing finding from the DHL case is that although it used to have an overt 
market-orientation (for transaction activities up to 2015 and for transformational 
activities up to 2017), even as an internal arrangement that has seen after several 
organizational changes, it has successfully repositioned the overall SSC structure 
towards a more balanced outlook with 1) a hierarchical control (from head office), 2) 
market control from benchmarking (external) and 3) SLAs (internal) combined with 
cost allocation. The latter acknowledges the need for ultimate transparency of service 
costs within a culture of collegial working to improve processes. In 2015, when the 
financial SSC of GBS became a responsibility of DHL Express, the recharging 
mechanism for transactional financial services was also changed. Instead of direct 
recharging, the SSCs report the recharges for transactional activities to the regional 
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head office which then allocates the charge to service purchasing countries. This 
strategy gives the regional office the necessary information about each business unit’s 
consumption of finance resources so as to monitor its alignment with the overall 
organizational strategy. In other words, to a more hierarchical-orientation.  
DHL’s recharging of transformational activities has continued to follow this pattern of 
progression. From 2017, transformation activities provided by the CoE were no longer 
recharged directly to the customers but included in the corporate “network fee”, which 
reflects the more general cost of providing a global platform to attract customers across 
the world. This fee still seems to allocate to receiving divisions in their management 
accounts, but it does so in a more indirect manner. This change from transfer pricing 
(direct recharge) to cost allocation (indirect recharge through the head office) is 
assumed to be based on mutual trust, transparent information and clear cost 
accountability between the SSC and its customers. This is possible because a baseline 
of reduced costs and service performance had been established in the period up to 2017.  
The situation in MyCSP is somewhat different. MyCSP used to have a very high level 
of hierarchical orientation since it was part of the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP). Since 2012, when MyCSP was created, the primary focus was on the 
transformation of the service for the benefit of the chief stakeholder, the Cabinet Office. 
At that time, the functioning of MyCSP was, in essence, akin to a captive shared service 
center with only one client, indeed MyCSP does not have the right to expand its 
business with government or set a service performance level unilaterally. Its bargaining 
power is significantly lower than its primary client, the Cabinet Office but this perhaps 
belies the reality because in 2018, MyCSP is operating with a new ownership structure, 
with majority control (51%) owned by Equiniti (a private sector partner). Unlike DHL 
which has moved from a market to a more hierarchical orientation, MyCSP is becoming 
more commercial in its outlook and attitude with an ambition to look outside the Civil 
Service for new business, competing with very market-oriented BPO vendors and other 
government SSCs.   
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8.3 TCE perspective and recharging in SSC 
TCE uses the notion of transaction cost to explain different organizational governance 
choices. Transaction costs can be determined by a number of factors of which the three 
major ones are asset specificity, frequency & uncertainty, and bounded rationality. This 
sub-section will interpret the findings in terms of the relationship between these three 
factors and draw together some thoughts on the recharging practices of SSCs.  
8.3.1 Asset specificity  
Assets specificity is normally argued to be the chief cause of different approaches to 
transactions costs (Riordan and Williamson, 1985). It has a close relationship with an 
organization’s choice of transfer pricing strategy (Colbert and Spicer, 1995). Internal 
transactions between an SSC and its customer comprise services instead of tangible 
(physical) goods and thus, a greater emphasis is put on human asset specificity: that is 
employing special knowledge acquired through education or experience. In other words, 
human asset specificity in an SSC arises from employees who have professional skills, 
special knowledge of tasks and who understand the operation of the organizations and 
hold deep tactic knowledge of the corporate culture and its systems. As explained in 
Chapter 3, there are two types of activities in SSC which are transactional 
(routine/administrative) and transformational (customized/value added) activities. In 
the case of AMD, there is only one global SSC now and this operates essentially as a 
part of the head office with no clear distinction between these two types of activities, 
thus only DHL and MyCSP will be discussed in this section.  
According to theory, activities with low asset specificity, high frequency, and low 
uncertainty will likely be outsourced, while the activities with high asset specificity 
and/or high uncertainty are more likely to be retained in captive SSC. However, the 
findings in DHL are inconsistent with this proposition. The majority of the activities 
which have high frequency and volume have remained in the SSCs so that the head 
office might control and manage them, even though SSCs can still benefit from 
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economies of scale and standardization by BPO. Yet, the only activity that was 
outsourced to a third-party by the SSC of DHL Express is purchase-to-pay. However, it 
was reported that it took DHL Express a lot of time and effort to monitor an external 
service provider about service performance and recharging figures every month, DHL 
Express decided to ‘back-source’ these activities to the SSCs. Once both the “buyers” 
and “sellers” are working within the same organization, the managers of each division 
have a responsibility to bring efficiency to their own parts and the whole organization 
but do not need to spend time challenging each other over prices. Another example, 
MyCSP, the staff payroll, which is now considered routine/transactional, is outsourced 
to Equinity, but that Equinity is the chief shareholder of MyCSP and thus, there is no 
outflow of economic benefits overall and no need for arguing and re-negotiation. Yet, 
despite the ownership issue, the arrangement gives top management of Equinity some 
influences over its different operating units.    
For both types of activities in DHL, there has been a change from transfer pricing (direct 
recharge) to cost allocation (indirect recharge). Although the recharging target has 
changed from internal customers to the head office, the method they use is budget cost 
rate based. The adoption of an activity-based recharging mechanism enables an SSC to 
have clear cost structure and, at the same time, the internal customers to appreciate their 
consumption in each activity. A high level of cost awareness helps the SSC to drive 
internal customers’ good behaviors whilst also raising their own accountabilities. Up 
until 2015, DHL used an activity-based costing principle (based on FTEs applied to 
each activity) to directly recharge internal customers transactional activities with 
monthly adjustment to budgeted numbers. The direct recharging and monthly 
adjustment provide an opportunity for the representatives from the SSCs and their 
customers to challenge each other, about both service quality and service recharging. 
Through this process of discussion, negotiation, and cooperation, efficiency was 
improved. Once this type of recharging and challenge process had been applied over 
several years, the standardization process had been largely complete, in addition, each 
customer of the SSC had built up a good base-line of both their normal consumption 
and the cost for each activity. Consequently, the recharging process has changed from 
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transfer pricing (direct recharge) to cost allocation (indirect recharge). The reason for 
this change is similar to the logic of back-sourcing purchase to pay. After each party 
had internalized its responsibilities, the head office hopes that both SSCs and its internal 
customers will focus more on value-added activities, rather than spending time arguing 
about intra-organizational recharging, a process that will not directly improve the 
profitability of the whole group. Aggregating all the information within the head office 
could potentially enhance management control and coordination over the organization.  
Although there is no changing process in the MyCSP case, the choice of transfer pricing 
and cost allocation is similar to the DHL case. For the service activities included in the 
core contact which have been undertaken for several years, both customers and MyCSP 
are familiar with the service content and process, recharging is enacted through the 
Cabinet Office to customers indirectly (cost allocation approach). However, for the 
additional services required by the departmental employers or individual members, the 
requirements vary, and the recharging numbers also vary. Unsurprisingly, these 
transformational activities are recharged directly to the customers (employers or 
members), in other words, a transfer pricing approach is applied.  
After analyzing the empirical data set from a TCE perspective, it could be seen that 
transactional activities normally have low human asset specificity which means that 
apart from the volume of transactions, the service content and customer requirements 
are barely changed between tasks. For these activities, cost allocation is preferred 
because it is straight forward for SSCs to standardize these types of activities and to 
benchmark them with external parties to improve efficiency and quality. Also, both 
customers and SSC have become aware of the cost driver and cost structure for each 
type of activity and it is less likely for customers to have doubt, about the recharging 
amount. Moreover, if the SSC considers changing the recharging mechanism, they will 
likely start with transactional activities. On the other hand, a transfer pricing approach 
is preferred for the transformational activities as these normally require special 
knowledge (specialized “know-how” gained through training and practice) or are 
customized or require situational knowledge. It is difficult to find a general rule for this 
type of activities. For customized services like the additional services in MyCSP, direct 
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communication is necessary as there is no standardized process.  
8.3.2 Uncertainty and Opportunism  
Uncertainty in an open market requires organizations to be flexible and adapt to changes 
in their business environment, however, internalizing transactions within the 
organization does not remove all the uncertainties. In the SSC context, uncertainty can 
arise from the recharging mechanisms of SSCs in terms of the necessity for 
coordination (Colbert and Spicer, 1995) and adaption. According to TCE, authority 
(hierarchical) relations are used to ensure internal coordination between divisions/ 
departments while in the market, coordination between different contracting parties is 
ensured by the price mechanism (Madhok, 2002). Whether the recharging mechanism 
can actually help to ensure coordination between SSC and its customer business units 
will likely depend on whether the choice of recharging mechanism is mandated by the 
head office or not. In the cases conducted in this research, none of the SSCs had the 
right to choose its recharging mechanism. There are two methods that the head office 
could use to encourage co-ordination at divisional level: 1) monitoring through the 
administrative process, and 2) applying the budget rate/volume rather than actual 
number and ensuring fairness between different business units to avoid conflicts. For 
general financial services, all three SSCs report their costs to the head office each year 
and these numbers reflect how well the SSCs and its customers have collaborated to 
achieve the cost reduction targets that the head office had set for them. Using budget 
numbers motivates the SSCs to collaborate with their customers and to search for means 
of improving efficiencies further. The effect of using this method is significant in AMD 
and MyCSP. The other way is to ensure the fairness of recharging with the help of 
transparent information. For example, the usage of FTEs is accessible to the customers 
of the SSC of DHL Express. By recording all the transaction in one certain system, 
customer units can trace the details of any transaction if they wish. This ensures fairness 
(Eccles, 1983) between different business units within the organization and reduces the 
possibility of conflicts. If there is a conflict between customers and the SSC, then the 
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head office could become involved and play the role of “arbitrator” (Watson and 
Baumler, 1975). Whilst there were no direct examples of this observed in the empirical 
investigation, there were a number of references by interviewees to hypothetical 
intervention by head office. This seems to enforce mutual co-operation as a contractual 
dispute with a third-party vendor and out of step with good internal relations, not least, 
visibility to management and thus, a strong motivation for managers to avoid conflict.  
Uncertainty about transactions also requires adaption to preserve relationships between 
divisions. The recharging mechanism is assumed to change if the organizational 
structure, business environment or customer requirements change. Eccles (1985) 
argued that transfer pricing should be dynamic and adapt to the changes. As recharging 
mechanisms capture the characteristics of transfer pricing, it is also assumed to be 
adaptive, as an external market would be. The change of DHL’s recharging mechanism 
substantiated this. In order to adapt to the change of organizational structure, the 
recharging mechanism changed, so that the recharging for routine (transactional) 
activities now has to be reported to the regional head office of DHL Express (since 
2015). Simplifying the billing procedures, reducing transaction costs and at the same 
time strengthens the management of the head office of DHL Express.  
In the operation of an SSC, most of the uncertainties are not from the external business 
world but from inside of an organization. The application of a known recharging 
mechanism reduces the internal uncertainty because it could be used by the head office 
as a tool encouraging co-operative and interdependent behaviors (Colbert and Spicer, 
1995) and ensuring integration (Watson and Baumler, 1975). At the same time, with the 
change of organizational strategy, structure, customer requirements, the recharging 
mechanism may also be changed (Eccles, 1985).  
8.3.3 Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality reflects the assumption that human ability to process information 
is limited (Jones and Hill, 1988; Simon, 1972). The limit of human ability makes it is 
impossible for the organization to manage unlimited transactions effectively, or forecast 
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all possibilities. Williamson (1975, 1979) uses this factor to explain the incompleteness 
of contracts although it is used here to explain why a simple recharging mechanism will 
likely be favored by the managers. It would appear that one of the most important 
factors that corporate managers consider when they choose the recharging mechanism 
is simplicity as complex recharging mechanisms require a large amount of time for 
managers to understand.  
 Obviously, the (recharging) mechanism that we choose has to be very ‘simple', not 
too complicated. Of course, it has to be measurable; it also should really reflect the 
amount of the efforts that required performing particular services. (MA1, DHL, 
January 2013)  
Generally speaking, the calculation methods behind the recharging amount in the three 
case organizations are all cost-based and relatively simple to implement. AMD 
consolidated all the costs incurred by the SSC during the accounting period and then 
increased it with a modest anticipated tax requirement (5%) to arrive at the total 
recharging amount. DHL base all the recharging on a single basis, i.e. the number of 
FTEs that were used to undertake the activity. The rate for each FTE is fixed in the 
budget but the actual recharging amount will vary s according to the number of FTEs 
employed each year and therefore the volume of activity becomes the focus for the 
client division. The total recharging amount reported to the head office also includes 
the minimum tax payment required by local authorities. MyCSP applied similar 
calculation methods to the recharging amount as DHL, except tax consideration. The 
system measured the time that employees take to undertake each activity and multiply 
that by the rate per hour agreed by the Cabinet Office to reach a total recharging amount. 
Apart from AMD, who only calculate total expenses, the other two case organizations 
base their recharging only on one basis: labor hours. This single base recharging method 
might be criticized by some academic researchers for the possibility of inaccurate 
calculation of costs.  
Another reason for the organization to choose a simple recharging mechanism is 
because the employees of operating units, who probably lack professional financial 
knowledge, have to spend time to understand the calculation method and the basis of 
allocation. It would be difficult for them to find out the usage of the resources and thus 
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find the way to increase efficiency. If a complicated recharging mechanism were to be 
used it may not be effective in driving good behaviors of managers in the business.  
 
The previous three paragraphs have explained the factors driving the implementation 
of different recharging mechanisms in the three cases in relation to contextual factors 
and TCE perspectives. Asset specificity has significant importance to explain the 
organizations’ choice of ‘make or buy’. However, after the organizations choose to 
internalize the support service in a captive SSC, the effects of asset specificity on the 
choice of recharging mechanism are significant. Based on the empirical evidence 
collected in this research, the calculation method of recharging amounts for support 
services does not vary according to different levels of asset specificity (either for 
transactional or transformational activities) and either transfer pricing (direct charge) 
or cost allocation (indirect charge) might be used. The existence of internal 
uncertainties requires the head office to ensure that coordination within the organization 
and in so doing adapt its strategies including the recharging mechanism of SSCs to the 
changing business environment.  
The last perspective, bounded rationality, is found to be closely related to the 
organizations’ choice of calculation basis of recharging amount. Due to human limited 
ability to process information, each organization in this research prefers a simple 
recharging mechanism, which is easy for both SSCs and other business units to 
understand. Complex methods such as ABC, which might provide more accurate cost 
information according to academic scholars, present application difficulties in practice. 
8.4 Agency theory perspective and recharging in SSC 
The purpose of this research is not only to investigate the method of calculating 
recharging figures but also to understand the underlying philosophy of recharging 
process and this should take account of the behavioral effects of recharging. In the 
traditional M-form organization (Williamson, 1985), operational activities are 
delegated to the divisions while corporate-level strategy is still the province of the head 
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office. Although it is possible that cooperative behaviors encouraged by the head office 
are not consistent with the interests of divisional managers and the group overall might 
suffer a loss of efficiency and effectiveness (Baiman, 1990). Chapter 3 has discussed 
the relationship between agency theory and the recharging mechanism applied in SSC. 
The organizational development of the SSC model creates a new agency perspective. 
In addition to the principal-agent relationship between divisional managers and the head 
office, there is also a similar relationship between SSCs and customer divisions. 
Especially when SSCs and customer divisions are geographically apart, the monitoring 
costs of the SSC’s performance could be significant and agency problems such as moral 
hazard might arise. Recharging for support services through either transfer pricing or 
cost allocation could 1) help to establish accountability of both parties, the SSC and 
customer divisions, and 2) enhance central control of the head office, which in turn will 
help to reduce the agency problem within the overall organization. The next sub-section 
will revisit the empirical evidence to identify possible instances of agency problems in 
three case organizations and the control processes used to mitigate the dysfunction 
effects of an agency. 
8.4.1 Possible causes of agency problem  
8.4.1.1 Mandated decisions  
Meer-Kooistra (1994) argued that there are two elements involved in coordinating 
internal transactions. First is the way that authority is signaled, which means whether 
the SSC has the authority to decide its operating strategy with respect to internal 
transactions or not, including the recharging mechanism. Second is the way in which 
the internal transactions themselves are valued by participants.  
None of the SSCs in the case organizations had full autonomy to choose their own 
recharging mechanisms. At AMD, the SSC costs are absorbed by the head office thus, 
the choice of recharging basis (budgeted or actual basis) and recharging targets are all 
mandated by the head office. The AMD’s SSC only provides services to internal 
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customers and it is not possible for them to switch to external service providers. The 
SSCs of DHL Express are all independent legal entities and managers claim that they 
are “quite free in handling things”. Despite the fact that the managers in different 
countries could choose external service providers for transactional activities, they still 
have to get the permission of head office, subject to represent from the SSCs. 
Interestingly, the customers of the SSC acknowledged that the decision to migrate 
supporting service activities to the SSCs is mandated. The situation is similar in MyCSP, 
which does not have the right to set the rate of service as this needs to be negotiated 
with their primary client, the Cabinet Office.  
Vancil (1979) argued that there is a close relationship between the distribution of 
authorities and responsibilities, and the transfer pricing system. In all three cases, the 
decision-making authorities are not delegated to the SSCs which would suggest 
possible agency problems. Firstly, the recharging mechanism that is chosen by head 
office is to ensure compliance with organizational strategy but at the same time to 
encourage cooperative behaviors. If the SSC’s KPIs include financial results, then at 
the same time its recharging mechanisms would not bring financial benefits to the SSC. 
Indeed, the SSC managers might have the motive to pursue their own benefits on the 
costs of the whole organization. For instance, DHL Express has to recharge their 
internal customers on the basis of a budget approved by head office. If the budget 
number is too tight, they might lower the service level to achieve budget number. Yet, 
if the budget is ‘slack’, the managers of the SSC might not have the motivation to 
improve working efficiency because any ‘saving’ will be returned back to the customers 
(in DHL Express). Secondly, it is not generally possible for the customer divisions to 
switch service providers. Although the customers of SSC could benchmark the service 
provided by SSC with that of an external service provider from both cost and quality 
perspectives. If they are not satisfied with the services provided by the SSCs, 
realistically all they could do is to re-negotiate with the SSC or make a representation 
to the head office. The lack of competition and a real market option may reduce 
efficiency. Thirdly, the recharging mechanism should be flexible enough to adapt to a 
changing business environment and customer requirements. As argued by Eccles (1985, 
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p.116) “transfer pricing is not a problem that is solved once and for all, but one that 
needs constant management attention”.     
Thus, centralized decision-making by head office would enhance central control but 
might be the cause of agency problems between the SSC and its customer divisions.  
8.4.1.2 Imbalance in bargaining power 
The SSCs of AMD and MyCSP are somewhat untypical cases in this study, although 
this situation maybe not so unusual given the discussion of SSC forum meetings. 
Although the GSC of AMD is a separate legal entity it essentially functions as part of 
the head office. MyCSP is a joint venture company and now has a majority private 
sector shareholder, although it still has only one client, the Cabinet Office. However, 
the bargaining power between the two parties is inherently imbalanced. For example, 
as a part of the head office, the SSC of AMD could only “accept” the “order” from the 
head office. Although the SSC has achieved the budget every year since establishment 
in 2002, there is still little evidence of complaining about the progressive “tightening” 
of the budget. Alternatively, MyCSP participates in the annual negotiation, the 
decisions about prices were eventually made by the Cabinet Office. As the Cabinet 
Office was the only client for MyCSP, it has no right to walk away during the contract 
period. Such an imbalance in bargaining power leaves little scope for the SSC to pursue 
its own economic interests. That might negatively affect the working enthusiasm of 
employees in SSCs and thus, reducing their service quality.  
8.4.2 Strategies to reduce agency problems 
The possible instances of agency problem in three cases and the behavioral effects of 
recharging for each case were described in previous chapters, the following sub-section 
will analyze these behavioral effects and discuss the common strategies of the three 
case organizations created to avoid agency problems.  
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8.4.2.1 Establishing accountability through transparent information  
Information asymmetry and contractual uncertainty may cause opportunistic behaviors 
whereby one division might increase its own profits on the internal transaction at the 
expense of the other (Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant, 1990). There are two ways 
applied in SSCs of case organizations to raise customers’ cost consciousness and thus, 
establish their accountability: 1) standardize the processes, 2) providing transparent 
information in the system.  
As discussed in previous chapters, one of the important objectives for SSCs to recharge 
its support services is to encourage cost consciousness and to motivate good behaviors 
of customers. This objective assumes that the internal customers understand their 
resource consumption and believe the payment is fair, thus, encouraging them to find 
the ways to improve their efficiency. Standardizing working processes and providing 
transparent information is the first method applied in the cases to reduce agency 
problems. All SSCs represented that they had standardized the working processes and 
thus enabling support service activities to be more readily quantified once process 
variability has been reduced.  
The effects of changing customers’ behaviors are more obvious in DHL Express. The 
details of customers’ consumption on resources become more transparent with 
increasingly enhanced ERP system capabilities to provide a very detailed single source 
of the transactions. After transferring support services to SSCs, the DHL Express 
business countries must pay for their usage of support services. At the same time, they 
expect service improvement and to compare the costs with the past. If they now seek 
higher quality services at lower cost (compared to the costs of undertaking the services 
within countries), they have also to improve their own efficiency and cooperate with 
the SSCs. For instance, the SSCs of DHL Express uses budgeted cost rate to recharge 
its financial services. If fewer FTEs are used, the costs recharged will be lower. Thus, 
customers could directly benefit from their ‘good’ behaviors and this provides the 
incentives for them to cooperate with the SSC.  
The effects of transparent information do not only influence the behaviors of the 
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customers of SSCs but also influence the SSCs themselves. As the agents of both the 
head office and internal customers, the managers of SSC could also be assumed to be 
motivated by self-interest, according to agency theory (Baiman, 1990). For example, 
the SSCs might have opportunistic behaviors through information asymmetry (Noreen, 
1988). However, as discussed before, the application of the ERP system and the process 
of standardization makes it difficult for the SSCs to hide information from either the 
head office or other customer business units. In DHL Express, the SSCs’ customers 
reported that they know very clearly the rate per FTE and the number of FTEs that are 
used on their work. Some of managers frequently visit the SSCs and know directly the 
specific employee that deal with the activities of their units. At the same time, by 
benchmarking the SSC’s services with third-party – BPO vendors (from both cost and 
quality perspectives), customers might be in a position to put pressure on the SSCs to 
improve their efficiency, year-on-year. 
Recharging also motivates the SSCs to take ownership of the real cost of services. For 
example, by fully understanding these elements, the SSCs of DHL Express can 
understand the activities that actually drives costs or causes wastage and can seek to 
improve work processes. This makes the structure of support service costs more clear 
and transparent to both head office and the customer business units that benefit from 
the support services. 
8.4.2.2 Central control of head office 
The previous sections have argued that mandating moving finance activities to the SSC 
with full-cost recharging mechanisms might lead to agency problems. However, direct 
supervision by the head office could also be used to reduce the agency problem and 
minimize agency costs. Watson and Baumler (1975) argued that placing transfer pricing 
in an organizational context creates a means to achieve differentiation and also integrate 
diverse units within the organization. They argued that transfer pricing is necessary for 
multi-divisional or multi-national companies to measure divisional/regional 
profitability (Dean, 1955; McAulay and Tomskins, 1992). All of three case 
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organizations in this study have inter-divisional transactions of services (inter-
organizational transactions in MyCSP), which raises transfer pricing or cost allocation 
issues. The chosen recharging mechanism should not only enable a fair reflection of 
regional profitability but should also align with the overall organizational strategy. At 
any one time, the relationship between different business units within one organization 
is essentially inter-dependent. The recharging mechanism also plays a role in the 
integration process to motivate employees to achieve overall organizational goals 
(Watson and Baumler, 1975; Spicer, 1988; McAulay and Tomskins, 1992) and requires 
the intervention head office (Spicer, 1992).  
There are two primary means of control found in the case organizations: outcome 
control and behavioral control (Dekker, 2004). Outcome control of all three case 
organizations is reflected by the ultimate cost reduction goals and budgets set by the 
respective head office. The use of a budgeting system could help to make agents’ 
behaviors transparent to the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989) and thus, mitigate any 
efficiency loss caused by agency problem (Baiman, 1990). The cost reduction targets 
set a direction to the SSCs and also to their customers (Das & Teng, 1998). For instance, 
the SSC of AMD has to operate strictly under the budget (which reduces continuously 
every year) and against its direct charge to the head office. MyCSP is operating with a 
budget rate which is negotiated between MyCSP and Cabinet Office and has to beat 
budget to make a profit. The case DHL Express is a little different. Before 2015, 
negotiations about recharging only happen between the SSCs and customer business 
units. The role played by the head office is more as a monitor: intervening only when 
there is a serious disagreement or conflict between SSCs and customer business units. 
However, after 2015, direct central control was strengthened to some extent. Now, the 
head office negotiates with the SSCs on behalf of service purchasing countries. By 
monitoring the SSCs’ performance and the behaviors of its managers' agency problems 
are reduced, and customer divisions are more focused on their core competencies. 
Behavioral control is represented by the daily monitoring of SSCs' behaviors through 
organizational regulations, rules, and standardized procedures. In the case 
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organizations, especially in AMD where the researcher was fortunate to have access to 
the CFO of the corporate group, the behavioral control is explicit. The corporate head 
office plays the role of “arbitrator”. Managers from the AMD GSC and its internal 
customers enjoy the autonomy to negotiate their arrangements about the type of 
services, major KPIs and other terms but the head office sets the boundaries of these 
activities and provide intervention when it is needed. The pre-condition of this 
arbitration process is that each business unit within AMD does its own “independent 
reporting” to the corporate, which enables the corporate head office to have a good 
knowledge of local information. As the head office of AMD reflects the interests of top 
management, it resolves the conflicts over internal transactions. In practice, 
maximizing overall profitability is the concern of most organizational management 
thus, it is critical for managers to use a recharging mechanism as a “routine and 
standardized process” to achieve integration and ensure the head office’s control 
(Watson and Baumler, 1975). In DHL, there was monthly adjustment before 2015, 
which gives the internal customers a monthly chance to exchange the information with 
the SSC and thus, to monitor the behavior of the SSC. Although after 2015, the 
frequency of adjustment became annual, but it was reported the monitoring effect of 
customer is not weakened. In every year, there is four to five months period for the 
customer to negotiate the service quality and recharging figure with the regional head 
office, which is also one type of behavioral control from customers. 
8.4.2.3 Performance measurement and reward system 
Eccles’s framework (1985) suggests that transfer pricing policy relates closely to the 
performance measurement, evaluation and reward system of the organization. Vancil’s 
research (1979) found that the financial measurement and evaluation system determines 
the way that both revenue and costs are charged to the respective profit center. As 
explained before, if the performance of SSCs is only measured by financial results, such 
as the annual cost reduction percentage, the SSC managers might lower the service 
quality to achieve this. If the views of customers or the head office are also included in 
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the performance measurement of the SSC, then this problem could be largely avoided.  
In both AMD and DHL cases, many customer-related KPIs are included in the SLAs 
signed between the SSCs and their customers. For example, in AMD, there is “First 
Pass Yield” to ensure the quality of service provided by the SSC. In addition, quarterly 
meetings between the SSC and its customers are held to check the quality of services 
provided by the SSC. The representatives of head office (sometime the CFO personally) 
visit the customer facilities of SSC frequently every year to discuss their feedback. In 
the other case organization, DHL Express, customer satisfaction is also one of the 
important performance indicators. There is a monthly call between the managers of 
both the SSC and their client countries. The requirement of customer satisfaction for 
the CoE of DHL Express is 98%. If it is lower the 98%, the bonus of CoE’s managers 
will be negatively affected. Relating customer satisfaction to performance measurement 
requires the SSC to put customers at the center of its operation. Meeting the customer 
requirement at lower costs becomes the priority of the SSCs. MyCSP has to produce a 
monthly service report to the Cabinet Office, with a qualitative-view of all-around 
services. There will be a financial penalty if any pre-determined service level is not 
achieved. Also, these service levels are closely related to the assessment of MyCSP’s 
employees’ daily work.  
Evidence of reward mechanisms is also found in the case organizations. For example, 
the bonus awarded to higher-level managers in both the SSC of AMD and DHL Express 
relates to both the performance of SSCs and performance of the whole organization. 
The higher the level of employees, the higher the performance-related proportion. At 
MyCSP, the innovative social ownership structure should further help to motivate 
employees (25% of shares are owned by trustee company on behalf of employees) 
thereby aligning the interests of the Cabinet Office, and top management and employees 
of MyCSP.   
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8.5 Summary 
This chapter started from the governance aspiration framework that developed in 
Chapter 3. Three case organizations in this research have different degrees of 
hierarchical orientation or market orientation, and particularly in the case of DHL, at 
different times. Differences in the ways of governing internal transactions lead to 
different recharging mechanisms. The strong hierarchy governance model applies in 
AMD minimize the agency problem that might otherwise occur by following a “not 
recharging” strategy. Although cost information of SSC is effectively hidden, the direct 
supervision of the head office helps to ensure that each business unit works towards the 
best interests of the whole organization. The situation in DHL is different. Hence, the 
SSC and its customers are bounded by contracts but are actually in a market-based 
relationship. But both the governance orientation and the recharging mechanism 
progresses over time to become more hierarchical. MyCSP is different again, with the 
introduction of private sector shareholder and an innovative ownership model, it is 
becoming more commercial in its language and attitude. Three characteristics of 
transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty, and bounded rationality) might lead to the 
different choice of recharging mechanism. For transactional activities with high 
frequency and low uncertainty, cost allocation would be preferred. For transformational 
activities, transfer pricing which requires direct recharging would be preferred. The 
agency problem could be avoided through the standardization of working process, 
transparent information shared in the single system and the use of budgeting system. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction  
This study was conducted for two purposes. First, to explore how SSCs recharge the 
cost of providing support services, either by the transfer pricing or cost allocation 
approaches. Second, to consider the behavioral effects arising from the choice of 
recharging mechanism(s) actually applied. This issue has been raised by a number of 
consulting companies such as Deloitte (2006, 2013) and KMPG (2007) as one of the 
key drivers to the success of shared services but the academic research in this field is 
lacking. Three case studies had been selected to explore the implementation of 
recharging mechanisms within the context of the SSC model and its setting within the 
multi-divisional form of organization. 
Specifically, the thesis contributes to transfer pricing and cost allocation literature by 
developing an integrated transaction cost economics/agency theory perspective to 
explain the behavioral effects of the recharging mechanism in a new organizational 
context – the SSC model. The thesis has argued for a synthesis between theories of cost 
allocation and transfer pricing. In doing so it supports the argument of Horngren and 
Foster (1987) that “all cost allocation is a form of transfer pricing” (p 836). Moreover, 
the recharging mechanisms are found not to be static but dynamic.   
This chapter starts with the summary of the main findings of the study. Following that, 
the theoretical contribution together with potential practical implications are presented. 
Finally, some limitations of the research are noted along with some suggestions for 
further research. 
9.2 Main empirical findings of the study 
The SSCs of three case organizations, two commercial, multinational companies and 
one UK-based company in the public sector, all apply a cost-based recharging 
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mechanism, no matter which stage of maturity they have reached as an SSC. Based on 
the empirical evidence, the governance aspiration of each organization is found to have 
significant influence in an SSC’s choice of recharging mechanism, including the basis 
for calculating the charge (e.g. budget/actual costs and budget/actual activity volume) 
and the target cost reduction/operating performance expected. The influence on the 
behavior of managers in client divisions and in the SSC arising from the choice of 
recharging method is confirmed in the case organizations.  
The details of the empirical findings of the case study are summarized below, in line 
with the two research questions developed towards the end of Chapter 1.  
1. To what extent do SSCs charge their costs to client units? In doing so are incurred 
costs simply allocated on a broad-brush basis or is a transfer pricing mechanism used 
to position professional support services as an internal market? 
Some consulting companies identified various recharging mechanisms, such as no 
specific allocation, budgeted rate, activity-based costing, full direct recharging and 
market-based costing (e.g. Quinn, Cooke and Kris, 2000; Bergeron, 2003; Deloitte, 
2007). In their illustrative life cycle of a typical SSC, Quinn, Cooke, and Kris (2000) 
indicated that the recharging mechanism would typically evolve from a cost-based to a 
market-based one across the four stages of a continuum of development. In this study, 
the following practices were observed.  
• At AMD, the actual costs incurred by the SSC are absorbed by the head office 
in the US without any further allocation to customer business units. The 
significant finding here is that whilst there is no direct allocation to divisions.  
• The SSC of DHL started with a very explicit transfer pricing approach for 
transactional services, based on budgeted cost rates and volumes. Any overall 
shortfall/surplus would be distributed across all divisions. Upon maturity in 
2015 (diminishing efficiency gains) a broad brush cost allocation approach, 
through the head office to divisions was adopted. As transformational services 
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started their own SSC journey, transfer pricing was used to encourage rapid 
change in management behavior and also changed to cost allocation approach.  
• MyCSP is another interesting situation because the whole organization acts as 
an SSC and is underpinned by an innovative mixed shareholder model 
(Government, private equity and employees). Recharges for the core contract 
are based on decreasing annual budgets and additional service based on a pre-
determined rate. The recharging for services covered in the core contract is paid 
by the Cabinet Office and any additional services that are required by employers 
(customer government department) or members (individual employee) are paid 
directly by himself/herself/itself. 
All three SSCs in the study had been incorporated as separate legal entities and had 
operated for more than five years, yet at AMD it still seemed to be treated as an 
extension of the head office instead of as separate business units, and thus, at variance 
with the progression expected in Quinn, Cooke, and Kris (2000). Indeed, in both cases 
of AMD and DHL, the use of the SSC for transactional activities and the choice of 
recharge mechanism(s) are mandated by the head office. In contrast, at MyCSP the 
recharging mechanism is based on an annual negotiation between MyCSP and the lead 
client, the Cabinet Office, despite the negotiation power being somewhat asymmetric. 
The two multinational companies have essentially off-shored their respective SSC 
operations and to avoid criticism around the global distribution of taxable profit, a 
modest mark-up is added to the total SSC cost to cover the requirement to pay local 
taxes. Generally, the recharging mechanisms applied in both commercial organizations, 
AMD and DHL are cost-based and, there are no plans for them to add a profit mark-up 
to SSC recharges. At DHL a further means of reinforcing the psychology of the market 
is to talk about the need for the SSC to achieve ‘zero-profit', as opposed to ‘breaking 
even'. The former term sounds positive, purposeful and commercial, the latter might 
appear to be merely the result of efficient cost allocation by back-office accountants. 
Interestingly, at MyCSP services are charged at the agreed budgeted cost rate and profit 
derives from beating budget, thus, none makes a profit out of government except by 
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virtue of innovation in delivery. Again, the recharging method and mechanisms are as 
much about psychology, in this case, the government accounting to the people and 
creating savings rather than paying profits to commercial firms for work previously 
undertaken by civil servants. 
The decision to use a cost-based mechanism is consistent with some of the empirical-
based research on transfer pricing (Vancil,1978; Tang, 1979). There could be several 
reasons for this. First, it could arise due to bounded rationality on the part of the 
organizations, especially the scope of divisional managers to understand and indeed 
engage with complex recharges for what are to them fringe parts of their world 
(Williamson, 1985). Hence, a simple and understandable cost allocation is preferred. 
Second, for more heterogeneous activities such as management accounting, an external 
perfectly competitive market is rare (Collier, 2003) and activity volumes are difficult 
to measure other than in broad brush assumptions such as ‘number of FTEs. Third, in 
the scheme of the overall value chain, SSCs are still treated as cost centers (KPMG, 
2007).  
2. How does the choice of recharging mechanism effect management behavior in the 
SSC and client divisions?  
The three cases show that the choice regarding the recharging mechanism in an SSC 
varies over time and according to different organizational contexts, not least the need 
to align with the overall organizational strategy and governance mode. AMD, as a 
highly vertically integrated company (in silicon chip manufacturing), chose to absorb 
the costs of the SSC centrally, rather than to recharge them. Such a process of central 
absorption reflects the orientation towards hierarchical governance within the company. 
DHL is a good example of a global company with many interdependent local customer-
facing units and overarching network facilities, e.g. airplanes. Branches in each country 
operate independently, cross charging is a feature of commercial life. Customers 
purchase some specific services from the SSCs and pay them directly based on the 
negotiated budget rate. This would reflect the market style of the recharging mechanism 
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applied in DHL. However, in 2015 the SSC strategy moved back to a more hierarchical 
model, with recharging the costs of financial support service to the head office. MyCSP 
operates as an independent business unit and seeks to grow as a commercial business 
by adding new clients and expanding their service offering in the future. Although it 
provides services to only one client at this stage, albeit to many individual customers, 
the recharging mechanism leaves scope for them to make profits from additional 
efficiency savings.   
Watson and Baumler (1975) proposed that transfer pricing policies can not only 
enhance differentiation (by allowing local adaptation and governance) but also 
facilitates organization integration (through corporate standardization of systems and 
procedures). This study confirms this proposition by showing that recharging for the 
use of support services to customer business units is a type of governance which helps 
to ensure and maintain the control held by the head office and encourage the 
coordination between an SSC and its customer business units. 
The empirical data from the cases show that applying transfer pricing approach (direct 
recharging for support services provided by an SSC) increases awareness of resource 
consumption in customer business units, and underscores managers’ responsibility to 
contribute to performance improvement of both the SSC and the whole organization. 
Nonetheless, even if recharging is indirect, i.e. through the head office, then behavioral 
influence on business managers can still be effective because the operation of the 
detailed SLA enables them to feel involved in the performance of the SSC and head 
office can intervene directly to raise cost-consciousness as appropriate on the part of 
SSC and/or divisional managers. It is such visibility, or at least the threat of visibility, 
that ensures customers’ awareness of cost and encourages them to be proactive in 
monitoring and improving efficiency.   
What seems to be different between the three cases and historical transfer pricing/cost 
allocation literature is the greater transparency of information provided by the ERP 
system about activities and costs and the ability of head office to ‘see’ into the system 
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and to direct resources to system improvement and pull recalcitrant managers into line, 
even when recharges are neither direct to the business unit or based upon actual prices.  
To ensure success in the application of a recharging mechanism (either cost allocation 
or transfer pricing approach), a good level of governance has to be maintained. All of 
the SSCs in the three case studies sign SLAs with their customers and use relational 
governance as a complement to the more contractual arrangements (Popper and Zenger, 
2002; Goo, Kishore, Rao and Nam, 2009).  
9.3 Theoretical contribution and potential practical 
implications 
9.3.1 Theoretical contributions 
A synthesis of transfer pricing and cost allocation theories 
One of the important contributions that this study makes to management accounting 
theories is a synthesis of transfer pricing and cost allocation literature in a support 
service context. Normally, these are treated as separate topics in management 
accounting teaching and academic research. However, when transfer pricing is used to 
reflect the economic value of internal support services and there is no substantive profit 
element leveled directly, it can be difficult to distinguish transfer pricing from cost 
allocation. Emmanuel, Otley, and Merchant (1985) argued that transfer pricing and cost 
allocation are "incorrigible twins" (p.193), whilst Horngren and Foster (1987) treated 
cost allocation as a form of transfer pricing. Recharging methods and mechanisms for 
support services provided by an SSC captures the characteristics of both transfer pricing 
and cost allocation, even when they are ostensibly used separately. If a wider 
perspective is taken over time then it can be argued that the two methods merely 
represent different points on a continuum of methods that first seeks to signal change 
and galvanize action ‘contractually’ and then foster more collaborative optimization of 
systems and cost in a more relational style (for example, transfer pricing followed by 
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cost allocation at DHL, post 2015). Within its overall mix of SSC types, recharge 
methods, and the use of BPO vendors and market benchmarking to create exposure to 
the external market, DHL could be viewed as a hybrid model of both the externalization 
of the finance function and internal recharging. 
The costs incurred by an SSC are part of the central service costs which should be 
allocated "to make divisional managers aware that central costs exist and must be 
covered by divisional profits" (Ramadan, 1989). At the same time, an SSC is expected 
to operate as an independent business unit (Quinn et al., 2000) which means that if it 
directly charges customers, the internal transfer of support services is essentially a 
transfer pricing issue, especially when the intra-company's transfer of services is cross-
board. With the investigation of the application of the recharging mechanism by an 
SSC, this study synthesizes cost allocation and transfer pricing theories by identifying 
instances of: 
- change in methods over time – a processual view; 
- mixed methods within a portfolio of change management approach; 
- complementary external benchmarking; 
- efficiency increases through detailed SLAs  
- psychological framing involving the assumed use of sophisticated market pricing 
mechanisms underscored by greater head office scrutiny through better ERP systems.   
In a U-form organization with a number of functioning departments or an MDF 
organization with several divisions, a certain degree of interdependence between 
departments/divisions could be observed. This interdependence can be handled by 
either cost allocation or transfer pricing (Emmanuel et al., 1990). No allocation means 
the central costs are kept within the head office which means that the 
departmental/divisional managers have no control of it. If the central costs are allocated 
to departments/divisions, the departmental/divisional managers will realize their 
responsibility for the costs. Even though the departmental/divisional managers do not 
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have control over the allocation amounts, they could still challenge or question them 
based on the use they make of the central services and performance levels. This shows 
that cost allocation has a counterpart in transfer pricing (Emmanuel et al., 1990). Both 
cost allocation and transfer pricing affect the performance measurement of different 
departments/divisions and thus are expected to influence the behaviors of subordinates 
(Zimmerman, 1979; Watson and Baumler, 1975; Eccles, 1985). In an organization with 
several responsibility centers (including SSCs), decision-making authorities are 
delegated to subordinates. As a service provider, an SSC performs service tasks on 
behalf of its internal customer and as one of the subordinates, the SSC is also operating 
as an agent of the head office which represents the owners of the organization – this 
creates an agency problem. Agents are supposed to act in the best interests of principals. 
However, based on the basic assumption of neo-economics that individuals are 
motivated by self-interest, it is possible that the manager of an SSC may make sub-
optimal decisions and pursue his/her own interests at the cost of the principal’s benefits. 
Both allocating central costs (Zimmerman, 1979) and transfer pricing (Eccles 1983, 
1985; Spicer, 1988) are related to the financial performance of selling and buying 
business units and could cause sub-optimization. The recharging for support services 
provided by the SSC captures the characteristics of both cost allocation and transfer 
pricing, thus it also aims to reduce agency costs and prevent sub-optimization, which is 
confirmed by this study.  
Dynamic recharging mechanism  
The empirical evidence of this research confirms that the application of the recharging 
mechanism is contingent upon different organizational factors. Moreover, the case of 
DHL shows that the recharging mechanism does not remain static but is dynamic. Some 
academic scholars, such as Eccles (1985), Emmanuel and Mehafdi (1994) and Colbert 
and Spicer (1995), suggest that transfer pricing policy changes to be responsive to 
changes in strategy, structure, a degree of transaction specific investment and 
exogenous factors like a change of tax and legal requirements. In terms of cost 
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allocation, if the activity volumes upon which the cost allocation methods are based on 
change, it is likely that the cost allocation method will also need to change. Since 
recharging for support services provided by SSCs captures the characteristics of both 
cost allocation and transfer pricing, it is also assumed to be dynamic.  
For example, in DHL Express, in contrast to the propositions made by some SSC 
researchers (Quinn, Cooke, and Kris, 2000; Bergeron, 2003), the recharging 
mechanism applied by the financial SSCs in DHL has become more hierarchy-based. 
In January 2015, as the financial SSCs were moved from DHL Global Business 
Services (GBS), the recharging mechanism was changed. The costs of both general 
financial services and management accounting activities provided by SSC are no longer 
recharged directly to the internal customers but are instead charged to the regional head 
office. This not only reflected the change of organizational structure but also the 
strategic nature of internal trade (Spicer, 1988). This change requires the financial SSCs 
to consider themselves as part of a more integrated system and more trust-based 
cooperation between SSCs and its clients is necessary. 
The contribution of this finding is to extend the contingent approach to the dynamic 
analysis of recharging mechanism. The research of recharging mechanisms should not 
only be based on static analysis but should also change over time. However, due to the 
limited number of cases conducted in this research, it could not be concluded as to 
whether the recharging mechanisms in the wider SSC community are likely to become 
more market-based or more hierarchy-based. 
Reducing agency problem in SSC context 
The focus of this study was not only to identify how the SSC recharges for its services 
but also to explore the different methods of recharging processes and consequent 
behavioral effects. The recharging mechanism is found to be an important type of 
governance that the organization can implement to reduce agency problems raised by 
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setting up captive SSCs. In order to drive good behaviors, there are four ways that 
organizations could benefit:   
• Ensure the transparency of information and establish accountability: using one 
system through the organization and standardizing operation procedures are 
found functioning in all three cases. Showing information like the achievements 
of KPIs and detail of recharging raise the cost consciousness of customers and 
thus, clarify their accountability and help them to reduce waste and improve 
efficiency. 
• Enhance central control: setting the goal (Das & Teng, 1988) such as cost 
reduction target for both SSC and its internal customers could ensure the 
alignment between divisional and overall organizational goals. Other behavioral 
controls such as monitoring of daily operation through the system and strategic 
intervention when conflicts between SSC and its customers arise could also help 
to reduce agency problem.  
• Using budgeting system (Das & Teng, 1988): setting annual budget volumes 
rates suggest that SSCs should comply with the SLA and cost reduction targets 
based on the negotiation between the SSC and its internal customers, with or 
without the intervention of the head office. 
• Performance monitoring and reward system (Eccles, 1985): link the rewards 
given to the managers of the SSCs with customer satisfaction, the performance 
of the SSC and the performance of the whole organization.  
 
9.3.2 Potential practical implications 
Based on the data collected from the three empirical case organizations, this study not 
only focuses on the recharging processes themselves but also frames them in an 
organizational context with reference to several organizational variables such as the 
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strategy and structure of the organizations, the governance aspirations (hierarchical or 
market), performance measurement and reward systems and the use of budget control. 
Despite the three cases in this study having applied different recharging mechanisms, 
the findings could provide practical guidance for organizations that have captive SSCs. 
Recharging do increase the cost consciousness of customer divisions. There is no 
‘optimal’ recharging mechanism because the application of a recharging mechanism is 
contingent upon various organizational factors, as mentioned above. However, for the 
case organizations that do recharge the costs of SSCs to internal customers, the good 
influences on the behaviors of customers were reported by managers, especially for 
those SSCs that directly recharge their customers. Fewer resources employed by 
customer divisions, fewer they would pay. Direct recharging or instant adjustment of 
budgeted number raise the cost consciousness of customer divisions and thus, their 
accountability of cooperating with SSCs such as providing high-quality information. 
For those SSCs that have already finished the migration stage, applying recharging 
mechanism would help them to further reduce costs and improve efficiency and 
effectiveness. Moreover, frequent communication between SSC and its customers is 
necessary to reduce information asymmetry. By doing so, the customers of SSC could 
also monitor the behavior of SSC and encourage SSC to improve its service quality. 
Setting up SSC and recharging for support services are helpful to enhance central 
control of top management. As observed in case organizations, the head office 
normally gathers the recharging information of SSC to monitor the behaviors of other 
service consuming divisions. For example, in AMD, the CFO admitted that the 
establishment of the SSC is to enhance the control of corporate and help the governance 
and compliance of the organization. In DHL, the recharging mechanism changed from 
transfer pricing approach to cost allocation approach, which is adapted to the change of 
organizational structure. This change reduces internal transaction costs and has the head 
office to take a lead again. This might be inconsistent with the suggestions of 
practitioners like Bergeron (2003) but for those companies that keen to keep their SSCs 
captive, they could follow the pathway of DHL.    
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9.4 Limitations of the study 
Even though this study has made some theoretical contributions (as mentioned above), 
it is subject to several limitations. Firstly, this research is based on three case studies, 
including two multinational commercial companies and one UK-based public sector 
organization. Each case has its own business and organizational context and thus the 
results might be difficult to be generalized to other commercial companies or public 
sector organizations that have captive SSCs. However, the focus of this research is to 
investigate the recharging process for support services provided by an SSC, including 
the behavioral effects of the recharging process in an organizational context. It has an 
exploratory purpose instead of finding a context-free generalized rule.  
Secondly, due to limited access to the head office and internal customer business units, 
most of the information collected in the cases has been provided by the employees of 
SSCs. However, in AMD, as the researcher was fortunate to interview the CFO of the 
group, which accessed information from the head office’s point of view and in DHL, 
the researcher contacted two representatives from a customer perspective. It should be 
stressed that the issues of cross-charging for services and making efficiency savings 
within multi-national companies is extremely sensitive and the researcher had to accept 
that there came a point when further probing was likely to create more negative 
reactions than contribute insight.   
The analysis of MyCSP case was essentially reliant on the information supplied by the 
SSC and the general lack of access to both the head office and internal customers for 
all the three cases indicates that the information gathered for some cases in this study 
tends to provide a somewhat one-dimensional view of the recharging problem at times. 
The feedback of both internal customers and head office would provide a more 
comprehensive view for the investigation into the recharging mechanism, in light of 
transaction cost economies and the agency theory.  
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9.5 Suggestions for future research 
This study was undertaken to explore how the recharging mechanism is used in an SSC 
context and the behavioral effects of applying the recharging mechanism. Although 
there are several limitations to this study which are mentioned in the previous section, 
these limitations can lead to suggestions for future research. 
Firstly, given the exploratory purpose of this study, only three case studies were 
conducted and essentially finance SSCs were the focus of study. In the future, 
functionalist researches, based on a large number of sample organizations, could be 
conducted in order to explore which mechanism is chosen to recharge the costs incurred 
by SSCs by consulting companies (KPMG, 2007, Deloitte, 2006, 2013). Moreover, the 
research could be extended to investigate the causal relationship between organizational 
factors and the choice of recharging mechanism.  
Secondly, as the SSC/BPO sector matures it is expected that tax and local regulation of 
labor markets will play an increasing role in recharging practice in most multinational 
organizations; as service center work is digitalized and off-shored. Presently, much 
information about income shifting and potential tax avoidance tends to be confidential 
and whilst this creates difficulties for researchers there could be more information 
available in the public domain, for example, the way in which Apple's service center 
operations in Ireland have been investigated by the European Commission. 
Thirdly, one of the contributions of this research is to move from static analysis and 
treat the recharging mechanism as a more adaptive/dynamic process (e.g. DHL’s 
change from transfer pricing to cost allocation approach). However, since the purpose 
of this research is to explore the recharging mechanism generally, the underlying 
reasons that might cause the changes of recharging mechanism are not discussed in 
detail. A longitudinal study of one SSC could be conducted to find the determinants of 
recharging mechanism changes.  
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Finally, one of the limitations of this study is that it provides a one-dimensional view 
of the recharging mechanism. Recharging the costs of SSCs to service purchasing 
business units not only generates revenue that helps SSCs to cover operating expenses 
but it also incurs costs to the customers which influence their financial performance and 
their managerial behavior. More information provided by the customer business units 
will be extremely valuable in allowing behavioral investigation of the recharging 
mechanism. At the same time, in order to understand the relationship between the 
recharging mechanism, organizational strategy and structure and how the recharging 
mechanism applied by SSCs helps enforce the control held by the head office, getting 
access to the head office managers would provide a useful opportunity to further 
triangulate views across the various actors in MDF organizations.  
To conclude, in order to understand the recharging mechanism applied in SSCs, this 
study provides a synthesis of transfer pricing and cost allocation theories. Moreover, 
this study extends the organizational theory of transfer pricing and cost allocation to 
investigate the ways used in case organizations to reduce agency problems. The purpose 
of this research is to explore the implementation of the recharging mechanism in SSCs 
through the use of empirical observations. This provides the foundations to further 
research to illustrate the application of transfer pricing and cost allocation in a new 
organizational context: an SSC. 
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Appendix  
1. List of Hypothesis in Spicer (1988) 
Hypothesis 1. Strategy, structure and the dimensions of intra-firm transfers 
The dimensions of intra-firm transfers of intermediate product are jointly related to a 
firm’s diversification strategy, its product design and its organization structure. 
Hypothesis 2. Centralized control of the make-or-buy decision 
The greater: (1) the degree of transaction specific investment, (2) the frequency and 
volume, and (3) the degree of uncertainty and/or complexity associated with intra-firm 
transactions, the stronger will be the firm’s interests in centrally controlling the make-
or-buy decision.  
Hypothesis 3. Existence of arbitration process 
The greater: (1) the degree of transaction specific investment, (2) the frequency and 
volume, and (3) the degree of uncertainty and/or complexity associated with intra-firm 
transactions, the more likely it is that the firm will have well specified arbitration 
procedures to safeguard the firm’s interest in the make-or-buy decision.  
Hypothesis 4. Performance measurement and incentives 
The greater: (1) the degree of transactions specific investment, (2) the frequency and 
volume, and (3) the degree of uncertainty and/or complexity associated with intra-firm 
transactions, the more likely it is that the firm will deemphasize performance 
measurement and incentive mechanisms that focus entirely on divisional profitability, 
in favor of broader measures and incentives that recoganize the need for cooperation 
and adaptation.  
Hypothesis 5. Conflict  
 189 
Hypothesis 5a. The greater (1) the degree of transactions specific investment, (2) the 
frequency and volume, and (3) the degree of uncertainty and/or complexity associated 
with intra-firm transactions, the more likely is conflict between divisional managers 
involved in internal transfers of intermediate products.  
Hypothesis 5b. Conflict between divisions involved in intra-firm transfers of 
intermediate product is more likely for ex-post proposals for transfer pricing 
adjustments than it is for ex-post proposals for quantity adjustments.  
Hypothesis 6. Transfer pricing policies 
Hypothesis 6a. Where standardized intermediate products are the subject of the transfer, 
or the transfer involves products for which the degree of customization is minor, market 
prices will be the primary basis for setting internal transfer prices and for profit center 
managers choosing between internal and external suppliers and customers.  
Hypothesis 6b. Where the internally transferred intermediate product involves a 
moderate degree of customization and a material transaction-specific investment, 
internal manufacturing costs will play a greater role in the initial negotiation to set 
transfer prices and in ex-post proposals to adjust them. 
Hypothesis 6c. Where the internally transferred intermediate product is idiosyncratic 
and involves a large investment in transaction-specific human and/or physical capital, 
internal manufacturing costs will be the primary basis for setting prices; and there will 
be strong central control over the make-or-buy decision. 
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2. Details of interviewees in each case  
2.1 Interviewees in AMD case 
Participants in the group discussion 
Name Position Department 
FD1 Finance Director OTC 
FD2 Finance Director PTP 
MF 1 Financial Accounting 
Manager 
Disti Ops 
MF 2 Financial Accounting 
Manager 
GAFS PNG-AP Support 
TM1  Tax Manager Global Tax Services & 
CCR 
MA1  Financial Accounting 
Manager 
GAFS-BIZ ANALYTICS 
MA 2 Finance Manager GAFS-PNG_AR & Global 
Credit Ops 
IT1 Sect. Manager IT GAFS PNG-AP Support 
 
Other interviewees 
FA1 Vice president  Global Service Centre 
FA2 CFO AMD (the corporate/head 
office)  
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2.2 Interviewees in DHL case                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Name Position  Department Interview time 
MA 1 CFO DHL GBS Asia-
Pacific 
January 2013 
MA2 CFO DHL Express CoE  May 2015 
August 2015 
May 2018 
MA 3 CFO DHL Express Fssc 
Western European 
August 2015 
MA 4 Senior Controller  DHL CoE August 2015 
MA 5  Manager  DHL Express 
Global Pricing 
department 
August 2015 
MA 6 Junior Controller DHL CoE August 2015 
MA7  Head of 
Controlling 
DHL Express UK July 2018 
MA 8  CFO DHL Express 
Finland 
July 2018 
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2.3 Interviewees in MyCSP Case  
FA1 Financial Controller of MyCSP 
FA2 General Manager of MyCSP 
Some informal discussions with the related staff were also undertaken, which were not 
officially recorded. But some information is included in the case chapter. 
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